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MODERN GREEK GOVERNMENT

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I. The Basic Framework

MODERN Greeks are proud to remind you that their ancient forbears twenty-five hundred years ago and more invented democracy and that from them came the precepts of self-government which were diffused throughout the world and down through the ages. Be that as it may, present-day Greeks are having a hard time making *their* democratic institutions work. The ones they have, however, came to them not directly from classical times, but through the good offices of the West. Their operation and effectiveness, therefore, should be of great interest to Americans, who in the twentieth century have resolved by word and deed to save the world for democracy and oppose the rising tide of totalitarianism.

When the Greek state was finally established in 1833, a new and artificial entity was created. Greeks had never before been organized as a nation. During the four centuries since the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, they along with other Balkan peoples were under the Turkish yoke. From 330 A.D., when Emperor Constantine the Great moved the capital of the Roman imperium to the shores of the Bosphorus, until 1453, Greece had been a part of the Byzantine, sometimes called the Eastern Roman, Empire, although from 1204 Franks and Venetians had occupied large sections of Greece and the islands. While Greek was the official language of this empire, Greeks seldom dominated or were in the majority. During its long sway, it had included a vast array of racial elements including Armenians, Slavs, Bulgars, Italians, Syrians, Egyptians, as well as Greeks and a host of others long since forgotten. During the fifteen hundred years before 330 A.D. back to the sack of Troy by Homer's heroes the political reality in Greece was the city state, sometimes sovereign and free, sometimes dominated by stronger powers: neighboring city states, Macedonia or Rome. The concept of national unity on which the present State rests assumes that

the Greeks should be both politically united and racially exclusive, which they never were before.

The present State is strictly Western in character and organization, fashioned after the early nineteenth century European model which included a written *Constitution*, a *King* without decisive powers but still a symbol of racial and social solidarity, an elective *Parliament* in which the basic governing authority resided, a *Ministry* headed by a prime minister and responsible to Parliament, and a permanent *Civil Service* with ever broadening administrative powers over the life of the people and over the established units of local government. As the Great European Powers set up the Greek state, it was altogether natural that it should take on a distinctly Western visage. There was no other alternative for between 1821 when the Greeks first declared their independence from Turkey until 1833 there was no unity, only internal chaos.

When Otho was installed King of Greece in 1834, he brought with him from Bavaria a host of "experts" who strove to make Greece over in the image of their European homeland. All during the 19th and 20th centuries Greece struggled mightily to become Western and, it must be said, with great success. Trade and industry increased, national boundaries expanded, and the capital city of Athens mushroomed from a miserable village to one of the larger and more pleasant cities of the world. But the fierce and enthusiastic national patriotism which was engendered took as its ultimate goal for a substantial segment of the nation the reconstruction of the Byzantine empire and the reoccupation of Constantinople—a strange and little understood objective to Westerners—but to many Greeks, it was the Great Idea which was finally dashed to pieces by the defeat in Asia Minor by the Turks in 1922. Since 1912, Greece has been drawn into the vortex of Balkan, Near East, and World conflict which has bled the nation white. During the last decade, it suffered four years of German occupation followed by communistic revolution and guerrilla warfare only recently ending in an uneasy peace.¹ Had it not been for British and American military, economic and technical assistance, Greece might be today behind the Iron Curtain as a result of utter and complete collapse.

An evaluation of Greek government, therefore, should take into account two over-all considerations: first, that Western institutions of government are not indigenous to modern Greece; and second, that a nation beset continually by war cannot put its best governmental foot forward. Today, in spite of everything, Greece is still a free nation trying very hard to govern herself in a manner suggested originally by her Western friends and allies, and having a pretty difficult time of it.

¹ See McNeill, W. H., *The Greek Dilemma*, 1946.

Constitutional Development

Since 1821, Greece has had twelve constitutions, the result of ten constitutional assemblies and four "revisionary" parliaments.² According to constitutional theory, however, the present Constitution is the Constitution of 1864 with "non-fundamental" amendments adopted in 1911, 1935, and 1952, for that document prohibits major revisions. The republican Constitution of 1927 is considered abrogated.

The first constitution, adopted in Epidaurus in 1821, declared the political existence and the independence of the nation. Government consisted of a legislative body formed by representatives from the various provinces annually elected by the people, and a commission of five exercising executive power. The second assembly at Astros held in 1823 added certain individual rights to the document. The third, at Troezine in 1827, adopted a new constitution establishing a governor instead of a commission. This instrument was never adopted because the famous Capodistria took power into his own hands by a *coup d'état* and established a provisional government. His régime was sanctioned by the fourth assembly held in Argos in 1829. He was advised by a senate appointed by him. These dictatorial tendencies proved unpopular and Capodistria was assassinated in 1831 by one of the local chieftains of the revolution. A fifth assembly met at Argos in 1831 and conferred executive power to Capodistria's brother, Augustin, and voted for a constitutional monarchy, but this document was never put into force as Augustin resigned. During 1831-32, the Great Powers—England, France, and Russia—took the settlement of Greek affairs into their own hands, decided that Greece should become a hereditary monarchy and that Otho of Bavaria, second son of King Ludwig, should be offered the Crown. Otho reigned without a constitution or a legislature from 1834 to 1843 when a revolutionary assembly adopted a constitution, based on the French charter of 1830, and set up a constitutional monarchy. The powers of the King were specified; a two-house legislature was established. Members of the Senate were appointed for life by the King, the Deputies of the lower house were elected by the people. Otho was forced to resign in 1862; a new constitution was adopted in 1864. This document was based on the Belgian constitution of 1831. Again the powers of the King were defined, the Senate was abolished, and the Chamber of Deputies elected by manhood suffrage. A new royal family was established when Prince William, second son of the King of Denmark, was crowned as George I.

The Constitution of 1864 lasted until 1911 when a new instrument of

2. Bacopoulos, George Theodore, *Outline of the Greek Constitution*, Athens, 1950.

government was adopted as a result of the revolution of 1909, which was led by modern Greece's greatest statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos, republican from Crete. Important changes were made: the establishment of a permanent nonpolitical judiciary and civil service; expropriation of large estates in Thessaly, and the creation of a new class of peasant proprietors there; the establishment of free and compulsory education; the reduction of the legislative quorum to one-third of its membership so as to overcome parliamentary obstructionism; the ineligibility of active military officers and men to serve in Parliament; the prohibition of unauthorized translations of the Scripture and the establishment of the "purist" Greek as the official language and the medium of elementary education; and the handling of election petitions by a special tribunal instead of by Parliament.

The Constitution of 1911 was abrogated by the Constitution of 1927, an instrument of the republican revolution of 1924. Royalty was abolished, and a president elected for five years by members of a two-house legislature was set up in its place. He exercised the executive power through the Ministry headed by the Prime Minister and which had to have the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house. A Council of State, with not more than twenty-one members appointed by the Council of Ministers, was empowered to settle administrative disputes, draft administrative laws and check all laws and decrees submitted to Parliament. The republic lasted eleven years and came to an end in 1935 as a result of a *coup d'état* and a plebiscite. The 1911, or 1864 (as you choose), constitution was re-enacted but amended with certain sections of the 1927 document. Greece became again a royal democracy. A revisionary parliament to regularize this procedure, however, was dissolved by General Metaxas in 1936, who governed without a parliament until his death in 1941. Under his régime certain individual rights in the 1911 document were abrogated. Law was made by decree. Metaxas had announced the establishment of a corporate state with a chamber based upon occupational interests but no such institution emerged before his death. Then came German occupation. The government-in-exile restored the civil liberties taken from the constitution by the dictator. After the withdrawal of the Germans, the revisory parliament of 1946 adopted non-fundamental changes in the constitution which were put into force January 1, 1952.

The Constitution

The general pattern of the modern Greek state is outlined in the Constitution.³ First, the Eastern Orthodox Church united in doctrine to the "Great

³ *The Greek Constitution*, promulgated January 1, 1952, English translation by Alex Tzinieris for the American Embassy in Athens.

Church of Christ in Constantinople" is recognized as the established church.⁴

Second, individual rights are guaranteed. The 1952 amendments, however, forbid strikes by civil servants and prohibit syndicalist unions of government and public service employees. Likewise, the goal of education in the State is defined as the development of national conscience on the basis of "ideological directives of the Graeco-Christian civilization." Therefore, teachers and university professors, because they are designated as civil servants, may not propagate ideologies which have for their aim the overthrow by violence of the political and social régime.⁵

Third, a constitutional monarchy is established. The Constitution declares that "all powers are derived from the nation." Legislative power is exercised by the King and Parliament. The executive power belongs to the King, but he exercises all his fundamental powers through his ministers, who, in reality, provide legislative and executive leadership.⁶ The Greek Crown is hereditary and passes to the legitimate heirs of King George I with male preference within the family.⁷

Fourth, the powers of the King are specified. He has no other powers

⁴ *The Greek Constitution*, Art. 1-2. The Greek Orthodox Church is independent in organization and is administered by the Holy Synod of bishops appointed by the King. There is freedom of religion in Greece but proselyting is prohibited. The exercise of this freedom, however, must not adversely affect public order or good morals, and no one, by reason of his religious convictions, shall be exempt from discharging his obligations to the state or refuse to comply with the laws of the country.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. 3-20, 91, 94, 97, 100. The following individual rights are specified in the Constitution: equality before the law; full protection of life and liberty, irrespective of nationality, creed, or language; arrest only upon warrant except in the act, swift hearing of charges, punishment only according to law, trial by jury in civil courts, right to petition authorities; right to meet publicly and unarmed (open air assemblages may be prohibited, police may be present only at public meetings); right of free association (except as described above); inviolability of dwelling; freedom of speech and press (except insult to the King and his family, indecency, rebelliousness, and as to military information); right to elementary education and to private property subject to condemnation for public use with indemnity; abolition of torture and general confiscation; and secrecy of letters.

Special laws passed by Royal Decree on states of emergency may suspend certain individual rights in the interest of public order, but these must be approved by Parliament.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Art. 21-28. Parliament, however, may not initiate salary, pension, or other bills benefiting an individual.

The Constitution states that the authentic interpretation of laws rests with the legislature.

Judicial powers shall be exercised by the courts of law and judicial decisions shall be executed in the name of the King.

No act of the King is valid unless countersigned by the competent minister, who "is rendered responsible by his signature alone."

⁷ *Ibid.*, Art. 45-53. If no successor exists, the King appoints one with the consent of Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote. Procedure for a regency when necessary is also provided.

than those delegated to him by the Constitution or by special laws consistent with it.⁸

Fifth, Parliament, namely the Chamber of Deputies, is established as the fundamental institution of government. Deputies are elected for four-year terms by "direct, universal, and secret ballot." The Chamber meets each year on October fifteenth by inherent right and must be in session not less than three months. Its financial powers are, however, somewhat restricted by the ministries, especially the Minister of Finance and the General Accounting Office.⁹

⁸ *Ibid.*, Art. 29-45. The King commands the military, declares war, and signs treaties. Parliament must approve those treaties which give concessions and those which relate to commerce. There can no cassation or exchange of territory except by law. Secret articles in treaties cannot subvert open articles. No foreign army may be admitted into Greek service or pass through Greek territory except by law.

The King appoints public officers, confers military rank and decorations according to law. He coins money. He has the right to pardon, commute or diminish punishments awarded by courts of law, except those concerning ministers and may grant amnesty for political crimes under the responsibility of the Ministry.

The King convenes the Chamber of Deputies once a year in ordinary session and in extraordinary session whenever he deems it expedient. He may dissolve the Chamber but only by a decree signed by the Ministry, which must also provide for a convocation of electors within forty-five days and of the Chamber within three months. He may suspend the labors of the Chamber but only once in a session and for not longer than thirty days. The King sanctions and publishes laws passed by the Chamber, but a law not published two months after the close of the session is null. He issues decrees necessary for the enforcement of the laws and cannot delay operation of a law or except anyone from its provisions. The King may issue legislative decrees for the settlement of exceptionally urgent matters when Parliament is in recess or adjourned, with the concurring opinion of a special committee of deputies established at the beginning of each parliamentary session and functioning until the opening of the new session. The committee shall be composed of not less than one-fifth of the total number of deputies, and the presence of two-thirds of its members and a relative majority shall be required for making decisions. Parliament may decide to place restrictions on the issuance of such legislative decrees. Bills submitted during the first quarter of the new parliamentary session recommending amendment, repeal, or cancellation of these decrees shall have priority on the agenda.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Art. 54-75. The number of deputies can never be less than 150 nor more than 300. A deputy must be at least twenty-five years of age. Ineligible are salaried civil servants, active military officers and men, mayors of cities, notaries, custodians of deeds and mortgages, process servers, and officials of legal entities of public law and organizations enjoying certain privilege by law. Deputies are granted compensation provided for by law (as of April, 1952, about \$210 a month), free transportation on Greek facilities, and exemption from postal, telegraphic, and telephone charges. They are prohibited from renting public lands, undertaking governmental contracts, renting of governmental taxes and concessions of public property.

The Chamber sits in public but debates may be held behind closed doors; it may not debate except when one-third of the members are present and may not take a decision without an absolute majority of members present, which majority can in no wise be less than one-fourth of the total number of deputies. In the case of equality of votes, the motion is rejected. Every bill must have appended to it an explanatory report and be submitted to a Parliamentary Committee.

Sixth, the "Government" is constituted as the Council of Ministers consisting of the Ministers, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, who are approved by the King from the majority party or coalition in Parliament. The Government must enjoy the confidence of Parliament. Upon its formation, the Government must, and at any other time may, ask for a vote of confidence from Parliament.¹⁰

Seventh, a system of administrative justice is established and special administrative courts, headed by the Council of State, which is given power to elaborate regulatory decrees, try differences between administrative jurisdictions and annul acts of administrative authorities that are beyond or in violation of law.¹¹

Eighth, justice shall be administered within the system consisting of a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, and Courts of First Instance in which the judges and other personnel are appointed by the King for life. Special courts are established for particular purposes in accordance with modern tendencies of specialization and the Greek need for popular representation within the judiciary.¹²

Each year the Chamber must vote upon the budget and the "final accounts," or annual fiscal reports. Every bill entailing expense or a diminution of public receipts must be accompanied by a report signed by the "competent minister" and the Minister of Finance. Every bill, entailing a burden on the budget, may not be introduced unless it is accompanied by a report from the General Accounting Office.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Art. 76-81. A motion of confidence or non-confidence shall not be adopted unless it has the supporting vote of at least two-fifths of the Deputies, and, of course, a majority of those deputies present. Parliament may impeach ministers before a judicial tribunal. Ministers shall have free access to the meetings of Parliament and shall be given a hearing on the floor whenever they ask for it. They vote only if they are members of Parliament. Their presence may be required by Parliament and parliamentary committees.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Art. 82-86. The number of members of the Council of State shall be determined by law but not less than twenty-five. They shall be appointed for life by the Council of Ministers, following an opinion of the Council of State. The office is incompatible with any public office except that of professor of law or economics. Conflicts between judicial and administrative authorities, between the Council of State and administrative authorities, and between the administrative and common courts shall be tried by a mixed tribunal composed of equal members of the Supreme Court and the Council of State presided over by the Minister of Justice or his deputy. Administrative differences shall be, until regular administrative courts are established, within the competence of the regular courts.

¹² *Ibid.*, Art. 87-90, 92-93, 96. The Constitution allows trials of police offenses punishable by fine to be entrusted to authorities exercising police duties and trials of misdemeanors relating to farm lands to be entrusted to agrarian security authorities. Appeals may be made from them to judicial authorities. Likewise, juvenile courts may be set up and popular judges may be allowed to participate in the trial of labor disputes. Mixed courts composed of regular judges and jury shall try press offenses.

The Supreme Judicial Council made up of members of the Supreme Court administer the personnel arrangements in the entire judicial system. Its decisions and those of the Supreme Court are not subject to appeal before the Council of State.

Ninth, a Council of Comptrollers appointed for life is established and under its jurisdiction comes the auditing of all accounts of the State, the local units and the legal entities included.¹³

Tenth, decentralization and local self-government are recognized based upon law, and the election of municipal and communal authorities shall be effected by universal suffrage.¹⁴

Eleventh, a permanent civil service is established. Regular civil servants shall be permanent as long as the pertinent services and posts shall exist.¹⁵

Twelfth, a number of miscellaneous provisions including self-government for Mount Athos, the Holy Mount; a program of land reform dividing certain types of land among the landless; and prohibition of revision of the entire Constitution and the fundamental provisions thereof.¹⁶ The last article appropriately reads: "Observance of the present Constitution is committed to the patriotism of the Greeks."

The Greek Constitution, therefore, may be described as a document well within the tradition of 19th century European liberalism. It is democratic in spirit, suffrage is universal, individual rights are recognized, representative government established, royal power restricted, civil service protected, and courts separated from politics. Yet it has weaknesses inherent in the nature of Greek psychology and politics. It can be amended too easily and without a vote of the people. Individual rights can be, in fact have

¹³ *Ibid.*, Art. 98.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Art. 99.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. 101-102. Permanent civil servants shall not be transferred without an advisory opinion, discharged or demoted without a special decision of a council constituted according to law and consisting of at least two-thirds civil servants. Appeal may be made to the Council of State. This protection includes all state, local (even communes may be included by law), and other public employees.

Every civil servant post must be established by law. No person may hold more than one salaried civil service post. No civil servant may participate in more than two civil service committees, nor receive more than double his regular salary for extra services from the public treasuries. Exemptions may be made, however, by special laws, but under no circumstances may he have more than two posts or get more than three times his organic salary.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Art. 103-107, 109-114. The powers of self-government granted to Mount Athos for its monasteries are in accordance with ancient privileges which extend back to the eleventh century.

The provision for land reform exists for a three-year period which permits land subdivision in order to settle landless farmers and small-scale breeders of livestock on certain categories of rural estates, especially those not utilized, and those tracts over 250 stremma, and grasslands owned either privately or publicly. Compensation is fixed at not less than one-third the value of the property expropriated at the time of entry into possession thereof, and may be paid in Greek bonds.

Other miscellaneous provisions are included: alteration of a will insofar as its provisions in favor of the State or the public is prohibited; the official language of the

been, too easily suspended. Furthermore, the relationship between Parliament and the Ministry is not clearly defined. Nor is there sufficient protection and guarantee for local self-government. Finally, it is not a well-balanced document. Many of the articles contain details that should be entrusted to laws and are written in language neither lucid nor clear in meaning.

Nevertheless, in spite of the nation's extremely checkered history since 1912, which includes deep-seated divisions within and extraordinarily heavy pressure from without, the Greek state, as established under the present Constitution, has proved itself extremely viable and able to withstand forces that have worked for its disintegration.

The King

For the three thousand years before liberation from the Turk, the Greeks had had no king. Even in Homeric times kings were chieftains only of individual city states. Of Roman and Byzantine emperors and Turkish sultans, all more or less absolute in power, however, they had had plenty. But a King, Western style, was a novelty. The first King found out by the bloodless revolution of 1843 that Greeks did not like an absolute monarchy, and by another such revolution in 1862 that they did not like high-handed rulers. Otho departed after a reign of twenty-nine years. In his reign Greece prospered and today no one doubts his sincerity and love for the new nation. Again the Great Powers conferred. They came up with Prince William, second son of the King of Denmark, who in 1863 was crowned as George I, now King of the Hellenes instead "of Greece" to indicate the national objective of uniting ultimately all Greeks into the state. He reigned almost fifty years until an assassin's bullet cut him down in Salonika on March 18, 1913. His understanding of his place in the Greek governmental system is illustrated by an anecdote King George II is supposed to have told: "My grandfather (George I) never read an official document before he signed it, and he reigned fifty years; my father (King Constantine) never signed

State is that which is used in the Constitution; compulsory cooperatives, both urban and rural, may be established by the State; suits against high judicial officials must be by special tribunal; a law may be passed to protect funds imported from abroad for investment in the country.

Revision of the entire Constitution is prohibited, and those provisions which determine the régime as that of constitutional monarchy, as well as its fundamental provisions, shall under no circumstances be revised. The "non-fundamental" provisions may be revised whenever Parliament by two-thirds of all its members call for a revision by a special act which shall specifically designate the provisions to be revised and which shall be voted on two occasions removed from each other by at least one month. The next Parliament must adopt these revisions by an absolute majority of its members. The present Constitution repeals all inconsistent laws and decrees and is put in force when signed by the King.

one unless he read it, and he lasted only five." During the reign of George I, the Ionian islands, Thessaly, Arta, and Crete were incorporated into Greece; population and foreign trade trebled; brigandage was reduced; four thousand kilometers of roads and one thousand kilometers of railroads were constructed. The first two modern Greek kings reigned a total of eighty years. This period was one of almost uninterrupted progress for the new nation.

George I was succeeded by his son Constantine. To those Greeks with their eyes on the ultimate reconstitution of the Byzantine empire¹ he was the XII, the direct successor to Constantine XI Paleologus, last Byzantine emperor who fell defending Constantinople against the Turks in 1453, rather than the first of a new line of modern Greek kings. Constantine reigned until 1917 when he withdrew in favor of his son Alexander under pressure from his political enemy Venizelos and the Allies because of his pro-German tendencies. But as the result of the Balkan Wars, which ended at the beginning of his reign, Greece had gained an important Balkan segment which it called Northern Greece and the island of Crete. Alexander reigned until he died by an accident in 1920, and Constantine returned, Venizelos having been defeated in the elections of that year. Constantine reigned until 1922 when he abdicated in favor of his son George II after the Asia Minor disaster that ended in Greece's utter defeat by republican Turkey and her expulsion from Asia Minor. George II reigned until December 1923, when he withdrew without abdicating upon a Venizelos-Republican victory at the polls. The Greek Republic was proclaimed in 1924 and lasted eleven years when King George II was recalled. He left the country in 1941 with the government-in-exile, returned in 1946 after a favorable plebiscite, died in 1947 and was succeeded by his brother Paul I, the present monarch. In one hundred and seventeen years, Greece has had only six kings, five of them father, son or grandson.

The long battle between royalty and republicanism has ended. All the present political leaders, except the outlawed communists, have publicly announced their support of the Crown. In the three plebiscites held on this subject (in 1924, 1935, and 1946) republicans won only the first. Barring a communistic revolution, constitutional monarchy seems to be in a relatively stable position for some time to come. However, there is one other danger. That is the intervention of a King into politics. Those Kings who became politically active had difficult times. Those who allowed the "government" a free hand had little trouble.

The Chamber of Deputies

Basic governing authority in Greece rests in the Chamber of Deputies. It has four main functions: (1) it amends the Constitution; (2) it passes

laws; (3) it forms, through its majority, the ministry; (4) it supervises, by means of votes of confidence, the work of the ministry. From the ranks of its members are drawn almost all of the ministers who collectively form the "government." Parliament is the unicameral Chamber of Deputies. Both the constitutions of 1844 and 1927 provided for an upper house but in neither case was it a success. In the first place, there is no aristocracy by birth in Greece (few "old" families date further back than the war of independence), nor is there a large landholding class, and the need for special class representation has never been felt. Second, it is difficult enough to get legislation through one house, and virtually impossible in two because of the habitual confusion in Greek government and politics. There is at present no segment of public opinion in favor of a second house.

The Constitution provides that there shall be at least 150 deputies and not more than 300, but the actual number is established by law for each election. For the 1950 and 1951 elections, the number was placed at 250, but after the 1951 election a bonus of eight additional members was given to the various parties in recognition of large blocs of votes not used in the complicated system of seat allocation. Some earlier revisionary parliaments have had 350 members, its being thought necessary to have a larger number for constitutional revision. In the 1952 elections, three hundred deputies were elected.

Since 1926, Greece has alternated between the plurality and proportional representation systems in electing its deputies. Before that only the plurality system was used. In the elections of 1926, 1932, 1936, 1950, and 1951 proportional representation was used; the plurality system was in operation in the elections of 1928, 1933, 1936, and 1952.

In each election, changes are made in the electoral law often with an eye to the advantage of the party in power. There is at present much opposition to the complicated system of proportional representation which has been responsible for the trend toward coalition government because one party cannot obtain a clear majority of votes. The battle between plurality and proportional representation systems will undoubtedly be a bone of contention for many years to come. While proportional representation has given more accurate delineation of party strength, it has not made Greek government more stable. The clear-cut victory of Papagos in 1952 was due to the plurality system as well as to his own popularity, for he obtained 49.6 per cent of the vote. Under the proportional system, he would have had much less of a majority in Parliament than his actual 239 out of 300 seats.

One word about the conduct of elections. They are administered by the Ministry of Interior and carried out under the supervision of judicial

committees in the various districts. Generally speaking, they are handled with dispatch, the voters are orderly, and there is little evidence of the kind of skulduggery associated with highly organized machine wards in the United States. There has been little or no rioting, but each polling place is more than adequately guarded according to American standards. It is not uncommon to see not only the ordinary gendarmerie but also soldiery armed with the regular infantry accoutrement of active warfare. However, registry lists of eligible voters are often far out of date and many persons, for example, that have lived in Athens the last ten years have not been added to the voting lists because of the predilection in Greece to consider the place of birth as the real and legitimate home and voting district.

Political Parties

National politics in Greece are directed toward control of the Chamber of Deputies; Parliament and politics are inseparable. Stability has never been a characteristic of Greek politics even in classical days. Certain unique factors have given modern Greek political parties their peculiar texture and structure. First, Greeks as a whole are mentally agile and alert. They devour newspapers, all of which emphasize politics, the comment on which is not notable for integrity, objectivity or depth. They congregate in coffeehouses and talk politics by the hour. The minute activities of the government, never long clandestine, are dissected, analyzed and discussed by the average citizen far more than in the United States. Contrasting English and Greek parliamentary behavior, William Miller, long-time observer of Greek politics, said: "Besides, in England, there exists that solid leaven of stupidity which Bagehot believes to be serviceable for the working of parliamentary institutions, whereas in Greece the number of alert intellects is relatively larger."¹⁷

Second, Greeks are individualistic. A great deal is made of their individuality, their *atomismos*. Every Greek feels himself competent to judge the acts of his government representatives—and does. He feels capable of doing a better job—and he is always willing to try. Greeks are not easily regimented; even in the army it is not uncommon to see privates arguing vociferously with their officers over some minor order or problem. Furthermore, there exists in Greece no traditional aristocratic class, no blue-blood background, and, therefore, little snobbery. In this there is something akin to the United States, especially west of the Alleghenies. One must remember that modern Greece is younger than the United States. In addition, Greeks returning from America to live in the villages and cities of their birth are continually emphasizing the equalitarian doctrine and the freedom of op-

¹⁷ Miller, William, *Greece*, 1928, p. 334.

portunity in America. Greeks are probably the most democratic people of the Mediterranean and the Near East.

Third, Greeks have little talent for organization and consequently their party arrangements are extremely sketchy, especially in the provinces. There are no paid year-around workers and few permanent offices, no hierarchy of local-regional-national leadership and organization, no door-to-door campaigns (beneath the dignity of a politico to make one, beneath the dignity of the elector to listen), no card index system of local electors and their political and other propensities. Political campaigns are fashioned mostly from speeches and editorial diatribes. As a result, the political party has nothing on which to build except the personality of the political leader, and as Greeks are most cynical about personalities in politics, the leaders rise and fall as blow the winds of circumstance and public opinion. The politician, no matter how talented, is helpless when faced by them: he is rarely the master of them. Even the great Venizelos had a whole series of ups and downs and finally died of a broken heart in exile. Tsaldaris, Populist leader, had 180 seats in the Chamber in 1946, only 2 in 1951. One of the great modern Greek historians, Aspreas, said: "During the fifty years reign of King George twelve political leaders altogether 'governed the country . . . none of them was justified by his contemporaries . . . One after another, small and great, they descend into their graves with bitterness on their lips and sorrow in their souls."

Fourth, the spoils of politics are not great in Greece. There are approximately eighty thousand employees of the national government. All but ten thousand of them are permanent employees protected constitutionally from demotion and dismissal. Even many of the temporary have stayed on for more than ten years and are virtually untouchable. Local employees and those of legal entities are also protected against politics by legislation. It is said, of course, that when in power the high-ranking politician feathers his nest and those of his friends and family, but competent observers have always emphasized the fact that Greece's leading politicians have died poor. Rather than wealth, the stimulus in Greek politics has always been the desire for transitory personal power dear to the heart of every modern son of Hellas. Each leader of a political party, no matter how small and insignificant it is, each prime minister, if only for a day, is known the rest of his life as *Kyrie Proethre* (Greek for Mr. President).

Modern party alignment in Greece begins with the republican revolution of 1909 when Venizelos was imported from Crete by a military group and made prime minister. Before that, political control was largely in the hands of patriarchal families descending from the revolutionary leaders, wealthy Greeks who came back to their homeland after independence, the

nouveaux riches and a sprinkling of the intelligentsia who congregated in Athens. While the struggle for control was often bitter, fundamental issues were not involved. For many years after liberation, political leadership was divided between the English, French, and Russian partisans, each of which had Greek leadership. The Republican movement, however, supported by shopkeepers, merchants, and peasants from newly liberated sections of Greece and bourgeois control and was antagonistic to Athenian "old-line" domination. From 1911 until his death in 1935, Venizelos was the unquestioned leader of these republican forces and his vehicle was the Liberal party. Venizelos was anti-royalist, especially anti-Constantine, and during the first World War was pro-Allies. Since his death, the Liberal party has deteriorated in power but a number of present center and slightly left parties, notably EPEK, sprang from its loins.

The main opposition to the Liberal party came from the Populist party organized in 1917—pro-royalist, pro-Constantine, conservative, strong in "old" Greece, especially Attica, Boeotia and the Peloponnesos. In the 1951 elections, most of its elements were taken over by the Greek Rally party, headed by former Field Marshall Papagos, which was swept into power by the electoral landslide in 1952.

Because it was responsible for precipitating the savage and costly Athenian revolution in 1944-45 and the guerrilla warfare lasting from 1946 to 1949, the Communist party has been outlawed and its elements have moved underground. During the thirties, communists received an average of ten per cent of the votes. Extreme left-wing groups, probably fellow travelers, are still organized in several ineffective political groups.

In the election of January, 1936, the last before the Metaxas dictatorship, the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were about equally divided between the Right (Popular, National Radical Union, Party of Free Opinion, Reform Group), with 143 out of 300 seats, and the Liberal groups (Liberal, Republican Coalition, Agrarian, Old Republican, New Liberals), with 141 seats. The Communists had 15 seats and thus held the balance of power and threatened either to take over the power with the aid of a popular uprising or to stop the wheels of government with their few votes. As a result, both parties finally acquiesced in the dictatorship of Metaxas whose party, the Party of Free Opinion, had only 7 seats.

In the election of 1951, the Greek Rally party received 36 per cent of the votes, EPEK 23 per cent, Liberals 19 per cent, EDA (extreme left) 10 per cent, Populist 6 per cent, Social Democrats 2 per cent, Agrarians 1 per cent. EPEK and the Liberals coalesced to form the government.

In the election of 1952, the Rally party won 239 seats, the Center (Liberals and EPEK) 58, and Independents 3.

In recent times it has been difficult for any one party to obtain a clear majority in the Chamber; thus, there have been many coalition governments which are easily overthrown. In the parliamentary elections of 1950, thirty parties entered the lists; in 1926, sixty-five. This difficulty has led to frequent breakdowns of parliamentary government, especially beginning with the republican period in 1924 and ending with the German occupation in 1941. There were five *coups d'état* during this time: Pangalos, 1924; Plastiras, 1932; Venizelos, 1933; Kondylis, 1935; and Metaxas, 1936. The normal process of setting up a dictatorship involved a prearranged conspiracy usually headed by military men; a capture of key spots; dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies; and support by military forces. None of these was especially bloody or violent but in some cases execution or exile of key figures took place. The last and most successful was that of Metaxas which ended only upon his death in 1941. None has been attempted since the return of King George in 1946, for the savage communist revolutions have so far effectively united the national parties against the necessity for such extreme measures. But there have been 26 "governments" in power since World War II.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE

THE POLISH PRECURSORS OF FEDERALISM

by Piotr S. Wandycz

THE federalist movement which has been growing among the Polish emigration in the West since the end of the Second World War is closely connected with European action for a federation. The ideology of the Polish federalists is generally akin to that of the federalist camp in Western Europe. It would be wrong, however, to assume that Polish Federalism is merely the outcome of a transplantation of the Western concepts, with no native tradition or background. The Polish tradition of federalism is old and the Polish federalist theory can draw upon its own historical sources.

The Polish-Lithuanian Union which lasted until the partitions of Poland towards the end of the eighteenth century, was clearly a manifestation of the federalist spirit which contrasts so forcibly with the spirit of aggrandizement through conquest. The Union which began in 1385 as a dynastic affair evolved in time into a true federation of the two nations. Its ideological foundations emerge to a great extent from an analysis of the various Acts of Union. These are characterized by the concept of a voluntary union based on freedom, equality and the idea of a Christian brotherhood. The conception of "caritas" (charity) envisaged as a basic social virtue was stressed in the Act of Horodło of 1413 which declared that through charity ". . . leges conduntur, regna reguntur, urbes ordinantur et status Reipublicae optimo fine perfecitur." The idea that the Union was an association of "the free with the free, and the equal with the equal, of the true with the true" was also clearly expressed.

The ideas underlying the Polish-Lithuanian Union form a chapter in themselves and cannot be analyzed in any detail here. They are mentioned, however, because they are important for the development of later Polish writings on federalism. In a sense they provide many of the fundamental tenets of these writings but strangely enough we find very few, if any, direct references in federalist literature to the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The fact is less surprising perhaps when we think about the Western writers, but even most of the Polish federalist thinkers do not mention it at all. Two possible explanations of this phenomenon may be ventured. Most of the Polish literature dealing with the problems of a peaceful organization of international society and with federalism belongs to the 18th and 19th centuries, i.e. to the era when French ascendancy and prestige stood very high in Europe and many Poles looked to France for their inspiration. Hence the Polish thinkers preferred to invoke the prestige of a Sully or

of an Abbé de Saint Pierre than draw conclusions from national achievements in the field of federation. Secondly, it is possible that to many Poles the Polish-Lithuanian Union was a fact so much taken for granted that they failed to see in it a model of a peaceful cooperation of nations, worthy of imitation by others.

The eighteenth century, the age of Reason and Enlightenment, witnessed a general outburst of federalist literature. The Abbé de Saint Pierre wrote his *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*, Kant his *Zum ewigen Friede*, and they were joined by Rousseau, Bentham and others. This period was also fruitful in Polish writings on peace and federation. In the second half of the century Stanisław Leszczyński, the exiled king of Poland and the reigning duke of Lorraine and Bar, wrote his *Memorial de l'Affermissement de la Paix Générale*, accompanied by another memorandum.¹ The *Memorial* was written after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 which had put an end to the war of the Austrian Succession and Leszczyński was impressed with this treaty in a way similar to the Abbé de Saint Pierre, who had believed that the treaty of Utrecht had created conditions for a durable peace. The belief in the value of the *status quo* after Aix-la-Chapelle forms the basis of Leszczyński's approach. He developed his ideas starting from a universalist conception. There is a unity of the human society, he contended, and it was only when the sovereign and independent states were set up "that ambition appeared together with the passions which usually accompany it: jealousy and envy."² The result is that states are possessed by a lust for domination, which is not very surprising given the existing divisions between them. In these conditions war became a constant phenomenon, even if from a rational point of view it is nothing but folly. But "if wars are unavoidable," wrote Leszczyński, "at least let us seek the means whereby they will be fatal only to those who do not fear to provoke them."³ What can this means be? Leszczyński attempted to keep in mind the existing reality and suggested feasible solutions. He said that he had studied carefully the project of the Abbé de Saint Pierre and he came to the conclusion that it offered small chances of realization. "I have often heard speak," he wrote, "of a general union of all Christian states assumed to be linked by a spirit of peace and devoid of any incentive of hatred or ambition," but where can we find such a Union?⁴ Instead of attempting to create an ideal union and an ideal peace, Leszczyński proposed that Europe should start from the peace of

¹ S. Leszczyński, "Memorial de l'Affermissement de la Paix Générale," *Sprawy Obce*, vol. II (1930-31, Warsaw).

² *ibid.* p. 668

³ *ibid.* p. 660

Aix-la-Chapelle, 'which he thought was a good and just peace. This peace, however, had to be strengthened in order to last.

While analyzing the European society Leszczyński divided states into two categories: kingdoms and republics. His criterion of division, however, was not so much the fact that a country had a monarch or not, but whether it was an absolute monarchy or not. That explains why he included not only Poland (which was traditionally called a *Respublica*) but also England among the "Republics." Republics, so understood, appeared to Leszczyński as essentially pacific,—“no Republic has ever made war for aggrandizement”—and therefore they ought to combine to become the hard core of a European structure. Accordingly Leszczyński suggested the creation of a Union of Republics reinforced by the accession of France which could play the part of arbiter. He placed his hopes in France which he felt certain would abandon the ideas of a “universal monarchy” that were ascribed to Louis XIV and which Leszczyński described as “baleful.” The Union of Republics, supported by France, would watch over the maintenance of peace in Europe, offer its mediation or even intervene in order to enforce justice and chastise aggression. Leszczyński did not minimize the difficulties inherent in his project. He was aware that it would be very difficult to bring into the Union the Maritime States—and above all England—but he thought the difficulties could be overcome. Apart from the rationalist and universalist eighteenth century ideas with which the work is stamped, a reading of the *Memorial* also reveals other traits which remind us of the Polish and Christian outlook of the author. There is undoubtedly some truth in the assertion that “these are the thoughts of a Christian internationalist, not a mere humanitarian: not the spirit of Rousseau, but rather that of Bossuet . . .”⁵

In 1775 another book dealing with the problem of the organization of peace appeared in Warsaw. Written by Father Kajetan Skrzetuski, professor of history in the Collegium Nobilium Scholarum Piarum, and entitled “Project for the organization of an undisturbed peace in Europe,” the book contained more truly federalist ideas than the *Memorial* of Leszczyński. The “Project” was intended for the use of the young noblemen of the College, a new centre of reformed education in Poland, and contained a historical analysis of various attempts at federation and unity in the past. It mentioned the Greek experiments and the Roman and the Christian contribution, and

⁴ *ibid.* p. 659

⁵ Eleanor L. H. Schlimgen, “Stanislaus Leszczyński, King of Poland, Reformer in Exile,” *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, III (Oct. 1944-July 1945) 647.

was centered on the basic idea of European cultural and geographical unity. This unity, Skrzetuski contended, was constantly disturbed by wars and rendered precarious by the absence of a common and universal law. Europe was characterized by an uncertain balance of power which could not be changed either by one state or by a league of states. States watched each other in constant readiness for attack. This state of affairs had to be changed and Skrzetuski considered that in order to do so "there is no surer or better means than the setting up of a Union government which, by uniting nations in the same way as it unites citizens, would make them all subject to the authority and force of law."⁶ Such a government is better than other forms of organization for the following reasons: it unites the advantages of small and big states alike, it is strong because of its great might, it assures the rule of law, and it is capable of containing within just limits both the sovereigns and the subjects and also the non-Europeans, or as Skrzetuski called them "the Foreigners." Father Skrzetuski presented a detailed project of the "articles of the Confederacy." An eternal league of kings and states was envisaged with a congress deciding by a three-fourths majority, except in the case of the revision of the articles, for which unanimity would be required, and with a Tribunal. War would naturally be outlawed within the Confederacy and a state resorting to it would be declared the common enemy of all. The same would happen if a state defied the decisions agreed upon by the Congress of the Confederacy. Skrzetuski explained at great length all the advantages that would result from the proposed Confederacy. Among these advantages he enumerated: security, a guarantee for the rights of kings, the disappearance of the causes of wars, the keeping of engagements, free trade, the development of agriculture, the abolition of war taxation, all factors leading to the assurance of happiness for the nations. Skrzetuski suggested a division of the Confederacy into 19 states, after which a *status quo* was to be preserved.

Skrzetuski's "Project" stands much closer to the various, more or less idealistic plans for federation, than to the more sober "Memorial" of Leszczyński, though the two have many ideas in common. In his argumentation and clarity of exposition Skrzetuski can hold his own against other federalist thinkers of his time, French or German.

In the course of the nineteenth century several books on the problem of a European league or federation appeared in Poland, or were written by Poles abroad. The most interesting and significant of these were undoubtedly the writings of Prince Adam Czartoryski, a great Polish patriot,

⁶ Ks. K. Skrzetuski, *Projektczyli ułożenie nieprzerwanego w Europie pokoju*, in *Historja Polityczna dla Szlachetnej Młodzi* (Warsaw, 1775).

a statesman with an expert knowledge of European affairs, active in politics first as foreign minister of Tsar Alexander I, then as the leader of the Polish emigration in Paris.

Czartoryski's approach was different from that of Skrzetuski. He was less concerned with drawing ideal blueprints for a federation and was more interested in political reality as he saw it. In this sense his writings are rather similar to those of Leszczyński, except for the fact that they were more elaborate and original.

Czartoryski's writings fall into two categories. First, there are his Memoranda and Instructions, during the time he was Russia's foreign minister, containing concrete proposals for a reorganization of Europe after a treaty of peace with Napoleon. In the second place, we have his treatise on foreign politics in which he developed his ideas on international affairs. His basic ideas in both types of writings are complementary, except for immediate proposals which are different, since at the time that he wrote his treatise he had already broken with Russia and was in exile in Paris.

The concrete proposals for a rearrangement of Europe are contained in the secret instructions, signed by the Tsar and Czartoryski, for Novosiltsov who was sent at that time to confer with Pitt in London. A memorandum drawn up by Czartoryski alone was joined to them. They both date from 1804 and are largely based on an earlier Memorandum submitted by Czartoryski to Alexander I, in 1803 and not yet published in full.⁷

The basic idea of the Instructions and the Memorandum was the creation of a stable system in Europe guaranteeing the freedom of nations. It is said in the Instructions that this idea had been fully exploited by the French Revolution and Napoleon and that it was high time that it ceased to be their exclusive political monopoly. The European system would have to be enforced by two main powers, namely the Russia of Alexander and the Britain of Pitt. "When peace is made it is written" a new treaty should be drawn up as a basis for the reciprocal relations of the European states", and it should "lay down a sort of a new code of international law which, being sanctioned by the greater part of the European States, would, if violated by any one of them, bind the others to turn against the offender and make good the evil . . . committed . . ."⁸

Hence, Czartoryski envisaged the creation of a kind of United Europe with its own code of laws. He went ever farther in this direction. "The peace of Europe", he wrote "could only be preserved by means of a League

⁷ Compare M. Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, Paris 1950.

⁸ *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his Correspondence with Alexander I*, edited by A. Gielgud II, (London, 1888), 47.

formed under the auspices of Russia and England, which would be joined by all the second class States and by all those who really wish to remain at peace."⁹ Although it was a League and not a federation strictly speaking that was envisaged in the Instructions, the organization of it, further elaborated in the Memorandum, is of great interest. The idea of regional federations was developed. After suggesting the different territorial changes that would be necessary in Europe, a reconstruction of Poland for instance, Czartoryski proposed the organization of regional groupings which would strengthen the internal balance in Europe. Thus he envisaged the creation of a German federation comprising all the German states outside Austria and Prussia, federated with Switzerland and Holland, an Italian federation, and an Iberian federation of Portugal and Spain. Poland recreated in its old frontiers was to remain linked with Russia by a dynastic union. The Balkans or as he says "the mass of the Turkish territories in Europe should be divided into separate States, governed locally, and bound to each other by the federation" under the protection of the Tsar.

Although it is clear that Czartoryski's proposals were vitiated to a certain extent by the faith which he put in Alexander I and his liberal approach to nations, and by his mistaken hope that Russia could become one of the pillars of a stable European order, many of the ideas expressed in the Memorandum are of lasting value. His recognition of the principle of nationality, qualified by the idea of regional federations, has become a part of Polish federalist theory.

Czartoryski's philosophy of international politics which formed the basis of these proposals was developed later in a book called *Essai sur la Diplomatie*, written after his break with Russia. This treatise contained a searching analysis of international politics in the past and present, and included suggestions for a European policy in the future. The term "diplomacy" is used in much broader meaning than is usually the case. "By diplomacy" he wrote, "we mean the course followed by states in their relations with each other, and the rules governing their foreign policy."¹⁰ A further remark that diplomacy has not kept pace with the development of other branches of political science makes it perfectly clear that under the heading of diplomacy Czartoryski discusses what we to-day would call the science of international relations.

In his analysis of international politics Czartoryski was guided by certain general conceptions. He claimed that the universalist element has

⁹ *op. cit.*, p. 51

¹⁰ A. Czartoryski, *Essai sur la Diplomatie*, (Paris, 1864), p. 5

been very important in the life of nations. "In every age" he said, "men have perceived universal society beyond national society."¹¹

The nation for Czarotorski constituted the natural unit of society and he thought that nationality provided the reason for the legitimacy of the state. He excluded therefore the right of foreign intervention in the affairs of nations. But on the other hand, true to his universalist conceptions, Czarotorski maintained that nations are not ends in themselves but are subject to natural law—which is not the law of nature in the Hobbesian sense—just as individuals are subject to certain universally binding obligations. Thus he reconciled his universalist concept with the idea of independent nationhood.

Czarotorski opposed the idea that justice was a product of society. "The idea of justice is not a consequence of the social compact as has been claimed; but rather it is the idea of justice which created society."¹² The role of society is to preserve justice. Consequently Czarotorski's conception of peace is not that of an absence of actual fighting. Real peace can come only when it is based on justice. "Peace and security will never exist where there is injustice or suffering."¹³

This explains why Czarotorski is not in favor of peace for its own sake, and why he insists upon a reorganization of Europe which would bring peace based on justice and reinforced by the rule of law. He is not naïve enough, however, to think in terms of establishing an ideal order once and for ever. Czarotorski is fully aware of the dynamic character of international society. As he declared, the object of good policy is not "to find means of keeping nations in a state of fixity, which is impossible, but to harmonize their strivings after what is best . . ."¹⁴ There is something in this conception of harmony and progress which foreshadows the ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century liberals such as Hobhouse and Renouvier.

Czarotorski's approach explains why he was wary of simple federalist blueprints which at his time were even more abstract than they are to-day. He was clearly aware, however, of the potentialities inherent in federalism and he expressed the opinion that the federal system "in the hands of diplomacy may yet become a valuable means of counteracting the narrow mindedness of states without infringing their rights, and also discovering the changes required to repair . . . the confusion born of old injustices."¹⁵

¹¹ *op. cit.*, p. 124

¹² *op. cit.*, p. 121

¹³ *op. cit.*, p. 224

¹⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 224

¹⁵ *op. cit.*, p. 243

He went on to explain once more his ideas about regional groupings and he thought that although foreign intervention as such was not justified, in the case of federation "Europe has the right to see to it that the fundamental character of the federal pact is not effaced."¹⁶

Czartoryski mentioned the old projects, especially the "Great Design" of Sully, with great approval. He seemed to be in favor of a permanent European congress of arbitration. He supported the idea of a European law. He also alluded to what became known later as the principle of "open diplomacy," when he expressed the opinion that a European congress would deprive diplomacy of "cet air suspect et mystérieux."

The *Essai* and the Memoranda of Czartoryski undoubtedly contained many valuable ideas. He started from certain assumptions which may be considered true or not but which are common to a long line of universalist and Christian thinkers. His analysis of international politics is in many cases very profound and some of his remarks quite prophetic. Though unaware of certain problems of international society, especially of an economic nature, he displayed a great knowledge of men and nations. His ideas on nationality and on regional federations, if followed by the Congress of Vienna or subsequent peace conferences could have averted many evils in Europe. On the whole, it is by no means a bold assertion to claim that the writings of Czartoryski belong to the best and most fruitful works on international organization and federalism which appeared in his time.

After Czartoryski several other Polish writers occupied themselves with the problem of federalism.

During the Polish rising against Russia in 1831 Wojciech Jastrzebowski prepared a draft constitution for a United States of Europe.¹⁷ Some time later the great Polish philosopher Hoene-Wronski was led by the development of his philosophy to espouse the idea of an "association messianique directrice de l'humanité" which would be the last stage of human history. He opposed the current concept of the balance of power and condemned what he called the "mechanical balance." He attacked also the "fatal principle of the exclusive popular sovereignty," but insisted on the necessity of preserving the individuality of nations, as essential for a federation of those nations.¹⁸

Towards the end of the nineteenth century federalist ideas were developed in a number of writings by Stefan Buszczyński, author of the "La décadence de l'Europe," a liberal, member of the Cracow Academy of Learn-

¹⁶ *op. cit.*, p. 247

¹⁷ J. Zycki, "Polskie Tradycje Pokojowe," in *Sprawy Obce*, vol. II, no. 8.

¹⁸ F. Warrain, *L'Oeuvre philosophique de Hoene-Wronski, Textes, Commentaires et Critique* (Paris, 1933)

ing and a great enthusiast of the United States of America. Buszczyński based his argument on the idea that Europe was declining and worked out a detailed plan for a supranational federation of European states. He even invented new terms to apply to this federation, such as "Etnopolia" to describe a national state, "cenopolia" for another form of groupings, etc.

Buszczyński's ideas deserve attention mainly because he analyzed factors driving Europe towards an inevitable decline and also because he revealed a prophetic insight into the potentialities of the United States. Buszczyński dwelt on the moral decline of Europe, pointed to the system of oppression which existed there, strongly criticized the European monarchies and the privileged classes and contrasted Europe with America. He explained that the spirit of liberty had left Europe for America and there, joined by the primitive element of Americanism, contributed towards the development of new creative forces in the New World. In his sweeping criticism of Europe Buszczyński made exception only for some of the small states, for instance Switzerland, which he considered a model for a federation, and for France.

His attitude to France and the role which he assigned to her are not unlike those of Leszczyński. "France" he says "can be strengthened only by a Union of freedom-loving nations which can change the governmental system in the whole of Europe. Such a union can save Europe and change the outlook of the world."¹⁹

Like other federalist writers he criticized the defects inherent in the European balance of power. He was in favor of regional federations, at least in Central and Eastern Europe. "In the place of Austria" he wrote, "there should grow up a new confederacy of the nations of the Slav race."²⁰ On the whole, except for his awareness of the United States and the part it plays in the world, Buszczyński's ideas follow the well known pattern of Polish federalist thought.

The federalist heritage of Poland presented above in a very general outline, from the ideas underlying the Polish-Lithuanian Union up to the writings of Buszczyński, constitutes in no way a closed circle without significance for the present or the future. Since Buszczyński it has inspired the supporters of federalist solutions in Poland after the country had regained its independence. It lies outside the scope of this article to analyze the impact of federalist ideas on Piłsudski and his federal policy,²¹ or on General Sikorski when he worked for the federal pact with Czechoslovakia

¹⁹ S. Buszczyński, *Ameryka i Europa, Studium historyczne i finansowe*, 2nd ed. (Kraków, 1894), p. 26.

²⁰ *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²¹ See e.g., M. K. Dziewanowski, "Piłsudski's Federal Policy," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, X, nos. 2, 3, (July, October 1950).

during the second world war. But whatever the connections may have been, the tradition of federalism exercised its sway upon many Poles. Many of the ideas analyzed above were integrated into Polish federalist theory of to-day, for example the conception of regionalism. They found their expression in the statements of aims of the Union of Polish Federalists and in other writings.

The Polish federalist heritage is generally neglected by Western historians. Writers such as Leszczyński are not even mentioned in some of the standard works on the subject.²² Whatever may be the reasons, it seems to us that the Polish federalist theory constitutes a valuable body of ideas, worthy in many respects of its Western European counter-part. This heritage forms a part in the vaster stream of federalist literature and as such shares with it certain essential elements, such as a universalist outlook, a belief in the value of peace and in the necessity for organizing and strengthening peace. It makes however its own contribution and has its own characteristics which emerge clearly even from a very sketchy analysis. These are: a distinctly Christian, rather than a purely rationalist approach to politics, an internationalist rather than a cosmopolitan outlook, a belief in the role which Western Europe, especially France, could play to bring about a United Europe, and last but not least the insistence upon the rights of various regions in Europe—in other words, a postulate of regionalism qualified by the principle of nationality. Although, as we mentioned before, the tradition of a successful Polish-Lithuanian Union seems to find no expression in the actual writings of various precursors of Polish federalism, the ideals on which the Union was built permeate to a large extent many of those writings.

Representatives of a nation which was exposed to foreign oppression and which suffered through wars more than any other in Europe, Polish federalist writers emphasize the idea of peace based on justice, an all-embracing Christian justice in which they all strongly believe.

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²² J. ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung*, etc.

BEGINNINGS OF ALBANIAN NATIONALIST TRENDS IN CULTURE AND EDUCATION (1878-1912)

by Stavro Skendi

ALMOST four decades ago (1913) a Frenchman, Gabriel Louis Jaray, wrote a book bearing the title *L'Albanie inconnue*. Albania is not an unknown country today. International events have often brought her to the foreground. But the struggle of the Albanian people for national cultural affirmation—which followed that of other Balkan peoples—is still very little known.

Even before the invasion of Albania by the Turks there existed documents in the Albanian language. They were a baptismal formula in the Roman Catholic rite and a fragment of the New Testament in the Byzantine rite.¹

During the first four centuries of Turkish domination, from the fifteenth to late in the eighteenth centuries, there was some Albanian literature, but it was solely ecclesiastical in character. Yet Pjeter Budi in his *Christian Doctrine* (1635) tried to stimulate the cultivation of the Albanian language, teaching that God does not hear him who prays in a foreign language and repeats words he does not understand.² Religion also mostly characterized the works of this period written in the Albanian language by the Albanians whose ancestors had emigrated and established colonies in Sicily and southern Italy—in the fifteenth century and later³—in order to escape the yoke of the Ottoman Turks.

It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that an Albanian literature with nationalistic tendencies emerged. It could not and did not originate in Albania proper, where Turkish occupation had transformed the religious picture. Almost two-thirds of the population had been converted to Islam. As the political and social basis of the Ottoman Empire was religion and not nationality, the Mohammedan Albanians were a privileged group within the Empire. Nationalism was further hindered in Albania by the creation of Turkish schools for the Moslems and Greek schools for the Orthodox Christians, as well as by the ban of the Turkish government on written Albanian. An Albanian literature of nationalistic character, however, did appear in Italy. Living in separate communities, the Italo-Albanians had preserved the language, customs, and traditions

¹ Both documents date from the fifteenth century.

² Cf. G. Schiro, "Della lingua albanese e della sua letteratura, anche in rapporto alle colonie albanesi d'Italia," as republished in *Studi Albanesi*, II, (1932), 105.

³ Cf. L. von Thalloczy, "Die albanische Diaspora," *Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen*, I (München und Leipzig: Dunckner & Humblot, 1916), 335-336.

of their fatherland. Since several of them were descended from the ruling families of Albania which had fought against the Turks, they also preserved the memories of the glories and defeats of their forefathers. They extolled in song the resistance of the Albanians to the Turkish invaders and the exploits of the national hero of the fifteenth century, George Castrioti Scanderbeg, although such songs remained unsung in Turkish-dominated Albania. The Albanians of Italy were also able to found schools for their own education and in 1794 they possessed an excellent institution, *Collegio di San Demetrio Corone*, in Calabria, where the Albanian language was taught.⁴

The two great initiators of the Albanian nationalist cultural movement in Italy in the middle of the nineteenth century were Girolamo de Rada and Demetrio Camarda. In the *Rhapsodies of an Albanian Poem*, based on Italo-Albanian folk songs, de Rada lauded the pre-Turkish state of freedom of the Albanians, their wars against the Ottoman invaders, and told of their surrender and exile. In *Scanderbeg* (1872), he dealt with the struggle of the Albanians under the leadership of Scanderbeg against the Turks, and with their national revival. Camarda laid stress on the language. In his *Saggio di grammatologia comparata della lingua albanese* (1864), he made a scientific study of the Albanian language, demonstrating its antiquity. In the *Appendice* of this work Camarda included specimens of prose and particularly folk songs from Sicily and Calabria, Albania proper, and Albanian settlements in Greece.⁵

The author did not neglect to tackle also the problem of a common Albanian literary language.

No doubt the movements for the liberation and union of Italy served as a stimulus to the nationalist cultural productions among the Italo-Albanians. It was in the liberated Naples of 1848 that De Rada published his patriotic political and literary newspaper, *L'Albanese d'Italia*.⁶ An event of great political significance also gave an impetus to nationalist cultural and educational trends within Albania proper—the formation of the Albanian League.

The Treaty of San Stefano, which Russia imposed upon Turkey in

⁴ A. Scura, *Gli albanesi in Italia e i loro canti tradizionali* (New York: Francesco Tocchi, 1912), p. 75; A. Galanti, *L'Albania* (Roma: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, 1901) p. 234.

⁵ The Albanian colonies in Greece date from the fourteenth century. Cf. K. Jireček, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit," *Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen*, I, 79-80; G. Finlay, *A History of Greece, from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time*, VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877, 28-29.

⁶ G. Volpe, "Formazione storica dell'Albania," *Nuova Antologia*, December 16 (1939) p. 327.

1878, accorded to the Balkan Slavic nations large pieces of Albanian land. When the Great Powers refused to accept it and convened a meeting of their representatives at Berlin—the Congress of Berlin (1878)—in order to consider its revision, Albanian leaders met at Prizren, in Kossovo, and created the *Albanian League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation*—often called the League of Prizren. The goal of these patriots was to defend the territorial integrity of their country and establish an autonomous Albania united into one *vilayet* (province) within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.⁷

The opposition of the League, by protest and the use of arms, to the decisions of the Berlin Congress detrimental to Albanian territorial integrity aroused a vigorous spirit of nationalism. One of its manifestations was the stress it placed on the importance of language and schools. During the period of the League the educational institutions in the country continued to be Turkish for the Moslems and Greek for the Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchate of Constantinople had taken over the protection of the latter—known as the *Roumuls*—and education was naturally given in Greek. (It served the purposes of both the Church and the Porte to keep Christian and Mohammedan Albanians apart.) The two Albanian Catholic institutions were in Skodra: a Franciscan seminary, opened in 1861, and a Jesuit school (*Collegio Saveriano*), opened in 1877 under the auspices of Austria, who had taken under her protection the Catholics of the north.⁸ In reaction to this situation, the League of Prizren included in its program for autonomy the provision that the language of the administration should be Albanian and that tax-supported Albanian schools be opened.

In order to strengthen the work of the League, Albanian intellectuals at Constantinople came together and founded in 1879 the first literary club, the *Society for the Development of the Albanian Language*. The aim of this society was the publication of readers and other educational books in Albanian⁹ as an indispensable instrument of nationalist propaganda. As a unified alphabet was lacking, the leaders of the society, Sami Frasheri, a Moslem, Jan Vreto, an Orthodox Christian, and Pashko Vasa (Wassa Effendi), a Roman Catholic, worked out an alphabet, with Latin and a

⁷ See for points of the program of the League Th. Ippen, "Beiträge zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens im XIX. Jahrhundert," *Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen*, I, 372.

⁸ G. Petrotta, *Svolgimento storico della cultura e della letteratura albanese* (Palermo, 1950), p. 73.

⁹ Cf. C. A. Dako, *Albania—the Master Key to the Near East* (Boston: E.L. Grimes & Co., 1919), p. 82; Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, *The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New* (Boston: The Writer, Inc., 1939), p. 37.

¹⁰ Cf. G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

few Greek symbols, called the alphabet of Constantinople. The first published book was the *Abetare* (The ABC of the Albanian Language). At the same time, through the initiative of Naim Frashëri, destined to become the apostle of Albanian patriotism, a periodical *Drita* (The Light), organ of the literary club, was published in Constantinople.¹⁰ The politico-cultural activity of Constantinople could not but reflect on other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where Albanian patriots who found great difficulty in carrying on propaganda within Albanian territory lived in a relative security. Greatly stimulating for the Albanians was a booklet published, first in Turkish and then in Albanian, by Sami Frashëri: *Albania: What She Has Been, What She Is, What She Shall Be*.

At the outset the Porte favored the activity of both the Albanian League and the society of Constantinople. It was to the interest of Turkey to preserve as much Albanian territory as possible within the frontiers of the Empire and stress the nationality of the Albanians as an obstacle to the expansion of the Slavs and the Greeks in the Balkans. But when the Porte suppressed the League of Prizren, which opposed with arms the refusal to concede autonomy, the fate of the literary club of Constantinople was sealed. In 1884 its headquarters were transferred, under the name *Drita*, to Bucharest, the center of another Albanian community active in the patriotic movements.¹¹

Albanian endeavors along nationalist cultural lines were now carried on mainly abroad. In Bucharest the periodical *Drita* continued its publication. Albanian congresses were convened in Romania, and in 1905 a school in which Albanian was the medium of instruction opened in Constantza.¹² Bulgaria followed suit. In 1890 the society *Dëshira* (Desire) was founded in Sofia. It comprised a group of patriots which published papers and books and founded Albanian schools. In Sofia the printing house *Mbrothësija* (Progress), which contributed so much to the diffusion of culture among Albanians, was also established.¹³ Egypt—whose Khedives were of Albanian descent—did not lag behind. Meetings were held and schools opened. In 1900 the fortnightly *Basbëkimi i Shqiptarëve* (The Union of the Albanians) was being published in Albanian and French in Cairo.¹⁴ From 1897 to 1909—first in Brussels and later in London—Faik Konitza, one of the most learned Albanians, edited the important review *Albania*, which dealt with all Albanian problems from philology to politics. The simple and pure language of this periodical became the model of many

¹¹ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹² G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

Albanian writers.¹⁵ In Greece, church and state stood as great obstacles to Albanian cultural activity. Nevertheless, Anastas Kullurioti in 1879 issued in Athens *Hé Phóné tés Alvanias* (The Voice of Albania), calling for the establishment of Albanian schools for the Albanians of the Kingdom of Greece and proclaiming as its main objective the awakening of Albania in order to throw off the Turkish yoke.¹⁶ Death in the prison of Athens in 1887 ended his patriotic activity.

A great deal of Albanian activity was developed in Italy. Apart from the presence of the Italo-Albanian minority, political circumstances favored it. Events in the Balkans and Italy's position as a great unified power called for increase in prestige and territory in the Mediterranean. As part of Italian Oriental policy, Premier Francesco Crispi—"Albanian by blood and heart," as he himself said—inaugurated a policy toward Albania which aimed not at Albania's occupation by Italy but at preventing a strong power from entrenching itself on her territory. This policy, pursued by most of the governments which succeeded each other after 1878, was accompanied by the more radical program of the Garibaldian and Mazzinian left, faithful to the principle of nationality: complete independence of Albania.¹⁷

Very active on the Italian scene in the post-League period was the veteran patriot Girolamo De Rada, who together with D. Camarda had contributed so much to the revival of the links between Albanians on both sides of the Adriatic. From 1883 to 1887 De Rada published in Albanian and in Italian a periodical entitled *Fjamuri Arbërit* (The Flag of Albania), endeavoring to make known to the West the existence of an Albanian nation which, possessing its own history, its own language, and its own national tradition, could well aspire to liberty and independence. In it he published literary works by himself and other Albanian authors. As Marchianò, an Italo-Albanian scholar put it, the reason for the favor which De Rada's review enjoyed was due "to the idea of Albanian nationality, which for the first time was being formulated, and to the diffusion of Albanian literature, which until then was vulgarly believed to be a myth."¹⁸ In 1887 *Fjamuri Arbërit* was replaced by the review *Arbri i ri* (The Young Albanian), edited by Giuseppe Schiro, the greatest Italo-Albanian poet. This new publication, predominantly literary, aimed at contributing to the national union of Albania. Two works by Schiro—*Albanian Rhapsodies*, in the spirit of ballads, and *In the Foreign Land*, in which Albanian

¹⁵ Cf. E. Çabej, *Elemente të Gjuhësisë e të Literatures Shqipe* (Elements of Albanian Linguistics and Literature). Tirana: Shtypshkroja e Ministrisë s' Arësimit, 1939, pp. 55-56.

¹⁶ For other points of Kullurioti's program, see G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁷ Cf. G. Volpe, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-331.

¹⁸ As quoted in G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

historical figures are placed in a picture of legend and history—are significant for the nationalistic trends of the time.

Through the initiative of De Rada, Schiro, and Anselmo Lorecchio, another poet and writer, two Albanian linguistic congresses were held in Italy, one in 1895 and the other in 1897. Their program was: (a) a unified alphabet; (b) compilation of a dictionary; (c) foundation of an Albanian National Society; (d) publication of an Italo-Albanian review; (e) opening of relations with the mother country.¹⁹ The Albanian National Society was formed with branches in all the Italo-Albanian colonies. Its organ was *La Nazione Albanese*, directed by Lorecchio, in which the best Albanian writers from both sides of the Adriatic collaborated.

Interest in the oral productions of the Albanian people was not confined solely to the Italo-Albanian writers. Under their influence and that of foreign scholars who took an interest in Albanian folklore, native Albanians had published collections of folklore even before the constitution of the Albanian League. In 1871 G. Jubani from Shkodra published a collection of popular songs of northern Albania and in 1878 Th. Mitko from Korça (Koritza) published the *Albanian Bee*, a collection of folk songs, tales, and proverbs, mainly from southern Albania. In the post-League period S. Dine compiled his *Waves of the Sea* and V. Prenushi, a Franciscan friar from Shkodra, published a well-arranged collection of popular creations in the dialect of the north. Inherent in these collections, which revealed the treasures of the people and their long tradition, was the desire for national affirmation. Did not S. Dine write that his aim in presenting the collection was to tell the life and history of the Albanian people through folklore?²⁰

In the national awakening literary works played an important role. Native Albanian writers appreciated the fact that the mother tongue, in order to be more efficient as an instrument of patriotic propaganda, should be raised to the dignity of a cultivated and literary language.

Already before 1878, Konstandin Kristoforidhi from Elbasan, in central Albania, had published translations from the Old and New Testaments in a literary prose that had become classical. He continued his literary and linguistic activity after that date. In order to study the dialects of his country, Kristoforidhi went from town to town and from village to village, coming into direct contact with the people.²¹ The treasury he collected was

¹⁹ G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁰ F. Cordignano, "Proučavanje narodne poezije u Albaniji" (The Study of Popular Poetry in Albania), *Prilozi proučavanju narodne poezije* (Contributions to the Study of Popular Poetry), 6 (1939), p. 173.

published in his posthumous work *Dictionary of the Albanian Language* (1904), a fundamental work.

But purity of language alone is not a sufficiently effective incentive to national awakening. Patriotic content should also be involved. Two writers of Albania proper have excelled in this art: Naim Frashëri from the south and Gjergj Fishta from the north. In *Bagëti e Buqësi* (Cattle and Land) (1886) the first poet exalted the natural beauties of Albania and the simple life of her people. His love for the fatherland shines in *Scanderbeg* (1899), a long poem in which the battles of the Albanians against the Turks are described. In the *Notebook of the Bektashis* Frashëri, who was himself a Bektashi,²² shows such a great desire for purity of language that he translates even the established Oriental terms of the sect. Owing to his influence, Bektashism in Albania followed a patriotic and nationalistic trend: "The Bektashis are brothers not only among themselves but with all humanity as well. They love the rest of the Moslems and the Christians as their soul and they get along well with all men. But above all they love their fatherland and their countrymen, this being the highest of all virtues."²³ The battles of the Albanian highlanders with the neighboring Slavs inspired Fishta, a Franciscan brother, in the writing of his powerful epic *Labuta e Malcis* (The Lute of the Mountains). In the first volume, *At the Bridge of Razhnica* (1905), the poet extols, in pure and manly language, the fight of the Albanians against the Montenegrins—that fight for the defense of Albanian territory which came about as a result of decisions of the Congress of Berlin. Another volume, *Vranina*, which appeared a year later, describes the battle between Albanian highlanders and Montenegrins in 1858. The actual frontier wars in the north, as well as their description, gave impetus to Albanian nationalism.

Both the collections of folklore and the literary works were published abroad. As the writing of Albanian was prohibited by the Turkish government, the books written by Albanians living within the Empire were published under assumed names. They all, however, found their way into Albania.

²¹ Cf. E. Čabej, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²² Bektashism is a Moslem pantheistic sect—considered heretic by the Sunni Mohammedans—which originated in the 13th century in Asia Minor and was introduced into Albania with the coming of the Turks. It has many points of contact with Christianity and is widely spread in southern Albania. Cf. J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*. (Hartford: Hartford Seminary Press, 1937) pp. 22, 30-33, 70, 210, 215-182; F. H. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929) 159-160, 166, 568-583.

²³ N. Frashëri, *Fletore e Bektashinjet* (Notebook of the Bektashis, as republished in *Balkan Archiv*, II (1926), 231-232.

From the formation of the League of Prizren the problem of the schools never ceased to be of concern for the Albanian leaders. As in the period between the Congress of Berlin and the Turkish Constitution (1908) the domestic policy of the Porte oscillated between reform and conservatism, Albanians who held high positions within the Turkish government exercised their influence, at propitious moments, for the opening of Albanian schools. In 1884 a secondary school for boys, in which the nationalist ideology was formulated to appeal to both Moslems and Christians, was opened in Korça by the Albanian society of Bucharest.²⁴ A year later a private Albanian school was established in the same city, followed by others in some surrounding villages. The patriot Petro Nini Luarasi was appointed inspector of the peripheral schools. In 1891 a school for girls, directed by the Qirias, began to function in Korça. The Rev. Ph. Kennedy, the first American missionary teacher to Albania, served in it with love. But in 1902 all the schools of the province of Korça were closed by the Turkish government and their directors persecuted.²⁵ However, those in Shkodra continued to function, being protected by Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, in 1901 the society *Bashkimi* (The Union), which published Albanian school books, was founded there.²⁶ Korça, in the south, and Shkodra, in the north, were during this time the propelling centers of Albanian cultural nationalism.

The efforts of the Albanians for the establishment of educational institutions and the development of national culture met with obstacles not only on the part of the Turkish government but also on the part of foreign propaganda. After the failure of Italian colonial plans the rivalry for the control of the Adriatic between Austria-Hungary and Italy was intensified. Each country began a peaceful penetration of Albania, one means being schools.²⁷ Italy opened schools in the south and was the more successful in her cultural propaganda.²⁸ Really dangerous was Greek propaganda. Greek schools had long been established in the south and Albanian education could not compete with the superior Greek culture. Besides, the majority of the Orthodox Christians, who were under the influence of the Greek clergy, opposed the opening of Albanian schools. The Greek clergy anathematized the teachers of Albanian. In his book *Anathema of the Albanian Letters* published in Albanian and in Greek, Petro Nini Laurasi

²⁴ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Federal Writers Project, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

²⁵ G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72; C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 84

²⁶ Cf. G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²⁷ E. P. Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in International European Affairs*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1926), p. 15.

²⁸ K. Thopia, "Das Fürstentum Albanien," *Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen*, II, 223.

included the two letters written in 1892 by the Greek Bishop of Kastoria against those who taught the Albanian language—the letters were, in fact, an excommunication of the Albanian language.²⁹ Albanian educational development ran counter to the interests of the Patriarchate of Phanar, for it meant the loss of its Greek influence and consequently the creation of an independent Albanian church. Adding to the confusion, at the beginning of the 20th century Bulgarian propaganda became active in southeastern Albania. A few schools and churches were opened in Ohrida and Dibra for the Bulgarianization of Orthodox Christian Albanians, but they had no success.³⁰

National cultural and educational activity of the Albanians within the Ottoman Empire was overtly resumed in 1908, when the Sultan was forced to proclaim a Turkish constitution. In the early summer of 1908, an Anglo-Russian scheme, known as the Reval Program, was announced. It aimed at imposing upon the Porte a plan of reforms for Macedonia. It was motivated, however, by the Austrian project of connecting the Bosnian and Macedonian railway systems.³¹ The Young Turks, alarmed because the Reval Program would lead to an autonomous Macedonia and eventually to its loss, decided to overthrow the Sultan Abdul Hamid and so save Turkey. They invited the Albanians to join them. The Albanian leaders, viewing the organization of Macedonia as a compromise to their national unity—an autonomous Macedonia would incorporate Albanian lands—and attracted by the promises of the Young Turks, among which was that of complete cultural and educational freedom, took up arms together with the Young Turks and forced the Sultan to promulgate the constitution.³²

Following this act a Congress of representatives from all parts of Albania was called at Monastir (Bitolje), in December 1908, in order to decide upon a common alphabet. In spite of the Constantinople alphabet a great diversity had continued to exist. Each author solved the problem for himself. The writers of the Catholic north used the Latin alphabet, with some special signs; the Greek alphabet was employed by those of the south because this was known to the Orthodox Christians; the Moslem writers used the Arabic alphabet with which they were familiar.³³ In adopt-

²⁹ Cf. G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212.

³⁰ Cf. G. E. b. V (Iora), *Die Wahrheit über das Vorgehen der Jungtürken in Albanien*, (Wien und Leipzig: Carl Frome, 1911), p. 43.

³¹ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76; J. Swire, *Albania, the Rise of the Kingdom* (London, Williams & Norgate Ltd., 1929), p. 80.

³² C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77; Sommerville Story (editor), *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1920) p. 365.

³³ G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

ing the Latin alphabet unanimously, the Congress of Monastir took a great step toward Albanian unification.

During the first ten months of Turkish constitutional government sixty-six Albanian cultural and political clubs were founded at home and in other parts of the Empire and four national congresses were held. In the same period twenty-four night schools with 1,753 pupils, and thirty-four day schools with 1,850 pupils were opened.³⁴ As the need for teachers was deeply felt, a congress was held in Elbasan in 1909 and a Normal School was established. Its first director was the active patriot, Luigi Gurakuqi, a Catholic from Shkodra.³⁵ Elbasan was chosen as the proper place for the school because of its dialect, intermediary between those of northern and southern Albania. At the same time the Congress appointed three committees: one, with headquarters in Korça, to raise funds and direct the day and night schools in the country; a second, in Monastir, to organize and direct national movements of the clubs; and a third to direct and oversee the work of the Normal School in Elbasan.³⁶ Schools were also open in Uskub (Skoplje), Salonica, Monastir, Janina, and Constantinople.

For months the Albanian educational movement was supported by newspapers and periodicals which appeared in all the important towns of the country and in other parts of the Empire. Among the significant newspapers of Korça were *Korça* and *Lidhja Ortodokse* (The Orthodox [Christian] Union); a politico-literary review, *Tomori* (the name of a high mountain in Albania), organ of the Normal School, was published in Elbasan; *Koha* (Time) and later *Bashkimi* (Union) were the publications of Shkodra; in Monastir *Bashkimi i Kombit* (The Union of the Nation) was issued; in Salonica appeared the political literary weekly *Liria* (Freedom) and the periodical *Dituria* (Knowledge); *Shkupi* (Uskub) was published in Uskub (Skoplje); and *Besa* (Albanian honor) and later *Shqiptari* (The Albanian) were issued in Constantinople.³⁷ Symbolic of the nationalist trends of the time are the names of the publications.

The cultural and educational progress of the Albanians alarmed the Young Turks, whose real aim was not the free development of the nationalities but "Ottomanization" of all the subjects of the Empire. In 1909 they attempted to close the Albanian clubs. They still hesitated, however, to take direct steps to close the schools. They resorted to another method.

³⁴ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-260.

³⁵ G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

³⁶ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

³⁷ Cf. T. Selenica, *Sbqipëria më 1927* (Albania in 1927), Tiranë Shtypshkroja Tirana, 1928, p. CLXVII; G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

They appealed to the religious sentiment of the Moslem Albanians by proclaiming the Latin script to be the invention of foreigners and its use a sacrilege, insisting that Arabic characters alone should be used in writing.³⁸ They also circulated Albanian publications in Arabic script. However, their propaganda met with a strong reaction. In Elbasan 7000 men gathered to declare their readiness to protect their language with their lives. In Korça, in February 1910, a demonstration in support of the Latin alphabet took place. It started with a prayer said by a hodja.³⁹

When the measure of the Arabic script failed, the Young Turks decided to suppress the Albanian educational and cultural movement altogether. The occasion was offered to them in 1910 by events in Kossovo. The Kossovars, who stood mainly for the preservation of regional autonomy, with exemption from taxation and military service for the Albanians in Albania, revolted. The movement spread to other parts of the country. The Albanians said: "We have been cheated. The Young Turks have broken their solemn agreement."⁴⁰ An ultimatum was delivered to the "Union and Progress" Committee of the Young Turks, one of its demands being freedom for private education in the country.⁴¹ The Turkish government sent Shefket Dorgut Pasha at the head of a large army to quell the insurrection. When he had subdued the Albanians the schools were closed, Albanian newspapers were suppressed and editors imprisoned, hundreds of leaders were jailed and others sought refuge in foreign lands. The extremist Turkish press called Dorgut's action "the definite occupation and enslavement of Albania."⁴²

It was during this time that the activity of the Albanian colony in the United States was intensified. Albanian immigration to America, which started toward the end of the nineteenth century, increased in the first decade of the next. Albanian nationalist leaders began to devote themselves to converting this new settlement of their people to their cause. In keeping with the typical pattern of nascent nationalism, the newspapers played an important role in forging a common national spirit among the Albanian workers in the United States.⁴³ Under the editorship of Sotir Peci, an intellectual from Korça, the newspaper *Kombi* (The Nation) began to be published in 1906 in Boston, laying the cornerstone of the Albanian na-

³⁸ Cf. T. Selenica, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁹ J. Swire, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁴⁰ E. Jäckh, *Im Türkischen Kriegs-lager durch Albanien*, (Heilbronn: Eugen Slazer, 1911), p. 26.

⁴¹ C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴² As quoted by T. Selenica, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁴³ Cf. Federal Writers' Project, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

tionalist movement in this country. *Kombi* supported the program laid down by the nationalist leaders in Albania, demanding an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman Empire as well as Albanian schools and the adoption of the Albanian language in the administration.⁴⁴ The year 1908 was momentous in American-Albanian life. A convention of Albanian Orthodox Christians in the United States resolved to abandon the Greek church and create an Albanian Independent Church with Fan S. Noli, then a priest, at its head.⁴⁵ The schism was a powerful incentive to the growth of nationalist sentiment. Translations of Greek liturgical books into Albanian followed. In 1909 *Kombi* was succeeded by *Djelli* (The Sun), directed by Noli, with the program of Albania for the Albanians. In 1910 it was prohibited for several months by the Turkish government to circulate within Albania.⁴⁶ For some time *Djelli* issued a literary supplement. In 1912 the editorship was taken over by Faik Konitza, who a year ago had published *Trumbeta e Krujës* (The Trumpet of Kruja). On April 28, 1912, the various Albanian societies formed in the United States were fused into the Pan-Albanian Federation *Vatra* (The Hearth).⁴⁷ *Vatra* published several books and by its activity contributed greatly to the resurrection of Albania.

Although Shefket Dorgut Pasha suppressed the 1910 Albanian movement, he could not subdue its spirit. The Albanians continued to resent the centralistic policy of the Young Turks. In 1911 the Catholic highlanders revolted one of their demands being the opening of state-supported Albanian schools.⁴⁸ But the great insurrection was yet to come. It broke out in Kosovo in 1912 and was followed by an uprising in the south. The Albanians occupied Uskub and were approaching Monastir. This last revolution dealt the death blow to the régime of the Young Turks: the government resigned. The Albanians continued to demand that their language should be the official language of the administration and the language of instruction in the state schools.⁴⁹ However, just as the new Turkish government began to show its intentions of acceding to the demands, the first Balkan war broke out. Albanian independence soon became a fact.

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⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴⁶ G. Petrotta, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁴⁸ J. Swire, *op. cit.*, p. 109; C. A. Dako, *op. cit.*, p. 79

⁴⁹ T. Selenica, *op. cit.*, p. 22; J. Swire, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

GERMAN SOCIALISM AND THE PEACE CRISIS OF 1916

by John L. Snell

"'Frieden in Ehren' boten wir.
'Vernichtung' heulte ihre Gier."

Erich Kuttner, "Weihnachten im Felde" (1916)¹

REFLECTING the wishes of Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German government on December 12, 1916, announced its willingness to begin peace discussions with the Entente powers. Six days later President Woodrow Wilson asked the belligerent powers to state the aims for which they fought. For a time there was hope that the governments would acknowledge the war-weariness common to all European peoples in 1916 and negotiate a peace of compromise. Both efforts failed to achieve peace, chiefly because: 1) the Central Powers refused to make known their specific war aims; 2) the Entente announced terms which could be realized only after the defeat of Germany; and 3) the German government embarked upon a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, effectively precluding further peace efforts, and insuring the broadening of the war. Scholars and politicians have been in agreement on these points for several years.² One question has remained unanswered: How, after the terrible losses of the indecisive Verdun, Somme, and Brusilov campaigns, and in the midst of the legendary "turnip winter" of 1916-1917, could the German government afford to ignore the desire for peace, then strong in Germany, and adopt instead a war measure which it assumed would probably bring the

¹ "'Peace in honor,' we offered. 'Destruction,' howled their greed." Erich Kuttner, "Weihnachten im Felde," *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost*, (Berlin) December 15, 1916, p. 1.

² For a brief account of the peace proposals cf. F. Lee Bennis, *Europe Since 1914 in its World Setting*, 6th ed. (New York, 1946), pp. 60-62. The diplomatic details have been presented by Esther Calkin Brunauer, "The Peace Proposals of December, 1916-January, 1917," *Journal of Modern History*, IV (1932), 544-571; Johannes Kühn, "Die Friedensvermittlung des Präsident Wilson im Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, XVIII (1928), 209-229; Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany's Drive to the West (Drang nach Westen): a Study of Germany's Western War Aims during the First World War* (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 139-151. German Socialist attitudes toward the proposals have been virtually ignored in secondary accounts. A. Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-21* (New York, 1949), presents an excellent survey of some of the main tendencies within wartime German Social Democracy, but does not deal with the problem at hand. The most important primary documentation for the official aspects of the problem is James Brown Scott (ed.), *Official German Documents Relating to the World War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1923), a translation by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, of Germany, Nationalversammlung, Untersuchungsausschuss, *Stenographische Berichte über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses*, 15. Ausschuss, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1919-1920). Hereinafter cited as Untersuchungsausschuss, *op. cit.*

United States into the conflict? It is the thesis of this paper that the policies of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) during the critical period reassured the government that the U-boat decision would not run afoul of serious opposition in Germany.

In late 1916 the SPD constituted the largest potential peace movement then in existence. The largest party in the German Reichstag, with almost one-third of the seats in that body, the SPD, had stood for international conciliation since its formation in 1875. Even in 1914, when Hugo Haase announced that his party would vote in favor of war credits, he voiced the wish that peace would be achieved "as soon as our opponents are ready for negotiations."³ Henceforth, throughout the struggle the issue of continued support for the war effort subordinated all others within the party. Over this issue the SPD was torn into two broad groupings. The "Majority Socialists" formed a vanguard of the proletariat for the defense of the fatherland. A "Minority" group, perhaps one-third as strong in following as the Majority in December, 1916, grew more and more reluctant to follow the Majority leaders like Philipp Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert, and rallied instead around dissenting Reichstag representatives, organized in March, 1916, as the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*. Centrifugal tendencies within the socialist movement were accentuated by radical factions within each of the major groups, the obstreperously ineffective Spartacists on the extreme left of the Minority only partly counteracting the influence of significant cliques of Socialist chauvinists, many of them prominent labor leaders, on the far right within the Majority. A deep sense of the importance of proletarian solidarity still held the divergent groups together in 1916, but formal unity scarcely disguised the partial emasculation of the SPD that had resulted from its inner rupture. Fear of aggravating tender grievances prevented the adoption of the program of either extreme.⁴ The resultant policy of drift and tactical adaptation was marked by periodic votes for war credits, accompanied by increasing talk of peace. By late 1916 the rise of disillusionment throughout Germany, plus the growing secessionism among Minority Socialists, caused SPD leaders to campaign openly for a "peace of under-

³ Germany, Reichstag, *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, CCCVI (August 4, 1914), 8-9.

⁴ For surveys of the arise of the Opposition within the SPD cf. Wilhelm Keil, *Ergebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten*, 2 vols. (Struttgart, 1947), I, 323-333; Wilhelm Blos, "Spaltungen in der Sozialdemokratie," *Die Neue Zeit* XXXI (December 14, 21, 1917), 251-258, 272-277; Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1950), I, 198-213; or the more accessible account by Eduard Bernstein, "The Rift in German Social Democracy," originally printed in *Die Zukunft*, No. 29 (April 21, 1917), 67-77 (presented in translation in Ralph Haswell Lutz [ed.], *Fall of the German Empire, 1914-18*, 2 vols. [Stanford University, 1932], II, 45-56).

standing." Scheidemann's name had come to symbolize such a vaguely defined peace by December.

The German government watched the developing disenchantment of the Socialists with one eye on Washington after November 7, 1916. The German foreign ministry knew that President Wilson, now re-elected to office, was preparing to act for peace.⁵ It was against this background that Bethmann-Hollweg on December 12 announced that Germany was willing to enter into peace negotiations.⁶ The Reichstag, having met to hear the chancellor's address, voted to adjourn without debate, the Majority Socialists supporting this decision. With the so-called "cave of winds" thus calmed, one must look chiefly to the SPD press for expressions of party opinion during the following weeks of the "peace crisis."

The effect of the German proposal upon Socialist morale was immediate and profound. The Majority Socialists identified governmental peace policy with that of the SPD itself, echoing the chancellor's warning that refusal of the German proposal would place upon it the responsibility for continuation of the war.⁷ The central organ of the party, the Berlin *Vorwärts*, rejoiced that the government had confronted the enemy with a psychological action which would prove more dangerous to them than would purely military measures.⁸ *Vorwärts* reminded the French, English, Italian, and Russian workers of the responsibilities the German note placed upon them. They were not asked to demand "peace at any price," but were expected to use their influence to bring about careful examination of the

⁵ Cf., e.g., James W. Gerard, *My First Eighty-three Years in America, the Memoirs of James W. Gerard* (Garden City, 1951), p. 242. Gerard was United States ambassador to Berlin during the years of American neutrality in the war. The timing of the German peace proposal was determined by the desire to forestall President Wilson's forthcoming proposal. Cf. Johann Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York, 1920), 306: Untersuchungsausschuss, *op. cit.*, I, 201 (for the testimony of Arthur Zimmermann, German foreign secretary at the time of the proposal). Wilson had already prepared a first draft of a statement on peace in November. Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols. (Boston and New York, 1926-1928), II, 391.

⁶ *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, CCCVIII (December 12, 1916), 2332. After hearing the chancellor speak, the Minority Socialist leader, Georg Ledebour, tried to convince the Majority Socialists and other deputies that the German parliament should "speak before the people what it has to say on the peace question." His words were wasted. *Ibid.*, 2332-2333.

⁷ *Die Glocke*, II (December 16, 1916), 401-403. Cf. also *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost*, (Berlin) January 1, 1917, p. 6. Great Britain, General Staff, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, December 23, 1916, p. 5.

⁸ Cf. also the *Fränkische Tagespost* (Nuremberg) Comment, as summarized in Great Britain, General Staff, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Enemy Press Supplement*. December 28, 1916, p. 7. The German press was oriented to regard the German proposal as a moral action Cf. Germany, Kriegspresseamt, *Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*, N. 20 (December 18, 1916).

German proposal by their governments.⁹ Only the German Minority Socialists were critical of the government's peace proposal. The chief newspaper of the minority group noted that it lacked "emphatic renunciation of annexations" and a statement of "firm desire for disarmament and cooperation in the construction of arbitration institutions."¹⁰ Extreme leftists went further, publicly asserting that the German government had purposely worded the proposal in a manner calculated to insure its rejection by the Entente powers, in this way to arouse anew nationalistic hatred of the enemy.¹¹ For its criticism of Bethmann-Hollweg's proposal the Socialist left was criticized in turn by the Majority Socialist press.¹² The German proposal thus took much of the wind from the sails of the left-Socialist critics, and won the endorsement of Majority Socialist leaders. It thereby rallied Socialist allegiances to the government as no other act had succeeded in doing since 1914. By identifying themselves with the German proposal, Majority Socialists prepared themselves for the same arbitrarily limited choice of alternatives that faced Bethmann-Hollweg even before the offer was made: if peace could not be achieved through negotiation, Germany must resort to unrestricted submarine warfare.¹³ "If the enemy refuses this offer to enter into peace negotiations, responsibility for the increased horror falls upon him," the extreme right-Socialist journal, *Die Glocke*, intoned.¹⁴

The critical months of December and January also marked the crisis of Wilsonian mediation. Wilson, like Bethmann-Hollweg, feared that unless the war could be ended quickly the United States would "inevitably drift into the war with Germany upon the submarine issue."¹⁵ On December 18, disclaiming any collusion with the German government, the American president asked the belligerent powers to state their peace terms. "It may be that peace is nearer than we know," he suggested.¹⁶

⁹ *Vorwärts*, (Berlin) December 13, 1916. This moral responsibility of the Entente Socialists was reaffirmed by Philipp Scheidemann in a speech at Chemnitz soon thereafter. Great Britain, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, December 27, 1916, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), December 13, 1916. Cf. also *Mitteilungs-Blatt des Verbandes der sozial demokratischen Wahlvereine Berlins und Umgegend*, December 17, 1916, pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Cf. Ernst Drahn and Susanne Leonhard, *Unterirdische Literatur im revolutionären Deutschland während des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 73-75. The left-Socialist Brunswick newspaper, *Volksfreund*, likewise considered the proposal as a "swindle." Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, January 4, 1917, p. 4. Cf. also Curt Geyer, *Macht und Masse, von Bismarck zu Hitler* (Hanover, 1948), pp. 89-90.

¹² (Chemnitz) *Volksstimme*, December 13, 1916, as quoted in Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, December 28, 1916, p. 7.

¹³ Gatzke, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

¹⁴ *Die Glocke*, II (December 16, 1916), 401.

¹⁵ Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 390.

¹⁶ For the text of Wilson's note of December 18 cf. United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1916, Supplement, *The World War* (Washington, 1929), pp. 97-99.

The proposition came as no shock to the German Socialists. As early as September 3, 1914, the Berlin *Vorwärts* had advised its readers that the warring states were "every moment" passing up mediation by the United States. On June 3, 1916, this journal declared that "the overwhelming majority of the German people" would greet Wilsonian mediation with "satisfaction and joy." A reminder in the Reichstag three days later of Wilson's availability for intervention on behalf of peace won vocal approval from the Social Democrats.¹⁷ Socialist praise of Wilson was, however, not unqualified. The Socialists were aware that Wilson favored the Entente, and their anxieties were intensified by American loans to England and by the increasing world economic influence of the United States. When Wilson rebuked Germany during the *Lusitania* and *Sussex* crisis, the German Socialist response was a mixture of indignation and fear that the United States might enter the conflict.¹⁸ The Socialists, like other Germans, were chary of Wilson's preparedness program, and were antagonized by his attitude toward "hyphenated" Americans. They considered the wartime friction between the United States and Mexico symbolic of a "new era of American imperialistic expansion."¹⁹ But in spite of all this, moderate Socialists of both groupings welcomed Wilson's re-election in 1916, and pointed to his increased freedom to act for peace.²⁰

The President's request of December 18 was in close accord with a Socialist demand, though the Minority had been much more aggressive in its call for an announcement of war aims than had the Majority. Would the German left now bring pressure upon the Imperial Government in order to further Wilson's peace effort. The central publishing organs of the Minority Socialists left little to be desired. "The German government declared . . . that it was ready for peace and to make suitable proposals to the enemy powers," the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* stated. "The American note offers an opportunity to make known these proposals; what has been hitherto neglected can now be made good."²¹ The Majority Socialist *Vorwärts*, more conscious of governmental sensitivities, commented that the German proposal had gone further than Wilson's, but regarded his note as "a very worthwhile supplement to the German peace offer."²² Only

¹⁷ *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, CCCVII (June 6, 1916), 1525.

¹⁸ Cf. the unpublished doctoral thesis by this writer, "The German Socialists and Wilson's Peace Policy, 1914-1918," University of North Carolina, 1949, pp. 52-55, 58-60.

¹⁹ *Vorwärts* (Berlin), March 17, 1916.

²⁰ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), November 10, 1916; *Vorwärts* (Berlin), December 5, 1916. The press was officially encouraged to treat Wilson's re-election as evidence of a "victory of the pacifistic tendency in the United States." Germany, *Kriegspresseamt*, *Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*, No. 13 (December 1, 1916).

²¹ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), December 22, 1916.

²² *Vorwärts* (Berlin), December 23, 1916. Cf. also *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost*

the SPD extremists of both left²³ and right, in unaccustomed agreement, saw little good in the President's proposal. Paul Lensch, who in Hegelian fashion saw Germany as the "Revolutionary Idea" being realized under the leadership of Bethmann-Hollweg during an international revolutionary war,²⁴ critically evaluated Wilson's "echo" of the German note. The President had acted because prolongation of the war would result in a harsher defeat for Britain, thereby endangering American financial interests.²⁵ Other right-Socialists likewise discouraged peace illusions on the eve of Christmas.²⁶

Notwithstanding the cautious, and sometimes hostile, attitude of the SPD press, Majority Socialist leaders are supposed to have "accepted with joy this second 'positive' step toward peace."²⁷ If, indeed, they did so, they were markedly out of line with official and military sentiment, and quite possibly with that of the German people. Arthur Zimmermann, German foreign secretary, had for some time feared that Wilson was trying to assure his own participation in the peace negotiations,²⁸ and in 1915 had informed the Vienna editor, Heinrich Kanner, that he would prefer to hang himself from his window ledge rather than accept a Wilson peace.²⁹ Karl Helfferich, Minister of the Interior, who claimed to have fathered the German proposal of December 12,³⁰ later remembered that in 1916 German feeling against America was "absolutely genuine and elemental."³¹ The National Constituent Assembly's post-war sub-committee on responsibility for continuation of the war reported that: "The meager and, to a certain extent inaccurate announcements of the public press, after the fact of Wilson's peace note had been made public, are surprising. His action was simply defined as an autocratic meddling on his part in our affairs, *which*

(Berlin) January 1, 1917, p. 1; and Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, January 4, 1917, p. 7.

²³ Cf. the appeal of the International Socialist Commission of December, 1916, as printed in Great Britain, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, January 11, 1917, p. 117.

²⁴ Paul Lensch, *Drei Jahre Weltrevolution* (Berlin, 1917), especially pp. 172-221.

²⁵ Paul Lensch, "Friedensecho," *Die Glocke*, II (December 30, 1916), 448-489. Max Schippel another right-Socialist called for continuation of the war, until Germany's world position was secured against continuation of "Anglo-Saxon hegemony." *Sozialistische Monatshefte* XXII (December 28, 1916), 1343-1349.

²⁶ Hartwig Koch, *Die Hamburger sozialistische Presse im Weltkrieg* (Elmshorn, 1929) p. 121.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120. When the SPD *Parteiausschuss* (Central Committee) met on January 18, 1917, there was no discussion of Wilson's peace efforts as such, but rather of the Entente reply to Wilson. *Protokoll der Sitzung des Parteiausschusses am Donnerstag, den 18 Januar 1917* (Berlin, 1917), pp. 1-39.

²⁸ The typescript papers of Dr. Heinrich Kanner, III, (Pt. 2), 51, Hoover Library, Stanford University.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 334. Cf. also *Untersuchungsausschuss, op. cit.*, I, 201-209.

³⁰ Max von Baden, *Erinnerungen und Dokumente* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 52.

³¹ *Untersuchungsausschuss, op. cit.*, I, 488-489.

must be prohibited . . .³² Bethmann-Hollweg told Count Bernstorff after his return from Washington that Wilson was in 1916 so unpopular in Germany that only the Social Democrats would have agreed to his mediation,³³ and he reminded the Socialists that at the time of the peace proposals they had constituted only a minority party, whose support would only have "increased the opposition of the other parties."³⁴

Perhaps fear of public distrust of Wilson caused the reluctance of even the Socialist leaders to insist upon an announcement of specific peace terms by the German government. At any rate, they did not press the point, and the German reply to the American President avoided all mention of terms, while re-avowing German readiness to negotiate with the Entente powers at a neutral place.³⁵ Only the most moderate Majority and Minority Socialists called attention to this omission, though the Socialists had often made of their government the same request that had most recently been raised by Wilson.³⁶ Potential criticism of the failure to state terms was forestalled by announcement of the Allied reply to Germany's own proposal. The Entente powers on December 30 exacerbated nationalistic sentiments by declaring the German note to have been a "maneuver of war," and by refusing to consider a proposal which was "without sincerity and without import."³⁷ The German Majority Socialists were as much aroused by this as was the rest of the German nation. "THE PEACE OFFER REFUSED," proclaimed the headlines of the Berlin *Vorwärts* on January 2, 1917, and other Majority Socialist source reveal similar defense mechanisms in operation, creating a robust predilection for continuation of the war.³⁸

³² *Ibid.*, II, "Bericht des zweiten Unterausschusses des Untersuchungsausschusses über die Friedensaktion Wilsons 1916/1917," p. 14. Only the Progressives joined the SPD in welcoming Wilson's action. Cf. the review of the non-Socialist press reaction in Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, January 4, 1917, pp. 5-6.

³³ Statement by Bernstorff, Untersuchungsausschuss, *op. cit.*, I, 105 Bethmann-Hollweg admitted to the ex-ambassador to Washington that he himself did not have enough faith in Wilson "to advise the Emperor to oppose the demand of G.H.Q. for declaration of an restricted submarine war." Bernstorff, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁴ Statement by Bethmann-Hollweg, November 17, 1919, Untersuchungsausschuss, *op. cit.*, II, 602.

³⁵ Cf. James Brown Scott (ed.), *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December, 1916 to November, 1918* (Washington, 1921), p. 22.

³⁶ The German failure to state terms was regretted by the Minority Socialist *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig) December 27, 1916; the leftist Brunswick *Volksfreund*, January 16, 1917 (cf. Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, February 1, 1917, p. 85), and by the moderate Majority Socialist *Volksstimme*, (Frankfurt) December 29, 1916 (Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, January 11, 1917, p. 23).

³⁷ Scott (ed.), *Official German Documents*, II, 1006-1009.

³⁸ Cf. (Berlin) *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost*, January 15, 1917, p. 2; France Ministère de la Guerre et des Affaires Étrangères, *Bulletin Quotidien de Presse Étrangère*, No. 313, January 8, 1917, p. 4; Germany, *Kriegspresseamt, Auszug aus der deutschen*

After the Allied rejection of the German proposal, it was unlikely that the Socialists would press the German government for further peace efforts; the Entente reply to Wilson's request for terms definitely precluded the possibility. The Allies insisted upon the payment of indemnities, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the reorganization of Europe on the basis of nationality.³⁹ The Entente note caused the warlike spirit of the Majority Socialists to rise to new heights, and led them to condemn the Entente answer as "an impudent mockery of common sense, a slap in the face to all lovers of peace," which left no choice but to "fight and hold out till victory!"⁴⁰ August Müller warned that the Entente announcement was proof that England was not content "to dominate half the world," and that its aim was "mastery over all of it."⁴¹ The leaders of German labor, Socialist and bourgeois, interpreted Entente aims in much the same way. Meeting on January 16, 1917, the highest officials of German labor advised Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg: "The Entente's answer removes every doubt that Germany is waging a defensive war. Fully aware that the existence of our country and of people is involved, we shall mobilize to the utmost all the powers of the working people."⁴² This conclusion was endorsed by *Vorwärts*: "We fight because we must fight in order to spare our children. War is our fate, peace remains our goal!"⁴³ Socialist chauvinists seized upon the Entente

Tangespresse, No. 964 (January 3, 1917); *ibid.*, No. 965 (January 5, 1917). Majority Socialist reaction should have been gratifying to the 7th Army Corps Headquarters, which on January 2, 1917, had advised the press that in its reaction to the Entente note it should "emphasize the harmony, unison and confidence of our people, and our complete trust in our Allies." Great Britain, General Staff, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Confidential Supplement*, No. 138 (March 10, 1917). Similarly, the War Press Office called upon the press to talk no longer of merely holding firm; rather it should "Speak of victory!" Germany, Kriegspresseamt, *Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*, No. 26 (January 5, 1917), p. 2.

³⁹ Cf. Scott (ed.), *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals*, pp. 35-38.

⁴⁰ *Volksfreund*, (Karlsruhe) January 16, 1917, as quoted in Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, February 1 1917, p. 84. Cf. also *ibid.*, January 25, 1917, p. 63; and the *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, January 23, 1917, p. 226; *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost* (Berlin), February 1, 1917, pp. 1-3.

⁴¹ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XXIII (January 17, 1917), 3. Cf. also Paul Lensch, "Eine Dummheit," *Die Glocke*, II (January 20, 1917), 601. Müller became the first socialist to accept high office in the Imperial Government. In July, 1917, he was named Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the War Food Office.

⁴² For the text of this statement cf. the *Gewerkschaftliche Frauenzeitung* (Berlin), January 31, 1917, or Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, *Geschäfts- und Kassen-Bericht*, 1916 (Berlin, 1917), p. 4. Minority Socialist unionists were critical of Legien's pledge. Cf. protest by Berlin Construction Workers in *Mitteilungs-Blatt des Verbandes der sozialdemokratischen Wahlvereine Berlins und Umgegend*, March 4, 1917, p. 11.

⁴³ *Vorwärts* (Berlin), January 13, 1917. Cf. also Max Beer, *L'Entente Annexionniste, la Paix du "Droit"* (Berne, 1917), pp. 335-345. Governmental propagandists readily adopted the idea that German victory was in the interest of the working class, which was

statement in order to gain converts among the German masses to their own ambitious war objectives: "What we must strive for is security for our existence, freedom for the expansion which we consider just, and the strengthening of our productive powers, through which Germany serves not only herself, but the whole growth of civilization," wrote August Müller. Post-war German economic territory "should stretch from the Elbe marshes to the waves of the Persian Gulf;" African colonies would provide the tropical products which Germany needed.⁴⁴

Only the Socialist left, denounced by the social-chauvinists of the right,⁴⁵ refused to forget the remissness of the German reply to Wilson. A national organizational conference of Minority Socialists, meeting at Berlin on January 7, adopted a bluntly phrased "Peace Manifesto of the Opposition." Written by Karl Kautsky and published in the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* on January 8, this manifesto refused to give approval to the method in which the German government had announced its readiness to enter into negotiations.

We hold, instead, that the time has come for the Socialist parties in all belligerent countries to demand emphatically from their governments the precise communication of the aims for which they carry on the war; to demand that these aims are of the kind that signify for none of the peoples concerned a humiliation or an impairment to its conditions of existence; that Socialists everywhere take up the struggle against all parties which desire to carry on the war for aims exceeding these.⁴⁶

Suiting action to words, on January 13 the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* summoned Saxon Socialists to mass demonstrations for peace. The local authorities, probably inspired by the desire to avoid any action which might restore Socialist solidarity, permitted the meetings to take place. The various gatherings proceeded to adopt a common resolution, which criticized the "profusely categorical" tone of the German proposal of December 12 and demanded immediate announcement of peace terms.⁴⁷ In the Prussian *Landtag* the stormy Minority Socialist, Adolf Hoffmann, denounced the German offer as not only clumsy, but inadequate.⁴⁸ To a larger audience, Karl Kautsky continued to set forth "The Tasks of the Peace Movement." In Kautsky,

urged to "continue its struggle for freedom and bread against foreign capitalism." Germany, Kriegspressamt, *Wirkungen der Kriegsziele unserer Gegner auf die Arbeitslöhne in Deutschland* (Berlin, n.d., but probably 1917), p. 11; Germany, Kriegspressamt, *Der Krieg des englischen Kapitals gegen die deutsche Arbeiterschaft* (Berlin, n.d., but probably 1917).

⁴⁴ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XXIII (January 17, 1917), 3-6. Foreign secretary Zimmermann was confident that many Social Democrats hoped for annexations. Cf. Kanner Papers, III (Pt. 2), 129, Hoover Library, Stanford University.

⁴⁵ *Die Glocke*, II (January 20, 1917), 622-623; *ibid.* (January 27, 1917), 646.

⁴⁶ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), January 8, 1917.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1917.

⁴⁸ Cf. the review in Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, February 1, 1917, p. 86.

responsibility to Marx was blended with a sense of obligation to Wilson:

"Restoration of the International for common battle against the war parties of all countries, complete independence of all workers' parties against the war policy of the governments—that must be the answer which the Socialist parties must give to Wilson's question and the answer of the governments."⁴⁹ The same twin sense of duty was announced in a resolution drafted by the Bavarian left-Socialist, Kurt Eisner.⁵⁰

The Minority Socialists were greatly outnumbered by the Majority, however; unless they, too, were won to a concerted attack against Imperial policies, there was no chance that the government would seriously consider Minority criticisms. The Majority leaders were in no mood to attack the government, but felt it necessary to re-demonstrate their own desire for an early peace. In the face of Minority pressure, *Vorwärts* combined allegiance to the government with a reaffirmation of its love for peace by shifting responsibility for its attainment to Wilson. The central organ of the SPD not only encouraged, but even instructed the American President in his role as potential promoter of peace:

Mr. Wilson has daily opportunity to see and speak with the representatives of the Central Powers as well as those of the Entente. As mediator he will deal with both with complete impartiality, he must . . . never allow himself to be the secret confederate of one or two parties, he must point out the realistic political limitations of their war aims, until he is successful in securing compromise of their mutual desires. Finally, the peace movement must be agreed upon among the warring states themselves, as the German offer desired. To clear the path to this agreement, to find the correct key to the conference chamber, that is for the mediator the great task, and he who succeeds is assured of fame in world history.⁵¹

Vorwärts urged the German government to assist Wilson's efforts by announcing concrete and suitable war aims: "The action of Wilson has prospect of success only if one lays no obstacle in the way of it. Such hindrances of an insurmountable kind will, however, grow out of an obdurate silence of both parties concerning their peace conditions."⁵²

The New Year thus brought renewed demands for Wilson's peace efforts, and would seem to have foreshadowed favorable response of his famous "peace without victory" speech of January 22. The President proposed peace through compromise, government by the consent of the govern-

⁴⁹ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), January 17, 1917.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Vorwärts* (Berlin), January 3, 1917.

⁵² *Ibid.*, January 8, 1917. Manifestations of cordiality were reciprocal. Ambassador Gerard was instructed by both Wilson and Colonel E. M. House to show exceptional friendliness to the Germans early in January. Gerard, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

ed, freedom of the seas, and moderation of armaments,⁵³ all of which the German Socialists had previously advocated. But the German government, having determined upon unrestricted use of the submarine on January 8, was indisposed to accept Wilson's gesture. The officials of the civil government⁵⁴ and of the army alike were distrustful of the President's motives.⁵⁵ For their part, the Socialists made no further effort to incline the government toward Wilson. Agreed upon his desirability before the address of January 22, both Minority and Majority Socialists seemed after the event to be equally agreed upon Wilson's shortcomings.⁵⁶ The left-Socialists, who might have been impressed by decisive intervention, were disillusioned by Wilson's idealistic address.⁵⁷ The extreme rightists were cynical of its idealism, and sarcastically hostile.⁵⁸ *Vorwärts*⁵⁹ and Scheidemann, chief spokesman of the SPD, once again pursued a middle course of action; Scheidemann praised Wilson's efforts, but admitted he foresaw no practical result of them.⁶⁰ Well might he be pessimistic, for in his own failure to mobilize Socialist pressure for an announcement of German peace terms he was passively contributing to the failure of Wilson's last effort as a neutral statesman.

Much might be said in extenuation of Scheidemann's failure, and that of the SPD leaders as a group, to press vigorously for German compliance with Wilson's request for terms and for favorable reaction to his address of January 22. Much more deplorable, and pragmatically inexcusable, was Scheidemann's failure to use the power of the SPD to forestall the German renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare. His colleague, Eduard David, later declared that the government had kept the German people uninformed about submarine and peace policy in January, 1917.⁶¹ Actually, the government was not alone in doing so. Scheidemann himself on January 17 was

⁵³ United States, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, Supplement I, *The World War* (Washington, 1931), pp. 24-29.

⁵⁴ Helfferich later asserted that the message was "but the mask which failed to conceal behind it the features of the Wilson of Versailles." Untersuchungs-ausschuss, *op. cit.*, I, 516.

⁵⁵ General Hindenburg considered the address "more a declaration of war than a step toward peace." Cf. his *Aus meinem leben*, 12th ed. (Leipzig, 1920), p. 214.

⁵⁶ The non-Socialist press was also strongly critical. Cf. Great Britain, *Enemy Press Supplement*, February 8, 1917, pp. 101-103; Great Britain, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, January 26, 1917, p. 255.

⁵⁷ *Volkszeitung* (Leipzig), January 24, 1917; Eugen Prager, *Geschichte der U.S.P.D., Entstehung und Entwicklung der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1922), p. 138.

⁵⁸ *Die Glocke*, II (February 3, 1917), 681-687.

⁵⁹ *Vorwärts* (Berlin), January 24, 1917.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, January 25, 1917.

⁶¹ Scott (ed.), *Official German Documents*, II, 697. In 1916 David himself supported the use of the submarine. Cf. (Berlin) *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost* May 15, 1916, *Beilage*, p. 1.

informed by foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann of the decision for submarine war to the limit. Though the SPD leader privately protested to Zimmermann,⁶² he did not alert the German people to the new policy, which was not publicly announced until January 31; his failure to do so amounted to a *de facto*, though reluctant, acceptance of the fateful decision.

It would seem that Scheidemann failed even to inform the Central Committee of his own party about Zimmermann's statement; no discussion of the submarine issue is recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the *Parteiausschuss* on January 18. Emphasis was rather on the schism in the party and, in the international sphere, on the Entente reaction to the American and German peace notes. Friedrich Ebert adequately phrased the attitude of the Majority Socialist leaders as follows:

The offer of a peace of understanding and equality of rights has been answered with monstrous imperialistic demands. As bitter as this disappointment is, and as fearful it may be for our country, for the future attitude of the party toward the war it creates complete clarity. Whoever favors national defense and regards conquest of our country as misfortune can no longer be in doubt about his attitude toward the war . . . Germany struggles today in fact for its life, for its existence. No one can still seriously question the fact that our country is on the defensive. Properly, the cause of our party strife, conflict about the character of the war, should be removed.⁶³

Contradictions by the Minority members gave proof that no such result was to be achieved. Arthur Stadthagen, speaking for those who were about to be read out of the SPD, expressed astonishment at the fact that the Majority persisted in paving the way for policies "which intensify the war."⁶⁴ But before the meeting was over the committee decided by a vote of 29-10 that the recent actions of the Minority constituted secession from the SPD. When the day ended the vaunted unity of German Social Democracy was in fact no more; formal organization of the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) in April, 1917, merely ratified the earlier decisions. Meanwhile, when the Reichstag resassembled in February, the Majority Socialists voted for credits once again, thereby giving further evidence of tacit acceptance of the U-boat policy.⁶⁵ The breach of diplomatic relations between Germany

⁶² Philipp Scheidemann, *Der Zusammenbruch* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 47-49.

⁶³ *Protokoll der Sitzung des Parteiausschusses am Donnerstag, den 18. Januar 1917*, p. 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶⁵ Within the SPD there was considerable support for unrestricted submarine warfare. Carl Legien, chairman of the Socialist trade unions, defended the new policy (cf. *Leipzig Volkszeitung*, April 13, 1917), as did the leaders of the Union of German Seamen (cf. *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, XXVII

and the United States on February 3 had then showed quite clearly what dangers lay in the new course.

The quick transition from talk of peace to U-boat warfare seems to have left the Majority Socialists in a state of depressive psychosis from which they were jarred only by the triple shocks of the Russian Revolution and United States entry into the war. Wartime governmental controls, fear of losing popular support, desire for an affluent stake in Germany's future, and, finally, the skein of nationalistic fear through which the Socialists, like other Germans, viewed the threat of Entente imperialism, all these factors contributed to the immobilization of German Social Democracy as a peace movement in early 1917. Pre-Christmas hope for an international understanding had been transmogrified into a patriotic self-righteousness among all the belligerent peoples. The resigned words of *Vorwärts*, "War is our fate, peace remains our goal," symbolized and strengthened the determination of the German people to seek peace through military victory. Conscious of the propaganda value of its peace proposal of December 12,⁶⁶ reassured by popular reaction against the Entente's stated war aims, and encouraged by Majority Socialist tacit acceptance of unrestricted submarine warfare, the German authorities steered a course that not only cut off Wilson's peace efforts, but which led straight to war with the United States, and eventual defeat.

Whether the SPD be condemned for its lack of international spirit, or praised for its patriotic support of governmental policy during the war, depends upon subjective rather than universally acceptable standards of reference. In its defense, Eugene V. Debs, certainly no supporter of war, on January 23, 1917, raised a question which has been too little considered in most accounts of SPD history, 1914-1918. Is it not possible, Debs asked, "that too much was expected from the socialist movement under all the conditions that surround it?"⁶⁷ Not only the wartime environment, but the historical evolution of the German Socialist movement before 1914 must be considered in evaluating its failure to act dynamically for peace in the winter

[March 24, 1917], 127). Cf. also *Sozialdemokratische Feldpost* (Berlin), February 15, 1917, p. 1; *Vorwärts* (Berlin), February 22, 1917; Heinrich Ströbel, *Durch zur Wahrheit* (Berlin, 1919), p. 23.

⁶⁶ One year after the event the War Press Office was still making capital out of the German proposal of 1916: Germany, Kriegspresseamt, *Zum Jahrestag unseres Friedensangebots* (Berlin, 1917), p. 7; Germany, Kriegspresseamt, *Bericht über die Tagung vom 7. bis 10. August 1917 in Berlin* (Berlin, 1917), p. 47.

⁶⁷ Eugene V. Debs to George D. Herron, January 23, 1917, Herron Papers, Hoover Library, Stanford University. Herron had complained that "the betrayal and degradation of a great cause can go no further or deeper than it has at the hands of the German Socialists." George D. Herron to Eugene V. Debs, December 19, 1916.

of 1916-1917. The SPD was not then, and for many years had ceased to be, a revolutionary movement; rather it was and has continued to be to the present time a parliamentary *political party*, dedicated to social progress and consecrated to the advancement of organized labor in Germany. Its history should accordingly be written as that of a political party. If its part in the peace crisis of 1916 is evaluated in such a spirit, then one may well conclude that the SPD acted not unlike any Western European party would have acted, given the situation in which German Socialists found themselves in the winter of 1916-1917.

KINGSTON, MARYLAND

NOTES

Three *Hefte* of the first volume of the *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* have made their appearance. Published by the N. G. Elwert Verlag,, Marburg Lahn, the *Zeitschrift* is edited by Professors Hermann Aubin, Herbert Schlenger and Erich Keyser, and the J. G. Herder Forschungsrat is sponsoring this effort to revive the study of the peoples of Eastern *Mitteleuropa*. In his introductory article, Professor Aubin emphasizes the great changes, political and economic, and cultural, that Central Europe has undergone in the last decade, and lays particular stress upon the present need for Western scholarship to study with great care the present situation and the effect the recent changes have brought to the peoples who have been in this area for millenia. The articles, notices, and reviews have an air of informativeness. A number of Sudeten German scholars appear among the contributors, though the general predominance of interest seems to point toward the Polish area. The Bibliography of current publications is conveniently numbered and classified. An effort has been made to list important publications of as far back as 1945.



A group of emigrés from Caucasus, now in Western Germany, have founded a journal "The Caucasus" (*Der Kaukasus*) published in German, English and Turkish. The first number appeared in January, 1952 in Munich (40, Steinstrasse, Munich 8), and, as of the date of going to press, 10 numbers have appeared. The Editor is A. Kantemir. The articles, partly historical and partly political, emphasize the geopolitical unity of the area, and envisage a Confederation of the Causasus, to include Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaidjan, and the North Caucasus, somewhat on the Swiss model.



Professors Hans Rothfels and Theodor Eschenburg, with the collaboration of a substantial editorial committee have founded the *Vierteljahrschrift für Zeitgeschichte*, of which the first *Heft* (January, 1953) has appeared. This journal is devoted to what is sometimes called Recent History. The editors feel that, perhaps by contrast with earlier post-war periods, there is enough documentation now available to justify scholars in treating the past several decades as history. The articles in the first number will illustrate this approach. General Helm Speidel, "Reichswehr und Rote Armee;" Wilhelm Treue, "Das Dritte Reich und die Westmächte auf dem Balkan;" Helmut Krausnick, "Rommel und der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler." There is also an interesting set of documents on the murder of General Schleicher. A not inconsiderable item in the journal is the section set aside,

with separate and consecutive pagination, for a systematic bibliography of studies in recent history. Admittedly it takes some time to establish useful criteria for such a bibliography, but this seems limited to a very few western European languages. It would be a mistake to assume that there is nothing significant in the other Western European languages and in many Central and Eastern European languages. Subsequent numbers of this review will be watched with great interest.

* * *

A group of academicians, now living in exile from their Central European countries in England, have organized a "Free Course of Central Eastern European Studies (32, Bolton Gardens, London S.W.8) The course was inaugurated by a lecture by Minister A. Torma, January 25, 1952 on "Independence and Interdependence," and subsequent lectures and study (1) on the history of Central-Eastern Europe, as a whole, (2) the economic problems of the area, (3) Demographic and Ethnic problems and (4) problems incident to the freedom and security of the area are planned. Monographic publication is envisioned for the near future. The list of collaborating scholars includes former professors of the leading universities of Central Europe.

* * *

The Göttinger Arbeitskreis has published a considerable number of popular brochures on subjects of interest to students of Central European history and culture. The last number is 27. The titles of some of the brochures would indicate the general approach of the series, 1, Walther Hubatsch, *Preussenland Werden und Aufgabe in sieben Jahrhunderten*; 2/3 Wilhelm Weizsäcker, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen und Mähren*; 7, Josef Hanika, *Sudetendeutsche Volkskunde*; 11, Erich Keyser, *Geschichte der Stadt Danzig*; 12, Richard Meyer, *Das Memelland*; 15, Manfred Hellmann, *Die Deutschen in Litauen*; 17, Jürgen von Hehn, *Die Baltischen Lande. Geschichte und Schicksal der baltischen Deutschen*; 27, Lutz Mackensen, *Pommersche Volkskunde*. The reader will soon perceive the general spirit informing the whole series from such statements as (No. 1, p. 11): "Der Deutsche Orden ist nicht ein Kampfbund gewesen, sondern eine geistliche Gemeinschaft." (No. 11, p. 4) "Nachdem deutsche Kaufleute und Handwerker die Stadt Danzig im 13. Jahrhundert bergründet hatten, . . ." The name Danzig (Gdańsk), which is the only name ever used for this port, is Polish. The murderous assault on the city in 1308 is called quite modestly a "Besetzung." The treatment of the Sudeten question in the 'thirties could be called an exercise in dialectic.

Memorial Fund for R. W. Seton-Watson

The effort of his British colleagues to erect a memorial, both in a bronze plaque to be placed in Masaryk Hall at the University of London, and in the establishment of a scholarship fund at the London School of Slavonic Studies is being seconded by an American Committee consisting of Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Arthur J. May and S. Harrison Thomson. It is hoped the response from Americans who have so much reason, over the years, to appreciate and profit from Seton-Watson's pioneering work in the field of Danubian and Balkan Studies may be as wide as possible. Contributions of five dollars—more or less—may be sent to the Editor of this JOURNAL, for transmittal to the British Committee.

* * *

Corrigenda

The sixth line from the bottom on page 190 of the July, 1952, issue of the JOURNAL, instead of, "His volume will never be one of the important sources for the eventual account . . .," "His volume will be one of the important sources for the eventual account . . .,".

The review heading on page 193, instead of, Wszelain, Jan H., "Fuel and Power in Captive Middle-Europe," read "Wszelaki, Jan H., "Fuel and Power in Captive Middle-Europe."

BOOK REVIEWS

CHUDOBA, BOHDAN, *Spain and the Empire, 1519-1643*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 299. \$5.00.

Among the most interesting characters in this book are the group of Hispanophile and half-Hispanicized Czechs and Germans and transplanted and half-assimilated Spaniards who provided diplomatic and cultural liaison between the courts of Philip II and III and the Austrian branch of the house of Hapsburg. This group Professor Chudoba treats with the sympathy one would expect of a Czech scholar who seems as much at home in the archives and the cultural climate of Spain as he would be in Prague and his freshest and most fascinating pages concern such figures as Guillén de San Clemente, Spanish ambassador to the imperial court from 1580 to 1608, and Johann Khevenhueller who served Austria at Madrid from 1575 to 1606. The activities of these diplomats and counsellors, patiently studied from the archives, helps explain why the two Hapsburg courts, in spite of the tensions between them, moved so often along parallel lines, how the Austrians came gradually under the influence of Spanish crusading ardor, and how Spain was drawn into the vortex of the Thirty Years War.

A good deal of this material Professor Chudoba has published in articles and in a book, *Špaňelé na Bílé hoře* (Prague, 1939, 1945) but it now appears in English for the first time. It is surrounded by a broader framework of narrative and generalization about Spanish policy and diplomacy which is less happy. The grasp of factual details is uncertain. Francis I did not defeat a "Spanish army at Marignano (p. 41); Charles V did not renounce all territorial aggrandizement at the expense of France in 1526 (p. 22); Henry VIII married Catherine of Aragon in 1509, not 1511 (p. 44). (Here, the following account of diplomatic and dynastic alliances is jumbled into unintelligibility.) King Sebastian of Portugal was not a "member of the Braganza family" (p. 156). And so forth. The number of such slips, some big, some little, is disquieting. The style, also, is uneven. Professor Chudoba's English is fluent and copious, but not always idiomatic or exact. The spelling of proper names appears to follow no known system. Valdštyň for Wallenstein and Olomouc for Olmütz are explicable though they will dismay some readers, but such forms as "the district of Charolles" (for Charolais), "Alsatia" (for Alsace) and "Toscany" are merely eccentric. But these blemishes are less disturbing than the tone of the explanation and generalization. All that is said to account for the spread of Lutheranism after 1532 is. "Greed, debauchery and nationalism led the German princes into the camp where confiscation of ecclesiastical goods and moral profligacy were encouraged" (p. 50). And of Bohemia in the twelve months before the defenestration at Prague: nothing of importance happened except that Ferdinand II recognized the validity of the Letter of Majesty (p. 216).

Unfortunately the documentation does nothing to restore our shaken confidence. There are no footnotes, and the notes at the back, though they refer re-

peatedly to archival sources, just list groups of bundle numbers in which each bundle may contain perhaps a hundred documents and as much as a thousand pages, so that there is no way that anyone can tell when a particular statement is drawn from archival research, when from published material, and when just from the author's inner certainties. It is a pity that the product of so much learning, industry and enthusiasm, a product in part of genuine value, could not have been cast in a more usable and persuasive form.

Columbia University

GARRETT MATTINGLY

TURVILLE-PETRE, G., *The Heroic Age of Scandinavia*. London: Hutchinson's University Library 1951. Pp. 196, 8/6.

It is a laudable intent which has led the author to prepare "an introduction to the history of the Norsemen." Not too many handbooks on this subject, or on major phases of it, are available to the English reader.

To a degree beyond what the title would suggest the approach is literary and biographical. The author's intent, stated in the Preface, is to write of "the lives and thoughts of the Norsemen at home." But the cultural side of the story turns out to be rather sparsely treated—a source such as *Völuspá* is not discussed and the mention of *Hávamál* is brief. Chapters entitled "The Age of S. Anskar" and "The Age of S. Olaf" contain much biographical data but little social or economic history. What most disturbed the age deserves a more consistent treatment than it receives here, namely the comprehensive clash between Paganism and Christianity. For that clash was then reshaping the life, including the literary traditions, of many peoples of Northern and Eastern Europe, Slavic as well as North Germanic. We are left with only brief hints of that rich distillation of cultural history of the Viking period, offered in Williams' *Social Scandinavia in the Viking Age* and Olrik's *Viking Civilization* or even in the studies on phases of its literature by Hollander and Koht.

The attention given to the cultural side of the story, limited and intermittent as it is, would in the aggregate prove more forceful if the culture of the age were treated as a unit instead of being scattered through chapters following national alignments. In Scandinavian society cultural differentiation along national lines was only beginning by the date (1030) intended to mark the close of this study.

The reader who will find this volume most rewarding will be the novice entering upon his Anglo-Saxon and Old Germanic studies. He primarily will appreciate that the author has spelled Norse names "in early Norse forms, but . . . modified them so that they may seem less strange and indigestible." Others however might prefer spellings closer to those current on the subject in modern Scandinavian literature; they may not promptly recognize forms such as Thrándheim, Hringisakr, Heidmörk, Upplönd, Thamborskelfir, Hörda-Knútt, or Valhöll (for Valhalla).

Turville-Petre's study thus provides a compact introduction to the literary

traditions—including those of common Germanic as well as distinctively Scandinavian origin—of the Heroic Age of Scandinavia. A surprising amount of information about those traditions—especially about their biographical phase—is packed into this modest-sized volume. Relatively generous is the attention given to the heroic lay, the saga, and the verse of the skald as literary forms and as historical sources. Within the limits indicated the reader will find a concise and sober survey of the subject, worthy of any good scholar seeking to bring part of his specialized knowledge before a wider public.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

FRIEDRICH, CARL JOACHIM, *The age of the Baroque, 1610-1660*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. Pp. 368. \$5.00.

The most recent addition to the series *The Rise of Modern Europe*, edited by Professor William L. Langer, is a volume on five stormy decades, from 1610 to 1660, by Professor Carl Joachim Friedrich.

The author believes he has discovered the characteristic mark of this era. He regards the baroque style and its victorious march from Italy to various parts of Europe as the mainspring of continental developments in the early and middle parts of the seventeenth century. His book is a bold attempt to present the various aspects of European life in those decades as products of the baroque state of mind. While the search for underlying ideas and unifying forces is laudable and rewarding, the risk of oversimplification should be taken seriously into account before rigid formulas are coined. In many cases it is far easier to enunciate the general ideas than to marshal the enormous variety of facts and cast them into the prepared mould without too much violence or arbitrariness. The book under review is not entirely free of such shortcomings.

In harmony with the rules governing the series as well as organization of individual volumes, Professor Friedrich's outline opens with a discussion of the main trends of European life in the early seventeenth century. Four chapters are devoted to the dominant forces and ideas to prepare the readers for the study of the struggles in which, for a half of the century, the peoples of Europe were engaged. The author faced two unusually demanding tasks and has made an earnest effort to fulfil them satisfactorily. One was a consequent application to the mass of concrete facts of his general observations and prefabricated formulas, the other, in some ways even more difficult, sprang from the desire to bring some order and unity into the mighty flow of political and military developments—it is necessary to remember that between 1610 and 1660 Europe knew only short spells of peace and genuine cooperation. The description of this period is approximately on the same level as other, hitherto published, contributions to *The Rise of Modern Europe* and will, undoubtedly, appeal to a wide and appreciative audience.

A book which aims at higher goals than a simple narrative is likely to stimulate thought and give rise to both questions and critical observations. It is easy to perceive that Professor Friedrich's outline was not written hastily and

that wide reading and much thought preceded the first draft. Two chapters (II, III) in which the various aspects of the baroque art are treated sound like a prolonged echo of discussion of the problems of the seventeenth century which went on in Germany during the 1920's and early 1930's. The author's conception of the period 1610-1660 is deeply rooted in the efforts of some modern German scholars to rehabilitate the products of the baroque art for which the rationalists of the eighteenth century and the practical-minded children of more recent times had little use or liking. There is no evidence in the book of his acquaintance with studies of the baroque in the Slavic languages although much work had been done in that field in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.

In a review which is intended as a serious analysis of the book some general problems must be touched upon. Such delicate and highly controversial questions as the origin of the baroque, while suggested provocatively by the author, have been left open. As the author proceeds from the introductory chapters to the treatment of political developments, the gap between the general characterization and the events to be recorded widens. It does not take much study to realize that the period lacked in unity in a far higher degree than the book is disposed to prove. There are in the text indications of the author's uncertainty as to whether the baroque had really become such a mighty factor in Europe before 1660 as he set out to show in the general survey. It is the reviewer's opinion that before 1660 large areas of the continent had not been reached by the waves of the baroque spirit and that its effects were really felt only after the closing of the campaigns and upheavals, labelled summarily, as the Thirty Years War.

The author has complicated his task by adopting the fashionable but highly arbitrary division of the Continent into western and eastern halves. If a dividing line had existed in the seventeenth century, then its course was different from the western boundaries of the Soviet orbit. It is an anachronism to lump together the Czechs, the Poles and the Russians of the seventeenth century and to treat lightly the high wall between Western Christianity, Catholic or Protestant, on the one side, and Greek Orthodoxy on the other. The Kingdom of Bohemia as a portion of the Hapsburg domain was hardly ever, before or after, so closely linked with either the Protestant or Catholic regions of Western and Central Europe as during the early part of the seventeenth century. The building, in 1578-1602, of the San Salvator church in the Jesuit controlled compound in Prague, known as the Clementinum, should be regarded as one of the milestones in the progress of the baroque north of the Alps and as one of the many symbols of Bohemia with the Western orbit. On another occasion Professor Friedrich goes to the other extreme and presents the building activities of Albrecht, Duke of Wallenstein, as early baroque monuments of Germany, although two of the three centers mentioned in the relevant passage (p. 85), Prague and Jičín (Gitschin), are situated in the purely Czech districts of Bohemia, and the third, Sagan, lies in the linguistically mixed Silesia.

The mechanical dissection of the Continent into western and eastern halves

has evidently influenced the author's grouping of political events in the various chapters. Thus one chapter (VIII) entitled "The Eastern Dynasties" is devoted not only to the Romanovs and the Vasas (Swedish and Polish) but also to the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Into this chapter of 25 pages the author has squeezed together the destinies of such countries as Brandenburg, Sweden and the Baltic region in general, Poland, Russia, Hungary, Transylvania, and Turkey. The disproportion between this chapter and those dealing with Western Europe is evident at the first glance. A closer scrutiny shows that the destinies of those countries have been briefly sketched and that in most cases such general surveys as G. Vernadsky's *History of Russia* and O. Halecki's *History of Poland* have served as the chief source of information.

Minor inaccuracies or typographical errors occur in chapter VII more frequently than in other parts of the book. As the series has secured such a prominent place among scholarly works on modern European History, the reviewer hopes he may be excused if he points out some of the mistakes. In the chart of rulers (p. 247) the name of the Polish King Sigismund III is given correctly. References to him in the index (pp. 253, 255) are also correct. But there appears in the index also John Sigismund of Poland (with references to pp. 169 and 248). The two rulers are identical: the Vasa prince John Sigismund ruled in Poland as Sigismund III. A misunderstanding might arise in another case: Sigismund's successor is listed in the chart as Władysław VII whereas elsewhere in the text he is referred to (correctly) as Władysław IV, or simply Władysław (p. 260). Under Hungary-Transylvania the chart mentions Stephen Boscaj—the correct name is Bocskay. It would have been more correct to list another prince in the index under Bethlen and not Gábor since Gábor (Gabriel) was his given name and the family name is Bethlen. A few typographical errors can be easily corrected: The peace treaty of 1606 was signed at Zsitva (not Zaitva) Török (p. 247). The names of two historians quoted by the author are Bobrzynski (p. 255, n. 16, p. 256, n. 18, p. 350) and Pokrovsky (p. 249, n. 4, p. 349). The name of the ardent proponent of all-German union, von Srbik, is undoubtedly of Slavic origin, but even the original name of the family was not Śrbik (as listed on p. 345). It is doubtful whether Polish historians would spell the name of the renowned Cossack leader as Hmielnicki (see p. 255) for the form Chmielnicki corresponds better to the rules of Polish grammar. The date of the death of Emperor Mathias (p. 143) should be corrected from 1618 to 1619. The *colloquium charitativum* was held at Toruń in 1645 not 1644 (p. 253). Wishing to present the immediate causes of the Bohemian revolt in 1618 as concisely as possible Professor Friedrich telescoped two incidents, the closing of the Protestant church at Broumov (Braunau) by the Benedictine abbot of Břevnov, and the tearing down of a Protestant church at Hroby (Klostergrab) at the order of the Archbishop of Prague (see p. 163, 165).

Professor Friedrich refers in passing (p. 42, note 6) to the common contention that the Jesuit architecture is identical with baroque architecture throughout the period which he has treated in his volume. He evidently disagrees with

this view which, like all generalizations, has its risk and limits. But even the sceptics could hardly deny the close links between the Society of Jesus and the pioneers of the baroque art. With the Jesuits the baroque spread from its cradle both west and east. Thus it reached through Spain and Portugal the western hemisphere and left its impression in the eastern and southeastern parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But this expansion was only in its initial stage before 1660 at which Professor Friedrich's *The Age of the Baroque* ends.

Columbia University

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

SNYDER, LOUIS L., *German Nationalism—The Tragedy of a People, Extremism Contra Liberalism in Modern German History*, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Company, 1952. Pp. 321. \$3.75.

Dr. Snyder, in this series of essays, has chosen one of the most significant themes that any historian could select and he has produced a notable contribution to the understanding of modern Nationalism and of German Nationalism in particular. Each essay is to a large extent self-contained and could have been published separately (as indeed one of them, at least, was) but their cumulative effect and value when all twelve are collected between two covers is considerably greater than their individual impact would have been. Inevitably Dr. Snyder has to retrace a certain amount of well-known ground in the process of giving continuity to his theme—perhaps the ideas of Rosenberg (in Chapter 9) and of Banse (in Chapter 10) have been if anything too often analysed, in view of their essential simplicity and crudity. But there is enough of original research and thinking in this volume to make it very worth while reading by all serious students either of the force of Nationalism or of German history.

In certain chapters Dr. Snyder puts into new and truer perspective personalities and ideas around which legends had already arisen to obscure them. This applies particularly to *Turnvater* Jahn (Chapter 2), to the brothers Grimm (Chapter 3) and to Professor Friedrich Meinecke (Chapter 11). In the case of Heinrich von Treitschke (Chapter 6), Richard Wagner (Chapter 7), Adolf Stoeckel (Chapter 8), and a few others whose contributions to the perversion of the German national idea Dr. Snyder analyses, he deepens and makes more convincing the generally accepted interpretations rather than adding anything original concerning them, but this in itself is a very useful service.

Only in the cases of Friedrich List (Chapter 4) and Heinrich von Gagern (Chapter 5) did this reviewer find Dr. Snyder's arguments in any way hard to accept. Dr. Snyder seems to "fall" too readily for the view that List's *magnum opus* could have owed little or nothing to his American experience or to his study of Alexander Hamilton, simply because List's ideas on a German customs union were basically in his mind before he went to live in the U.S.A. This is like saying that, for equally good, or bad, reasons, *Das Kapital* owes nothing to Karl Marx's long residence in England. The Chapter on Heinrich von Gagern and the Collapse of Liberal Nationalism is perhaps on the thin side, as if Dr. Snyder considered that he ought to put in something about the 1848-49 revolutions in

Germany without having anything very significant to add on that subject. He fully accepts the thesis propounded by Sir Lewis Namier in *The Revolution of the Intellectuals*, but embroiders it slightly, with the result that Heinrich von Gagern emerges as a rather more important figure in the history of German Nationalism than he is really justified by the evidence.

The chapter in this book which is likely to receive most attention from contemporary readers is that (Chapter 11) on Friedrich Meinecke, not only because its thesis is highly controversial but because publication coincides with the various celebrations of the 90th birthday, on October 30th, 1952, of that venerable German scholar. Dr. Snyder makes a very careful survey of Meinecke's evolution as a historian. He starts rather disarmingly (p. 256) by saying that "It is with a sense of reluctance, that this chapter on Meinecke is included in this book. There is no intention of impugning his reputation as one of the great technicians of the historical craft in modern times." But then he goes on to assert that "Meinecke's advocacy of the reason of state, and of historicism as a philosophy of history was in reality what others more irrationalist than he utilised for the purpose of pursuing extreme nationalism, state-worship and aggression." Citing chapter and verse, Dr. Snyder goes on to build up a formidable case against Meinecke for committing the "basic error or judgment" of accepting "the principle of a morality encased in a Prussian frame and limited by the demands of the state" (p. 257).

More than one of the several distinguished pupils of Meinecke who are now living and working in the United States, from their personal knowledge of Meinecke's views, as expressed in his lectures and seminars (see p. 275, note 89) may wish to cross swords with Dr. Snyder on what exactly are Meinecke's real prejudices and limitations, but on the basis at least of his printed words Dr. Snyder's criticisms of Meinecke seem to be justified. Anybody who has read Meinecke's *German Catastrophe* (1946; English edition 1950) will have to admit that it contains only a partial retraction of his Prusso-German chauvinism and by no means takes him all the way back from the worship of the *Nationalstaat* to a belief in *Weltbürgertum*. Dr. Snyder's stimulating book is slightly impaired by a few minor errors of fact (Meinecke's age is stated to have been 84 in 1951, on pages 255 and 256, but his birth-date is given correctly as October 30, 1862 on page 258), and some slight distortion, due to telescoping his narrative. But it has sterling worth throughout and it is hoped that he will continue his fruitful line of investigation into the springs of that political nationalism which (in the words of Sir Norman Angell, quoted in Dr. Snyder's opening paragraph) "has become for the European of our age, the most important thing in the world."

University of Birmingham, England

JOHN A. HAWGOOD

WEIDLE, WLADIMIR, *Russia: Absent and Present*. Translated by A. Gordon Smith. New York: John Day. 1952. Pp. vi, 153. \$3.50.

Professor Weidlé's small book about Russia can best be described as a study in the philosophy of history, similar in its essentials, for instance, to Berdiayev's

well-known outline of *The Russian Idea*. Professor Weidlé uses five chapters to trace in a masterful sweep the troubled history of the Russian State to the present and then concludes with a special chapter on "The Russian Soul."

The author's main argument is in a sense fascinating, but it is also unreasonable and profoundly unhistorical. To state that argument briefly and in a somewhat oversimplified manner, the author believes that the Russian people as such never had a history, that Russian political organization, social structure and culture were always imposed from the outside, while the Russians themselves merely offered passive resistance to the internal forces which molded their destiny. "The principal difficulty that could never be surmounted—whether by the Russia of Kiev, the Muscovite Russia or the Russia of St. Petersburg—was precisely that non-participation of the people in the political and cultural life of the nation, its virtual refusal to provide the necessary labor for the establishment of a national tradition and continuity" (p. 16). Chapter sub-headings such as "The smallness of the élite," "The state as oppressor," or 'A people but no nation' illustrate well Professor Weidlé's main line of thought. As a matter of fact, the author claims that the one statement that describes Russia best is to be found in the words of Rozanov, "words that only a Russian could have written," which read as follows: "I am like a child in its mother's womb, reluctant to be born. I am warm enough here" (p. 149). Proceeding from his basic premise, Professor Weidlé grossly exaggerates the influence of the Norsemen on Russian culture, interprets Peter the Great's activity as a catastrophic break with the Russian past, the point of view which was modified already by the historian S. Soloviev a century ago, and describes the collapse of tsarist Russia simply as a logical result of its lack of foundations.

Professor Weidlé's ambivalence on the subject of Russian culture is worth noting. On the one hand, Russian culture as well as the Russian state were, in his opinion, always "developed by 'Varangians,' by strangers in spirit if not in race" (p. 23). On the other hand, Professor Weidlé who himself belongs to the intellectual élite of Russia and appreciates Russian culture as few people do, both commends its enormous lasting achievements, for instance in the case of Pushkin, and cites its representatives, especially the great writers, as the best witnesses to the true Russian spirit.

The last chapter, "The Russian Soul," is the worst. The author usurps universal human traits as peculiarly Russian characteristics, cites particular attitudes and aspirations of different writers as mysteriously revealing the national soul, argues on the basis of sparse and arbitrarily selected evidence, and uses other similar techniques common to most proponents of national souls. To be more specific, Professor Weidlé postulates four main characteristics of the Russian soul: the family connection, fear of law, hatred of forms, and the spirit of humility. As to the author's evidence for his view, one example should suffice. To prove the uniquely intense fear and dislike of law of the Russian, "one has only to read Gogol's *Cloak* (1842) or the description of a government office in Goncharov's *Trivial Tale* (1847)" (p. 135).

In spite of its futile main argument, Professor Weidlé's book has much to offer. Notably, it contains many interesting observations, stimulating suggestions, and brilliant aperçus. The pages on Pushkin, on a comparison between Russia and Spain, or on Russian culture on the eve of the Revolution, as well as some others, deserve particular attention. The English translation of the work is good although it does not do full justice to the superb style of the French original. Professor Weidlé's *Russia: Absent and Present* should provide interesting reading to discerning students of Russia and Russian culture and be a welcome addition to any library containing material on that country.

State University of Iowa

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

WILLIAMS, WILLIAM APPLEMAN, *American Russian Relations 1781-1947*. New York and Toronto: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1952. Pp. 367. \$3.75.

This latest addition to the growing list of works on Russian-American relations is richly detailed and provocatively interpretive. It does not, however, quite fulfill the promise of its titled dates, as only about forty pages are allotted to the pre-1900 period and developments since 1939 are briefly surveyed in a concluding essay—a commendable recognition of the scarcity of authoritative sources for the recent era.

Obviously, the book is the product of extensive research within the chronological boundaries 1900-1939, especially in the State Department Archives and in the private papers of a number of individuals who as private citizens or public servants helped shape American policies toward Russia. The result has been to throw much new light on the role of personalities both in and out of government and on the weight of economic motives in determining Washington attitudes and actions toward tsars and commissars. Of particular interest are the chapters dealing with the pre-World War I economic rivalry in the Far East between the United States and its financial giants and Imperial Russia. Equally revealing are the sections describing the confused and confusing policies of Washington during the revolutionary epoch, 1917-1921.

The years of non-recognition and the uneasy friendship after 1933 are carefully investigated. The author concludes that the delay in establishing normal relations with the Bolshevik régime was short sighted and unwarranted and that the potentialities for fruitful collaboration in the cause of peace following recognition were dissipated by American inspired petty arguments over debts and propaganda. The final chapter is an indictment of American diplomacy during and after the war for its ignorance of Soviet strength and aims; for its failure to use continued economic aid to Russia as a method of controlling Soviet activities in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; for its resort to arguments rather than negotiation as an answer to growing Moscovite intransigence; and above all (and this is applied to the entire period since 1917), for its refusal to acknowledge the "broad challenge of the Bolshevik Revolution, face its implications, and embark on a conscious effort to prove Marx's *predictions* to have been in error." (p. 283).

There is little question that the United States must acknowledge her culpability in regard to many of the errors the author delineates. But is it equally clear, as the author at least infers, that America must assume the primary responsibility for the present impasse between the two great powers? It is true that anti-Soviet bias and parochial thinking often characterized Washington policy making. But it is also evident from the record that the provocations were great and that on a number of occasions America made a sincere effort to salute the Soviet cheek only to find it bristly and cold. A more careful examination of the long-term motives behind the periods of Soviet courtship of the United States and more attention to the constant Russian insults, broken promises, and petty annoyances might perhaps have softened the harsh evaluation of our diplomats.

Of course, the book is concerned primarily with American conduct and American errors in the relationship and is so titled. But the danger in such an approach is that the neglect of irritants and blunders on the other side will throw the picture out of focus. Yet, whatever doubts the reader may entertain concerning the validity of some of the interpretations on this work, he can not fail to be stimulated by them, nor to be impressed by the wealth of new factual material presented.

University of Colorado

ROBERT P. BROWDER

CHABOD, FEDERICO, *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896*. Vol. I, *Le Premesse*. Edited by Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. Bari-Gius. Laterza, 1951. Pp. 172. Lire 5500.

In 1936 the *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale* in Milan announced its intentions to publish a series of scholarly researches in all aspects of the history of Italian foreign policy between the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 and August 1914. Research was to be based primarily on examination of official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which hitherto had been inaccessible to scholars, at least in their entirety. Investigation of the period from January 1861 to September 20, 1870, was assigned to Prof. Walter Maturi; from September 21, 1870, to March 1896 to Prof. Federico Chabod, from 1896 to 1908 to Prof. Carlo Morandi; and from 1908 to August 1914 to Prof. Augusto Torre. Completion of the enterprise was hampered by the war and by the untimely death of Prof. Morandi, whose section for investigation has been reassigned to Prof. Giacomo Perticone. The editors wisely have not delayed the publication of the first manuscript to be completed, that of Prof. Chabod, even though chronologically it forms the second topic in the series.

Recently superimposed on the original I.S.P.I. series is an even broader program of publication in the field of Italian diplomatic history. With governmental backing, this expanded program, made possible by the overthrow of the Fascist régime in 1943, will involve the publication of most of the Italian diplomatic documents of the period between 1861 and the armistice of September 8, 1943. Under the presidency of Senator Alessandro Casati, a commission of

scholars which includes the original I.S.P.I. group and some others is classifying and editing these documents according to the following plan:

Series I	January 8, 1861—September 20, 1870	Prof. Walter Maturi
Series II	September 21, 1870—March 5, 1896	Prof. Federico Chabod
Series III	March 6, 1896—December 31, 1907	Prof. Giacomo Perticone
Series IV	January 1, 1908—August 2, 1914	Prof. Augusto Torre
Series V	August 3, 1914—November 4, 1918	Prof. Augusto Torre
Series VI	November 5, 1918—October 30, 1922	Prof. Rodolfo Mosca
Series VII	October 31, 1922—April 14, 1935	Prof. Ruggero Moscati
Series VIII	April 15, 1935—September 3, 1939	Prof. Mario Toscano
Series IX	September 4, 1939—September 8, 1943	Prof. Mario Toscano

Recently it was announced that Volume I of Series I and Volume 12 of Series VIII of the documentary collection have been completed.

Limitation of space precludes a detailed discussion of Chabod's exceptionally meritorious study, the first to appear in the original I.S.P.I. series. Prof. Chabod explains in his preface that it is not his intention in this volume to provide a chronological analysis of the specific problems and phases of Italian foreign policy between the triumphal breach of Rome's *Porta Pia* on September 20, 1870 and Crispi's colonial disaster at Adowa on March 1, 1896. That will be left for subsequent volumes. Here the author is primarily concerned with elucidating the "passions and feelings, the ideas and ideologies, and the attitudes of the country and people" which make foreign policy "nothing else than an . . . aspect of a much larger and more complex historical process—embracing the entire life of a nation and precluding any rigid compartmentalization." In carrying out this plan, the author has divided his work into two sections: the first entitled, "The Passions and the Ideas"; the second, "The Things and the Men." The former contains several penetrating essays which deal with the repercussions in Italy of the Franco-Prussian War, the "idea" of Rome, and the prevailing concepts in Italy of freedom and order. The latter portion of the volume, embracing the final 225 pages, takes up many of the specific topics of Italian diplomacy and discusses the motivations of the leading Italian diplomats.

In addition to examining exhaustively the materials in the archives of the Foreign Ministry, Prof. Chabod has studied in various Italian public and private archives papers and correspondence, much of which hitherto had been inaccessible to researchers. Private collections, the contents of which often were invaluable for clarifying obscure points, included those of Victor Emmanuel II, Visconti Venosta, Depretis, Mancini, and Nigra. Moreover, Prof. Chabod has utilized hitherto unpublished materials in the archives of the *Quai d'Orsay* and of Vienna. Unfortunately, during the years he was engaged in the research, Chabod was unable to obtain permission from the German Government to consult its archives. He expects to examine the British archives before the volumes containing the relevant Italian documents of the period 1870-1896 are published.

The author is both Professor of Modern European History at the University of Rome and Director of the *Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici*, a post-gradu-

ate school founded by Benedetto Croce in Naples since the recent war. It is not surprising to this reviewer that Prof. Chabod, who enjoys a brilliant reputation for sound scholarship of the liberal tradition, has maintained throughout his study exceptionally high standards of objectivity and precision. Almost never does he write in a tone of nationalistic self-righteousness. His style is uniformly felicitous, avoiding the involuted syntax dear to some Italians. Here and there, however, the lengthy text might have benefited from compression. While this volume presents relatively few substantial revisions of previous historical judgments regarding Italian diplomacy, it pulls together many of the loose threads in earlier studies and skillfully integrates it all with the domestic scene. Extensive footnotes on almost every page attest to the careful research incorporated in this work, which in all likelihood will become the standard reference in its field. If the succeeding volumes in this series maintain the high standards set by Prof. Chabod, the historical profession may well take renewed pride in Italy's post-war scholarship.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

MANNING, CLARENCE, *The Siberian Fiasco*. New York: Library Publishers, 1952, Pp. 209. \$3.50.

It is refreshing to review a book written without prejudice, objectively and well. In the third sentence of the Introduction the author states that the movement (i.e. the American Intervention in Siberia), was commenced in ignorance, continued in folly, and fortunately, by the successful withdrawal, did not end in disaster."

The author is inclined to ascribe the instructions given to Gen. Wm. C. Graves, the Commander of the American Expeditionary force, to the pen of President Wilson himself. These instructions expressed in language of foggy idealism and directing Gen. Graves to render military assistance to the rear of the westward moving Czechoslovak troops without interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, etc. were the obvious result of ignorance, as at that time there was no sovereignty of Russia and no legal government entitled to represent such sovereignty. Some of the Allies could have organized such a government, but the others prevented it, as the disorganized Russia was better suited to their aims.

Non-interference in the internal affairs of a dead state, on the territory of which they were operating the armed forces of more than half a dozen nations, was unthinkable and the idea of such non-interference could originate in the mind of a person completely ignorant of the Siberian situation.

The instructions given to Gen. Graves were "singularly unclear in their practical application of these principles" (i.e. the Wilsonian disinterestedness and idealism). The author is not an admirer of Maj. Gen. Graves' qualities "which were both, limitations and virtues. They were primarily a rigid obedience to orders and a willingness in case of a confused situation, to act only upon that portion of orders which were clear and applicable. In case of a situation in which

there was possibly an interpretation of the entire order on his own initiative, he would not act." This circumstance should always be born in mind in evaluation of the American Army's activities in Siberia during the Intervention.

The official purpose of the American Intervention in Siberia was "that of aiding the Russian people to secure for themselves those democratic liberties which, at the time, were accepted as the common heritage of the entire civilized world." But everybody who was in Siberia at that time knew well that the American troops were present there for observation of the activities of the Japanese Expeditionary Force and the author himself recognizes it. (p. 72). Unfortunately, Gen. Graves' attitude of a superior being, standing aloof of the very cause for which the forces under his command were sent to Siberia, gave the Japanese an ample opportunity to profit by the total collapse of the Russian State (p. 127).

"The Siberian expedition and the one to North Russia were both formed in a way that doomed them to failure" (p. 83).

Prof. Manning is one of the very few authors, writing on the Siberian Intervention, who recognizes the ugliness of the betrayal of Adm. Kolchak, who "was induced by General Janin to join the Czechoslovaks, leave his own trains and proceed under their protection, while Janin very ostentatiously painted the Allied flags on the windows of the Admiral's cars." When the train reached Irkutsk on December 14th Adm. Kolchak was handed over to the Social-Revolutionists with the consent of both Gen. Janin and Czech Gen Syrový, and shot on February 7th.

"When all is said" writes the author, "there still remains a mystery about the surrender of the Supreme Regent and that mystery certainly smells of some kind of treachery, some form of deal." This statement is unbiassed and one appreciates Prof. Manning's courage in making it.

The drawbacks of the book are few. One of them is the disregard to punctuation in many sentences. Some sentences are somewhat obscure (p. 102) but, in general, the book is a good, objective representation of the Siberian situation in 1918-1920, and, as such, is a valuable addition to the literature on that rather disappointing subject.

Boulder, Colorado

ALEX A. NENNSBERG

SCHWARTZ, HARRY, *Russia's Soviet Economy* New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. 592. \$6.65.

This book fills admirably its purpose to present the available facts, with interpretative comment, relating to: (1) economic developments in Russia prior to 1917; (2) economic developments there under the Soviets from 1917 to 1950, and (3) probable economic developments there through 1970, barring Soviet involvement in war.

As the title appropriately suggests primary emphasis is on developments in Russia since the establishment of the Soviet power; possibly the title may even

suggest that there will be an economy in Russia after its Soviet phase shall have ended.

The scope of the book, as a listing of chapter titles will show, is well-nigh all inclusive. The reviewer knows of no comparable recent publication. The first three of a total of fifteen chapters cover the resource background, the historical background, and the ideological background. The next ten chapters present an over-all view of economic developments under the Soviets and the details of economic planning; the organization and operation of industry; the growth of industrial production; the organization and communications; commerce, housing and services; the financial system; and labor, hired and prison. The fourteenth chapter treats foreign economic relations. The final chapter is a review and a forecast: retrospect and prospect.

The organization of the material, both as a whole and within each chapter, is praiseworthy. A good index and lists of maps, figures and statistical tables add greatly to the utility of the volume as a reference work alike for the specialist, who needs to consult data of his nature frequently, and for the dilettante who likes to have such data available quickly for theoretically frequent but actually seldom realized consultation. As a textbook or classroom aid, both teacher and student will find that the material presented more than adequately covers the essential features of Russia's past, current and probable near-future economic development.

Happily, there is frequent comparison with developments in the United States, both as concerns trends and as concerns statistics in so far as available. A feature of Soviet life is the frequent absence of absolute, as opposed to percentage, figures. The result is that considerable uncertainty attends attempts to arrive at absolute figures. Secrecy in such matters is obviously connected with the Soviet Government's military program. Because voids exist, particularly in the statistical picture, a desire may be fired to make wider and deeper research to get the wanted facts. It is to be hoped that future editions of this book will be frequent enough to keep abreast of important developments.

Some of the high spots: "The impressive production achievements of Soviet heavy industry are unmatched in those sections of the economy serving consumers, except for education and medical care, both fields directly related to production efficiency." "... the [Soviet] government put guns before butter and factories before homes, failing time and again to realize the glowing promises of improved conditions made to its people." "From the point of view of organization and objectives it [the Soviet economy] is a military feudal economy based upon industry rather than agriculture and employing twentieth century technology for military, productive, and propaganda tasks."

"The high hopes once held that the Bolshevik revolution might usher in an era of freedom and abundance have long since been destroyed. Deprived of political liberty, the Soviet masses have received neither economic liberty nor a satisfactory standard of living. Deceived by lies and cowed by the secret police, they are powerless, as the fruits of their toil are diverted to support the new

Soviet aristocracy and to maintain the largest military establishment in the world."

The Soviet Union now ranks after the United States as a military and industrial nation. "In a little more than a third of a century . . . coal output has been increased about ninefold, pig-iron production almost fivefold, steel about sixfold, petroleum more than fourfold, and electric power generated over forty-fivefold. Along with this has gone the comprehensive development of every other branch of heavy industry: machine-building, armaments, chemicals and the like." "Gains made in agriculture, though appreciable in some fields, have been of no such magnitude at those in industry."

Heavy costs have been paid for Soviet progress both material and non-material. Perhaps the greatest single item is the loss of personal freedom in a dictatorship. "The system of Soviet incentives makes it clear that personal self-interest, not idealistic enthusiasm, is the primary source of motivation for the U.S.S.R.'s citizens."

It will be difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve by 1980, or perhaps even later, United States *per capita* production in 1948.

The already substantial integration of the economies of the Soviet satellites with that of the U.S.S.R. will increase, unless present international tensions lessen. In particular Soviet-Chinese relationships are important and are likely to be one of the decisive factors of world history.

Washington, D. C.

E. L. PACKER

ADAMIC, LOUIS, *The Eagle and the Roots*. Garden City; Doubleday and Company, 1952. Pp. 531.

HOGKINSON, HARRY, *West and East of Tito*. London; Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1952. Pp. 190. 12s 6d.

ULAM, ADAM B., *Titoism and the Cominform*. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 243. \$4.00.

Throughout *The Eagle and the Roots* Mr. Adamic insists he did not go to Yugoslavia to write a book. He finally gave way before a sense of obligation to report what he considered the true story about his "old country" and produced a volume of considerable size.

He spent a good part of 1950 in Yugoslavia where he saw Tito and other Yugoslav Communist leaders a great number of times. He traveled 11,000 miles within the country, visiting factories and villages, speaking with people of nearly every class and occupation. Tito's Yugoslavia fascinated him.

Mr. Adamic was critical at the beginning of his journey but step by step his critical attitude was discarded as if it were unnecessary baggage. He was impressed by having been served dark bread with no butter at Tito's villa; witnessing his friends in high positions not having enough fuel to heat their homes in winter; a Politburo member drinking "coffee" made of chicory; and a Communist boss driving an old Chevrolet. He accepted, without comment, the outrageous statement, "We Communists in Yugoslavia respect the people. We respect human beings" (page 203).

Mr. Adamic was, of course, most impressed by Marshal Tito whose story he relates in all details including how the former metal worker loved to read Goethe and Heine. One is reminded of the stories told about the good Kaiser Franz Joseph or of Stalin's mother talking about her son—"Soso has always been a good boy." Mr. Adamic persistently searched for the real origin of Tito's rift with Stalin. He was unable to find anything new. Tito told the author that the Party itself "comes nowhere near knowing the whole story" (page 253). This, at least, should be a useful indication to many students of the Cominform-Yugoslav break not to analyze the problem solely upon the version of the Yugoslav Communist sources.

Mr. Adamic knew well his métier as reporter-novelist. He showed a remarkable ability for seeing a tree but refused to see the huge forest of the cruel injustice from which the Yugoslav people have suffered under Tito's régime. The reviewer happens to know all the people who appear in Mr. Adamic's book as heroic humanitarians. He feels that Mr. Adamic's observations are not quite so correct.

Harry Hodgkinson's book is of a different caliber and purpose than Mr. Adamic's *The Eagle and the Root. West and East of Tito* is a skillful analysis of the wider and deeper meaning of the impact of Titoism upon Stalinism and Western thought. Mr. Hodgkinson believes that Tito's successful defection and his "back to Marxism" policy have compelled Stalin to think of revising his own thinking and pattern of expansion. He considers Titoism to be a major symptom of a general crisis in Marxist communism, and interprets Stalin's article on linguistics, published in 1950, as proof of his ideological revisionism. Hodgkinson states that the Soviet Union suffers economically from the East-West standstill in trade and faces almost unsurmountable obstacles in production, especially agricultural. The extension of Soviet power over the underdeveloped areas of Eastern Europe and China is more of a liability than an asset while its policy of world revolution by imperialist, military methods has been checked by Western preparedness.

The dilemma Moscow faces is whether to go ahead with the aim of world revolution at the risk of complete disaster for communism or to co-exist with the Western world in peace. The author believes Stalin has already decided in favor of the latter. He supports this opinion, among many arguments, by an original reason: the atomic bomb would destroy his very basis of the Communist society, the sources and means of production and its back-bone, the working class. Even if Russia won the war, there would be no more opportunity to establish communism.

As Titoism has affected Stalin's policy, so it has not been without impact. Hodgkinson writes, upon Western Europe which has witnessed a trend toward social emphasis upon public affairs in today's complex society. Some Labour Party leaders have been impressed by Tito's experiment to move toward socialism without the Soviet way of totalitarian state control.

The author does not bring convincing proof to his bold concept of Stalin's readiness to reinterpret his own interpretation of Marxism. The Soviet leaders have been rather modest in the last fifteen years in their contributions to ideologi-

cal discussions. Perhaps the forthcoming Congress of the Party will throw some light on their ideological trends. He bases the evaluation of Tito's split with Moscow and his present policy on unfounded premises and inevitably, then, reaches conclusions which are by no means certain.

Historical arguments concerning the struggle of the Yugoslav people for freedom, Tito's policy during the last war, and his defiance of Stalin's exploitation of Yugoslavia are only mentioned briefly to prove the author's major case. They reveal, however, a lack of differentiation between the great acts of the national Serbian tradition (the battle of Kosovo, the Serbian struggle in World War I, and the Serbian uprising in March 1941) and Tito's non-Yugoslav treatment of the country's war and post-war problems. They also disclose a serious weakness of quoting and endorsing almost exclusively Yugoslav Communist writings, which by the way, are not supported by giving the reference sources.

Tito's opposition to Moscow and his political and economic contacts with the West have compelled the Yugoslav Communist party, according to the author, to be not only critical of Stalin's policy but also of its own past and to revise its own policy. In arts and sciences the Yugoslavs are flexible and open to Western influence. Their leaders come to London to see the British democracy at work. They give "factories to the workers." To prove that they are right and Moscow wrong they bring "new life to old aspirations deep in the heart of the socialist movement throughout Europe" (page 13).

Mr. Hodgkinson does not seem to be bothered by the moral issue that the same leaders who once professed Stalinism now pretend to have discovered the real "humanitarian" meaning of Marxism. He does not examine the decentralizing trends in the Yugoslav economy against the background of the one-party totalitarian methods of control. The author fails to take into consideration the possibility of the Yugoslav Politburo making a virtue out of a temporary necessity.

He also hopes that Titoism will spread. The developments since June 1948, however, do not justify this optimism. Anyhow, the value of Titoism spreading may be doubtful for the cause of peace and democracy.

Mr. Hodgkinson, in spite of the uncertain ground he moves over and the risky predictions he makes, has contributed to the "great debate" on Titoism.

Mr. Ulam's *Titoism and the Cominform* is a scholarly work. The author has a thesis on the origins and significance of Titoism and presents arguments to support it. He expresses himself with clarity but caution, aware of limitations imposed upon every research worker who tries to dig into the obscure backgrounds of Communist activities.

He uses the Historical Archives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, published in 1950, to trace the history of the party from its founding until 1937, without forgetting that its editor, Moša Pijade, has developed a capacity to revise historical facts in a similar fashion as his great former teacher, Josef Stalin, revised the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He reminds us that Tito was elevated to the leadership of the Yugoslav Communists, in 1937, due to his exemplary subservience to Stalin, which he continued to profess during the subsequent years and throughout the war. If anything Tito was more

Communist than his Moscow boss and there was not a shadow of nationalism in his thoughts and acts. Mr. Ulam refuses to apply to the study of Tito's war-time past the easy method of hindsight cherished by so many publicists, who are inclined to read today in Tito's statements and policy unmistakable signs of the inevitability of his break with Stalin.

When analyzing the causes of the break the author also rejects in distinction from other observers and analysts, the combined Yugoslav-Soviet version which presented the conflict as a result of ideological deviations, party mechanics, and economic divergences. He does not see Tito's defection as a consequence of any nationalist feeling but as a result of the psychology of power.

In discussing the prospect of Titoism spreading among other Communist countries Mr. Ulam warns against oversimplification and wishful thinking. He points out how different was the communization of Eastern Europe from that of Yugoslavia. He stresses the specific personal background of Tito and other Yugoslav leaders which does not characterize the Communist leaders in the satellite countries. He analyzes, though only briefly, the crisis of the Communist party in Poland and Bulgaria, and mentions the fate of the Hungarian, Rajk, to show that there were no signs of Titoism in their behavior.

In conclusion, Mr. Ulam reminds the apologists of Tito that the latter's régime continues to be Communist, both in methods and policy, and that "Titoism should be recognized for exactly what it is: a grave recurrent but not fatal disease of Communism."

There are few new facts in Mr. Ulam's book, nor is the treatment of the known facts original. But it would not be correct to judge its value from the point of view of whether he made a final discovery in Tito's heresy and its consequences. His work is to be praised for its thoroughness in research, self-restraining analysis, and logical conclusions.

(Two minor errors, for the second edition: page 82, the footnote, *Politika* is a Belgrade, not a Zagreb newspaper, and page 189 and 209, Clementis is spelled with C, not K).

University of Denver

JOSEF KORBEL

LENDL, EGON; *Die mitteleuropäische Kulturlandschaft im Umbruch der Gegenwart*, vol. II of "Schriften des Instituts für Kultur- und Sozialforschung e. V. in München." Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1951.

This small book is a useful one. After a very brief sketch of the population movements and their effects on the "cultural landscape" of Central Europe before the twentieth century, Dr. Lendl, for many years a member of the Geographical Institute of the University of Vienna, proceeds to analyse the mass migrations of the last decade and a half. In these years, and particularly since 1945, in Central Europe—which he conceives as the area east of France and west of the Soviet Union—there has taken place a vast movement of peoples which has produced in the "cultural landscape" of the area "a greater revolution and a more decisive change . . . than in all of the previous centuries." And

this movement, leaving no state of Central Europe unaffected, has been a reversal of the trend of the past 1000 years. Germans, expelled or fleeing from the Baltic countries, from the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line taken over by Poland, from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, have flooded into Germany, and particularly West Germany. Similarly, the center of gravity of the Polish population has moved westward, the loss of lands to the Soviet Union being balanced by the territories taken from Germany. Czechs and, in considerable numbers, Slovaks have occupied the districts evacuated by the "Sudeten" Germans, although the density of the population has, to some extent, fallen. Likewise the Magyar, Roumanian, and Yugoslav people have, through the emigration or destruction of the German inhabitants, acquired new lands onto which to move. All this, with its social and political implications and its immense human tragedy, is, indeed, generally known. So far as the reviewer is aware, however, all the available data are gathered here for the first time. Moreover, although on reading the book, one has the feeling that it is written inevitably from the point of view of the German cultural group, there is likewise the feeling that the author has endeavored to remain scrupulously objective in regard to the non-German elements in the picture.

In addition to providing statistical details for his account of this great movement of peoples, Dr. Lendl ably analyzes the effect which these population changes have had, and are likely to have. He shows clearly the shifting relationship between agriculture and industry, and the growth or decline of industrial centers as they have been affected by population changes, the needs and destruction of the war itself, and the political and economic decisions made since then. Thus, he sees Central Europe in the midst of a great cultural revolution, drawn into the struggle between east and west, but not itself acting as an independent and positive force. Moreover, the fact that a large part of the Central European area has been withdrawn from the sphere of German culture has reversed a condition existing for centuries. "The question, therefore, repeatedly arises, whether our old concept of Central Europe which embraces the entire area between the Vosges and the Carpathians, the Baltic and the Alps, and of which the territory of the German people was the essential nucleus from which the cultural impulses for the whole area derived, can, in the future, still have currency."

It is unfortunate that, in view of the intrinsic merits of *Die mitteleuropäische Kulturlandschaft*, it should have been written in a style which even the utmost charity would be compelled to describe as turgid. It seems more than difficult for the author to state a simple fact simply, and the sentences are inflated with a sort of jargon which tries the reader's patience. Nevertheless, the book is a solid contribution to a new and very important subject.

Wellesley College

HENRY F. SCHWARZ

BONN, M. J., *Whither Europe—Union or Partnership*. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1952. Pp. 204. \$3.75.

The major thesis of this book is expressed in the Introduction as follows:

Even the closest union of Europe is not equal to the worldwide tasks confronting her. Her nations must be encompassed within a much wider frame. This makes it possible, if not necessary, to create a much more flexible European unit. The problems to be solved are no longer purely "European"; they require multiple partnerships rather than a single union, and joint institutions rather than an overall constitution. (p. 9)

It is much safer to tie nations loosely by pacts than to constrain them within the rigid framework of a constitution... The perils threatening from outside can only be successfully met by Europe's cooperation with her Atlantic associates. She can face them without forcing developments which may imperil her from within after world peace has been secured. (p. 12)

Readers of *The Economics of Freedom* will not find Professor Bonn's contention new; but they will appreciate his illuminating analysis of the political and constitutional aspects of the problem, and they will profit from his study of historical precedents. The constitutions of the United States, the *Zollverein*, the Bismarckian *Reich*, the British Commonwealth and others are dismissed from the standpoint of whether they offer precedents for a United Europe, and the impossibility of applying a set of alien institutions is emphasized again and again.

Most of the volume is devoted to the analysis of post-war experience in drawing the European nations and the west into working cooperation. These chapters contain a compact and wise discussion of the constitution of the Marshall plan, O. E. E. C., N. A. T. O., the Schuman plan, and others, and of the political difficulties which these agencies face. The treatment of the German problem with respect to them is particularly illuminating. Since the author has for many years been participating in or observing international organizations at work, his favorable views about the present ones are cheering.

The volume is marred by a considerable number of unsubstantiated criticisms, especially of United States foreign policy, and by the frequent absence of a discussion of alternatives. In some cases his opinions seem to this reviewer of very doubtful value. Two especially deserve notice. One is that before World War II the economy of the European States was doing well by the people; the other is that the colonial imperialism of the Dutch, French, and others was far wiser than the bumptious American policy of supporting the national independence of these colonial peoples. These and other examples of conservatism on the part of the author strike this reviewer as outdated.

University of Nebraska

EUGENE N. ANDERSON

STAVRIANOS, L. S., *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity*. Chicago. Henry Regnery Company, 1952. Pp. 246. \$3.25.

In a vivid, vigorous style that bears witness to his intimacy with the subject, Professor L. S. Stavrianos tells the story of Greece during the crucial years of the Second World War and its aftermath. He discusses the outstanding characteristics of the dictatorship of General Metaxas, the Italian invasion of Greece, Greece's victory over Italian Fascism, the German invasion, and the Axis occupa-

tion that lasted three years and a half; the resistance movement, the fratricidal war of Leftists and Rightists, the British armed intervention, and the thirty-three-day battle of Athens; the Communist rebellion, the Truman Doctrine, and the final victory of democracy with American aid.

This chain of events is now well-known in the United States. What is not known is the inner story, the interplay of social and political forces within Greece. With these Professor Stavrianos is intimately acquainted because of his diligent research on the contemporary Greek scene. It would have been easy for him to give a thorough, scholarly account, well-documented and heavily annotated, using every bit of material that can be found, but he chose to write a book for the large reading public, for the American taxpayer, who is interested in Greece largely because he contributes to keep her out of the Iron Curtain. As such the book has unquestionable virtues. It is a clear and accurate presentation of the facts as well as a penetrating study of the causes. It is, moreover, an attempt at prognostication, a venture into the thorny area of "What-must-be-done."

Professor Stavrianos points out that it is America's duty and interest to give proper recognition and support to the social forces that have emerged after the crisis. The Greek people want an enlightened, incorruptible leadership that will introduce certain popular reforms that are clearly overdue. The author does not deny the fear that "a really serious and meaningful reform program . . . would cause a virtual upheaval"—a fear that may be open to question under mid-twentieth century conditions. At the same time he points out that when poverty, disillusionment, and pessimism are allowed to prevail after the defeat of the Communists, there is a danger that "if the cold war should become hot, we may discover that our ally is a government rather than a people". No one who has seen the struggle of the Greeks in the last fifteen years, a struggle that has involved enormous sacrifices and has made the masses extremely sensitive, will be likely to deny Professor Stavrianos' fear as an exaggeration. The author's figures regarding unemployment, inadequate unemployment relief, income per capita (the lowest in Europe), may lead to conclusions that are far from reassuring. It is not an exaggeration to state that Greece faces a constant threat of an extremist upheaval if the ills are not remedied.

Professor Stavrianos appreciates the beneficial results produced by America's dollars in Greece, on reconstruction projects, in spite of the ravages of civil war. Had it not been for that war, which absorbed the Greek nation's resources from 1946 to 1949, a much larger portion of the two billion dollars, spent on Greece by America and the British Commonwealth from 1944 to 1950, would have been spent on a wide variety of productive enterprises, which would have raised the standard of living.

Stavrianos' book, extremely well written, will make a great impression on those who are interested in Greece. If it does not offer a generally accepted solution of the Greek problem, it certainly will make people think and be aware of the complexity of the problem. And herein lies the great value of the book. Occasional disagreements and reservations that the informed reader may have about a number of thorny issues, evaluation of personalities, and distribution of

responsibilities, do not detract from the value of the book. Today, after reading this book, one may recall with relief that some of the much needed reforms, such as women's suffrage and a modern system of taxation, have already been introduced. With American interest in Greece continuing, more of these important reforms are under way.

Kansas City, Missouri

G. G. ARNAKIS

DE MADARIAGA, SALVADOR, *Portrait of Europe*, London: Hollis and Carter, 1952. Pp. viii, 204. 18s.

Among the welter of often ponderous discussions of ways and means to solve the European "problem" learned and worried disquisitions conclusively establishing that the old continent, long the center and power house of the entire planet, is played out; or alternatively finding grounds for hope in its future possibilities, the lighter touch is welcome for a change.

Señor de Madariaga is a thorough scholar and an industrious man. His books on the rise and fall of the Spanish American empire, his recent *Bolívar*, in addition to his other activities, attest to this. But his learning he carries with both lightness and charm, as the present little volume, verging at times on the impish, conclusively shows. Of Spanish background, with deep-rooted British associations, long connected with League of Nations work, his interest and activity in behalf of the current European Movement come from love and deep conviction to one so eminently qualified to advocate the cause of European unity.

But this unity must be sought with understanding and discrimination. America, more precisely the United States, is an extension and outgrowth of Europe. The astonishing performance of the offspring, living proof of the successful fusion of diverse strains, has raised some unexpected problems. Twice rescuer of Europe within a generation, unexpectedly catapulted into an unsought position of power, and of even less desired responsibility, Americans easily perceive the virtues, even the necessity, of European unity. But the American approach, logical fruit of the American experience, is apt to be based at times on oversimplification and on somewhat boisterous optimism. Of the validity of the ultimate goal there need be no question; but the manner of reaching it is important. That is why de Madariaga's essay is of value, for his knowledge of Europe makes him unusually sensitive to the desirable as well as to the possible.

The stress is here definitely on cultural values. The significance of Europe lies in such things as the great diversity of its peoples, the stress on quality, the high degree of consciousness of distinct individuals. Nationalism in its more modern political manifestations may have become a malignant absurdity, but the fact of national diversity goes deep. It is a reality that may not be denied, one of the most fruitful sources of the richness of Europe and of her contributions. We are here on treacherous ground. The stubborn persistence of national diversity observable in Europe is not to be denied, any more than the facility of fusion into a common mold such as that of American life. Clearly, this is a case where institutions play an important role.

Señor de Madariaga is more concerned with illustrating differences, drawing on his wide knowledge of language in which he finds deep expression of these diverse national characters. The predominance of the explosive *sp* combination for the Spaniard; the sharp *i* for the Italian; the sedate *é*, associated with the logical order, for the French; the fluid, formless, all-encompassing *schw* in German, etc. By the time the Irish are explained in terms of their being Spaniards stranded amid the discomforts of northern mists and alien English tongue, we can join the author in his smile. One wishes that he had seen fit to enlarge on the relation between English spelling and phonetics—surely a fertile field for disrespectful observations.

More seriously, the concepts of "tensions" (Anglo-French, Franco-German, German-Italian, etc.) and of "resonances" (the Irish, the Poles, the Jews) make an interesting frame in which to situate the whole portrayal of the varegated European canvas. The tensions have produced brilliant sparks, but also costly conflicts, continued indulgence in which means mortal danger; "Europe is already one body; it is not yet one consciousness" (p. 1). to the fostering of this consciousness, for Europeans themselves, to the understanding of the oneness in diversity that is Europe, for others, this is a charming contribution.

Paris, France

RENE AIBRECHT-CARRIE

MILATOVIC, MILE, *Slučaj Andrije Hebranga*, Belgrade: Kultura, 1952. Pp.266.

To the student of current Yugoslav politics this exposé of the case of Andrija Hebrang serves as an additional excursion into the known facts of Communist efforts to justify the Titoist régime and to perpetuate the mythology of the Communist state as the defender of popular interest. Evers since Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 a great deal of literature has poured forth from Belgrade aimed at exposing the Soviet conspiracy against the Tito régime and in this plot Hebrang emerged as one of the leading characters. This exposé, authored by the official investigator in the Hebrang case, reveals that part of the investigation (heretofore less publicized) which links the former member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CC of the CPY) with various pro-Ustashi activities. The facts which come more clearly into the open reveal that during his period of detention by the Ustashis, (February-September 1942) Hebrang, (1) informed the Ustashi police about the scope and nature of Partizan and CPY activities, (2) disclosed the names of various members of the CC,CP of Croatia, (3) authored a series of anonymous articles in Ustashi publications exposing Communist tactics and strategy, (4) maintained contact with the Ustashi secret service after his release in September 1942, and so forth. It appears that thereby Hebrang hoped to save his life and prepare for any political eventuality by playing both sides of the fence. It is ironic that the first warning of his double dealings should have come from Soviet quarters, while the fact that his connections with the Ustashis were long known to the CC of the CPY casts new doubts on its general judgement in permitting Hebrang to wield primary influence in the vital nerve center of the Communist

dictatorship—the administration of the Five Year Plan. Hebrang, who owed his fall from power to treason in favor of the Soviet Union is, according to Milatović as guilty of "collaboration" with the Ustashis, and of having led a Croat chauvinist factional struggle within the Communist leadership of Yugoslavia.

The book, quite inadvertently, offers great insight into the investigational procedures of the Titoist security agencies. Americans, sensitive to a democratic tradition of judicial procedure (especially in matters of evidence, testimony and the rights of defendants), will most likely be struck by the tactics of this investigation which presuppose the guilt of the defendant and thence proceed to prove its claim by ruthless police methods. There is no need to stress the duplicity and lack of character in Hebrang. What is more essential is that one cannot help being struck by the significance of the new twist in the Hebrang case. The total lack of reference to Hebrang's Soviet connections is unusual, to say the least, and one must remain alert to the possibility that this change in emphasis may have something to do with a new trend of thought among Yugoslav Communists, a speculation not as to the past nature of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift, but, more ominously, as to its possibilities for the future.

Princeton, N. J.

IVO J. LEDERER

TOSCANO, MARIO, *Le origini del Patto d'Acciaio*, Biblioteca della "Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali" in Firenze. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1948. Pp. 207. L. 800.

TOSCANO, MARIO, *L'Italia e gli Accordi tedesco-sovietici dell'Agosto 1939*, Biblioteca della "Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali" in Firenze, Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1952. Pp. 96. L. 500.

These two studies on the origins of the so-called Pact of Steel and on the position and function of Italy in the Nazi-Soviet negotiations of 1939 are inter-related chapters of a single story: the pathetic chronicle of Fascist diplomacy, or, more precisely, of its directors, in its final stages. At this moment of writing Professor Toscano has further implemented this chronicle with an illuminating article on Italo-German military conversations on the eve of the War (*Revista Storica Italiana*, LXIV, iii, 336-382). From the documentary point of view these studies are as complete as the present stage of investigation permits and, at least in the case of the work on Italy and the Nazi-Soviet negotiations, Toscano can state that he has found "no lacuna" in his documentation and that he believes he has consulted "all extant material" (*L'Italia e gli Accordi*, p. 7, n. 3). As one of the editors of the now issuing *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Toscano has had access to reserved archival material and it is his utilization of the telegraphic correspondence between Palazzo Chigi (Ciano) and the Italian Embassies in Moscow (Rosso), Berlin (Attolico), Paris (Guariglia), London (Grandi), and Tokyo (Auriti) that constitutes the real basis and novelty of his revealing studies.

One of the most brilliant aspects of Toscano's reconstruction in his unobtrusive demonstration of Ciano's and Mussolini's "blind spots," against all the evidence at their disposal, in reference to the meaning and significance of par-

ticular links in the diplomatic chain they were helping to forge. Toscano's meticulous, systematic, "scientific" reconstruction of Fascist-Nazi and Nazi-Soviet diplomacy is thus, among other things, an impressive analysis of the meeting and clash of uncertain diplomatic skill on the Fascist side with organic techniques of diplomatic power on the Nazi-Soviet side. For, as late as 1939, the major part of Italian diplomats abroad were no Fascist dilettanti: Rosso, Attolico, Guariglia, Auriti were able professionals who knew their diplomatic business. Their real worth, however, lay less in their individual capacity as such than in the evaluation of their collective work and recommendations. It was at Palazzo Chigi and Palazzo Venezia that their value could be measured and exploited for the realistic formulation and constructive guidance of Italian foreign policy. But neither Ciano nor Mussolini made the best of those resources (on the Ciano-Mussolini divergence of views Toscano makes some interesting comments in *Le origini*, pp. 163-64). After the fall of Litvinov, the crucial listening-post was Moscow, or rather, the Italian diplomatic wire to Berlin was activated only after passing through Moscow. Attolico's dispatches derived from Ribbentrop who was reticent on particulars and silent on essentials, while Rosso's information derived from von Schulenburg who was merely cautious on details and wary on ultimate aims. The Ciano-Mussolini failure to appreciate immediately and properly this shift of the Italian diplomatic center of gravity from Berlin to Moscow was a technical blunder of the first magnitude and in no small sense responsible for the genuine but otherwise unnecessary shock and surprise of August 23, 1939, in Rome (*Le origini*, pp. 153, 158-59; *L'Italia e gli Accordi*, pp. 22-28, 49, 57, 73, 86).

The disparity in technical-diplomatic capacity was perhaps merely a function of the deeper contradictions and latent conflict inherent in the real substance of the Nazi-Fascist alliance. Ideology apart, but basically even in this (*Le origini*, pp. 144, 150; *L'Italia e gli Accordi*, pp. 22, 41), there was not now and there never had been a community of interest, a fundamental agreement on aims, a real identity of ultimate vision between Mussolini and Hitler, Italy and Germany. The Axis had been born almost by accident without any true solidarity of views and it had thrived in anomalous circumstances amidst confusion of ends and equivocation. Mutual faith had never nurtured it (*Le origini*, pp. 91-95). The original idea of the *military* alliance and the course of subsequent negotiations revealed a glaringly progressive accentuation of fundamental divergence, particularly as gradually the Japanese retraced their steps in a complete circle, from their initiative in sponsoring it to their definite refusal to join in it on April 24, 1939 (dispatch from Attolico to Ciano, April 25, in *Le origini*, p. 125). This Japanese realism, involving a practical repudiation of Oshima's and Shiratori's moral commitment to the Axis and the clearcut stand taken by Baron Hiranuma on May 4 might have constituted one of the best gratuitous lessons in Machiavellian politics for the man who claimed the Florentine as a precursor and who had written a thesis on his philosophy. On the contrary, it rather throws into greater relief Mussolini's pathetic policy of spite and his temperamental incapacity to pursue or adopt realism in his dangerous diplomatic game. Mussolini's outburst to Ciano as to the reason for not changing course ("*Noi non possiamo cambiare politica*

perchè non siamo delle p—," Le origini, p. 89) is a true measure of the fantastic delusions inspiring his actions.

There was worse too. Neither Ciano nor Mussolini comprehended the deep significance of, and intimate connection between, Tokyo's refusal to join in a tripartite military alliance except on the Japanese's own terms, the *Auswärtiges Amt's* intensive concentration on the line to Moscow, and Kremlin's cautious stand and oracular responses to Schulenburg's and Rosso's interested inquiries. These were all aspects of the same phenomenon: the pursuit of brutal realism by each of these Powers. Almost simultaneously, on May 4-5, 1939, Ciano was receiving Auriti's dispatch from Tokyo on Hiranpuma's declaration and Rosso's dispatches from Moscow diligently reporting and intelligently interpreting Litvinov's retirement (*L'Italia e gli Accordi*, pp. 23-27; *Le origini*, pp. 139-140). What was transpiring was perhaps held together only by the tenuous thread of coincidence, but on the basis of the facts received at Palazzo Chigi a connection could have been established, a series of alternative conclusions drawn. Not only was this completely missed, but on that same May 4 Mussolini prepared the memorandum which was to serve as Ciano's directive in his colloquy with Ribbentrop at Milan on May 6-7, *as if nothing had happened in Moscow and Tokyo and as if Rosso and Auriti had not reported*. Professor Toscano himself, in his analysis, might have underscored the critical importance of this substantial blunder.

But it was perhaps already later than one might like to believe, even at Milan. Two weeks later, on May 22, at Berlin, Ciano affixed his signature to a German document ("diplomatic dynamite," he called it) he had not really contributed to frame in its actual form and thus helped to nail his country to a military compact whose ultimate significance eluded him, his father-in-law, and all Italians. The tragic irony of this Fascist diplomacy of disaster is implicit in Toscano's lucid presentation of the facts. For the Germans the Pact of Steel was merely a part of an organic diplomatic offensive whose most valuable points lay in Moscow and Tokyo (*Le origini*, pp. 68, 161). For the Fascist leaders the Pact was identical with the whole of their diplomatic resources, but they were never sure as to what real interests it might ultimately serve for Italy. Mussolini himself had first suggested a limited Axis rapprochement with Soviet Russia (*L'Italia e gli Accordi*, p. 22), but had soon been left behind by Hitler's all-out policy of Nazi-Soviet reconciliation. While Mussolini had gradually become a hopeless prisoner of his own illusions, fears, and uncertainties, Hitler had gained in self-assurance and decision. Unaware that the cast was irrevocably cast by Hitler *the day after* the signature of the pact, a week later, on May 30, Mussolini dispatched General Cavallero to Berlin with a Memorandum reiterating the Italian need of a three-year peace (*Le origini*, pp. 183, 186-89). At the Salzburg meeting, August 11-13, 1939, the Nazi leaders' partial duplicity and Ciano's partial stupidity sealed the last chance for an Italo-German clarification of fundamental aims (*L'Italia e gli Accordi*, pp. 75-78). To the very end the contradictions persisted, the latent conflict remained, through the strange night of August 23 in Moscow and Italy's long night through war to the Liberation.

New York University

A. WILLIAM SALOMONE

MANNING, CLARENCE A., *The Forgotten Republics*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 264.

This book fills an important gap. The "Forgotten Republics" of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their fate during the second World War definitely need re-emphasizing, if only to illustrate the aptitude of man's memory for suppressing inconvenient and ominous facts. Although the forcible absorption of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union has never been recognized by the United States, few recent maps distinguish them as separate units. Even passing references to them have become increasingly rare. Widely read history books, including even some used in universities—e.g. F. L. Schuman's *Soviet Policy at Home and Abroad*—still describe the circumstances of their annexation by the U.S.S.R. in a way which has little in common with the actual facts of the case, and misrepresent the situation in these countries 'before the war. The complex drama of their incessant struggles with foreign oppressors throughout the centuries, the tenacity of their attempts to retain and develop national cultures, the surprising, and in some respects almost unparalleled, success which these attempts achieved during the brief inter-war period of independence, and the sinister story of the crushing of the three states during the war years badly needed competent treatment for readers on this continent. The problem of small nations is perhaps nowhere exemplified in a more typical form than in the case of the Baltic nations, completely peace-loving and interested exclusively in the fostering of civilization and prosperity whenever they were able to wrest a chance from circumstances. Professor Manning's book presents the facts in an objective but vivid fashion, starting with prehistory and carrying the account to the present period of genocidal oppression under Soviet rule. In spite of the numerous differences in the development of the three countries, he has succeeded in describing their history as a connected whole, emphatically bringing out the essential features and linking them into an impressive historical panorama. The individual characteristics of each country are clearly delineated, but the international factors affecting the entire area are never neglected. Fairness and considerable breadth of perspective characterize the presentation throughout. The result is an informative, readable, and indeed often gripping book.

More emphasis might perhaps have been placed on the cultural evolution of the three countries, especially in recent times. The obstacles deliberately and systematically put in its way by the alien rulers are graphically depicted, but what emerges much less clearly is the success with which these almost insuperable handicaps were overcome, putting Estonia and Latvia ahead of almost all European countries as regards literacy and intensity of literary production. This is important, since it illustrates the power of the cultural urge, often sweeping far in advance of economic and political conditions in this area. Even in their present impoverished existence, the Baltic refugees in the Western World continue their cultural activities with an unflagging, purposeful energy which needs to be seen to be believed. As for the political picture, an essential correction has to be made in respect to the Soviet "elections" on July 14 and 15, 1940. It does not appear

from Professor Manning's description how utterly falsified the results were. The totals for the Lithuanian elections were inadvertently released to the Western Communist Press before the votes had been collected. Detailed accounts of the proceedings in Estonia are available in published reports by the present writer and others. Even by applying the most ruthless pressure, the Soviets were far from obtaining from the Baltic peoples the kind of formal endorsement of their policies which they proclaimed to the world. Intimidation alone was insufficient: they had to resort to forgery.

University of Florida

ANTS ORAS

ZAVALANI, T., *How Strong is Russia, Propaganda and Reality of the Soviet Five Year Plans*, New York: Praeger, 1952. Pp. 244. \$4.00.

The question—how strong is Russia—is one of the decisive issues confronting the Western world today. There is little, if any, doubt that this issue is most intimately connected with the appraisal of the strengths and the weaknesses of the particular form of economic organization, set up in Soviet Union and commonly known as Soviet Planning. After all, both the military might and the gangster-diplomacy of the Kremlin, are made possible, financially and technically, by the presence of a veritable economic machine, concentrating in the hands of Soviet leaders enormous industrial, labor, agricultural and financial resources. Planning of materials, food, finances and labor is an important prerequisite of planning of armaments as well as planning of cold wars and other acts of aggression.

Mr. Zavalani—an Albanian who has spent five years in the Soviet Union studying at Leningrad, and later working at the "International" Agrarian Institute in Moscow before quitting the Cominform in 1932—has set himself the task of evaluating the performance of the Soviet economic organization.

The writer deals in consecutive chapters with the first, the second, the third, and fourth (post-war) five year plans, as well as with the war-time planning in Soviet economy. His chief contribution appears to lie in drawing our attention to the enormous chasm, which separates vociferous Soviet claims as to the performance of their economic machine, all too frequently reiterated by uncritical writers in the West; and the sombre reality of economic life in Soviet Union which, though a commonplace to Soviet citizens, has been brushed aside as "propaganda" by some writers of the unduly optimistic first post-war years. Mr. Zavalani shows the enormous chaos and the endless muddle permeating what is claimed to be a scientifically organized economy, and draws attention to numerous weaknesses in its performance. It may be of some interest to point out that recently no lesser Soviet authority than M. Malenkov has endorsed, though unwittingly, many of Zavalani's statements in his report to the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party held in Moscow this October.

Nevertheless, it ought to be observed that in spite of all this chaos in production, which makes Soviet Planning a very imperfect tool indeed as far as peace-time economic life is concerned, Soviet financial planning makes it

possible to divert a great portion of available resources to serving the military might of the Kremlin, and thus constitutes a serious threat to world peace. The fact that in the Soviet Union a greater proportion of steel and other strategic materials, however inefficiently produced, is diverted from civilian to military use than in most other countries, should not be overlooked. At the same time, there is little doubt that the Great Chaos, so eloquently described by Mr. Zavalani, may in time of war—expand, and may ultimately reduce the Soviet war-making potential **very considerably indeed.**

Soviet economic strength appears thus to harbor the seeds of its ultimate decline under prolonged war-time stress and difficulties.

The University of British Columbia

H. E. RONIMOIS

GLUCKSTEIN, YGAEL, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 333. \$4.50.

STOWE, LELAND, *Conquest by Terror*, New York: Random House, 1952. Pp. 300. \$3.50.

SCHMIDT, DANA ADAMS, *Anatomy of a Satellite*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Pp. 512. \$5.00.

These three books have an almost identical main purpose: to present to the Anglo-Saxon reader a reasoned and documented picture of what has happened to the Central European countries since they came under Soviet Russian domination. The temper differs in the three books, as does the emphasis and focus, but the conclusion reached by the three authors is substantially the same.

Mr. Gluckstein makes no claim to first hand knowledge, though he quite well may have had it. He professes simply to have used official and published material available to any serious student of the area. The book is divided into three parts, economic events and plans, political life in the captive states, and a close examination of Tito's break with Moscow. It cannot be said the author is afraid of statistics. He uses them carefully and effectively. He shows that the economic transformation imposed upon these states is intended to improve Russia's economy at the cost of the economic and industrial superiority these countries have enjoyed heretofore. It is not difficult to show that the economic plans brought forth by economic experts in each of the satellite states fit into an over-all plan so neatly as to make it ludicrously sure that they all excogitated in one central office. He presents Titoism in rather pessimistic colors, emphasizing the point that Tito's rejection of Moscow Stalinism has not prevented him from utilizing in Yugoslavia almost all the armory of Stalin's techniques. Mr. Gluckstein is persuaded that this empire, founded on force and fraud, cannot endure, and will fall of its own unwieldiness and simply because of its violation of historical realities. There is much and carefully amassed data in the book.

Mr. Stowe has known Eastern Europe for many years, as a professional journalist and war correspondent. He writes, thus, on a rare background of long personal observation. He is deeply impressed by the determined utilization by

Soviet leadership of the great industrial and manpower potential of the states Russia has taken over. He examines this mobilization from every possible point of view, material and psychological, in religion, art, athletics, education, as well as the area of economics and war preparations. He has much to say of the planned discipline and control of the mind of the populace, the ruthless police measures, the perversion of law and its organs to enable the state to annihilate the individual. He documents abundantly this plan and its implementation, though as to the latter, at times, he fails to grasp the capacities of the system to produce technicians. When he asserts (p. 164) that "Eastern Europe simply does not possess more than a small fraction of the technological army which it required by such huge and accelerated industrialization," he has either forgotten or failed to comprehend the simple fact of the vast increase in theoretical and technological training that has been put into effect. It is poor policy to underestimate the capacity of a determined and powerful adversary. Like Gluckstein, he devotes much attention to the Communist conquest of the churches, but does not state so clearly the important point that Moscow has undergone a change of conviction as to the nature and potential of religion. Recognizing that religion is here to stay, Moscow now prefers to use it instead of trying to crush it. The effect on religion, obviously, would be the same.

Mr. Schmidt's work differs from the other two in that it is an account of a single one of the satellites, Czechoslovakia, over a shorter period of time, since the February 1948 coup. Mr. Schmidt was *New York Times* correspondent in Prague from April 1949 to May 31, 1950, when he left Czechoslovakia hastily, slightly in advance of uncomfortable conclusions with the Czech branch of the MVD. In that short year he collected a wealth of impressions and factual data concerning the functioning of aggressively repressive Communism in a country once noted for its love of liberty. His survey of daily life among the people, the law and its perversions, education, the press, the bureaucracy, religion, letters, theatre and the arts, collectivization and the peasant, and what resistance may be noticeable, is vivid and, so far as our best information goes, accurate. He provides some background, where a few though not significant factual slips intrude, and gives a rapid account of the February 1948 coup and Beneš' part in it. He thinks this whole tragedy could have been avoided if Western judgment had been better in 1945—a conclusion that may be true but not very useful at this late date.

On p. 93 the reader gets the impression that Ambassador Steinhardt initiated the simultaneous withdrawal of American and Russian troops from the Republic. That impression would be incorrect. The initiative came from Beneš who naturally did not want Czechoslovakia to be an occupied country. Mr. Steinhardt was reluctant to accept the suggestion, and in fact the Soviet ambassador announced the withdrawal of Russian troops before Mr. Steinhardt informed Beneš of American withdrawal. The account of the currency reform in the fall of 1945 is not quite correct. The ratio of "three units of old money to one of the new" is wrong. Above certain limits, determined by the individual's pre-1939 capital holdings, there was a 100% tax. It may have worked out as virtual confiscation.

The heavy capital levy came later. But these details and others of the same sort do not affect the great importance of this case study of Communism in action. The description of the grim and hopeless realities of life under the hammer and sickle and the brutal perversion of all time-honored concepts of justice, truth, decency and freedom, leaves no room for doubt that western liberal culture is facing its most crucial struggle for survival. It is seldom that I am moved to say of a book that it should be "required reading" for the literate and thinking public, but I am quite prepared to say just that of these three extremely important books

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SHORTER NOTICES

ROESSLER, HELLMUTH and GUENTHER, FRANZ edd., *Biographisches Wörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte*, Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1952. Lieferungen 1-4 of projected 8; pp. 1-480.

The first four fascicles of this biographical dictionary of German history have appeared within a matter of months. The subsequent four fascicles are promised within another three or four month period. The completeness with which the dictionary was organized makes this prompt delivery possible.

The editors (who drafted Professor Willy Hoppe as an associate) have limited their work to political history, thus making the usefulness of their biographies greater because of added space to each one of the *ca.* 2000 names to be covered. A maximum of abbreviation consistent with reasonable comprehension is intended to allow for additional text. Such an undertaking must be judged from its timeliness, its solidity, its judicious proportion, its comprehensiveness. Its timeliness is obvious, as German education and scholarship is reentering a period of freedom and hoped for objectivity. The *Handbücher* of the twenties are quite out of date, and German scholarship that survived the Hitler era is anxious to regain world respect. As to its solidity, it is only fair to say, from a sampling of controversial biographies, that the facts appear to be well presented. One should not, for example, expect a pupil of von Srbik (Rössler) to belittle the character or performance of Frederick II of Prussia. All of the longer articles and most of the shorter have a brief bibliography of the best and most recently published sources or biographies of the subject. Fifty pages in the first *Hef*t are thoughtfully devoted to several complete listings of all the rubrics that are to come, to tables of abbreviations and a breakdown of the subjects by periods, and geographical origin and *Beruf*.

Great care has been exercised to attain a balanced proportion of subject, both as to the period from which chosen and their precise profession. This must have demand much thought and discussion. The results seem eminently successful. For example, of *ca.* 2000 subjects 105 are from the Hohenstaufen period, 167 from the later Middle Ages, 111 from the period of Frederick the Great, 256 from the Bismarck period, 154 from the period of William II and 91 from the Weimar Republic. Statesmen are the most numerous as to *Fach*, with 537, Scientists (41), industrialists (30) the least numerous. *Lacunae* as to subjects do not immediately appear. If the remaining four *Hefte* are on the same level, it will be an extremely valuable tool for the European historian.

All things considered the editors are to be felicitated upon the success of their arduous enterprise. It would be difficult to conceive of a more useful single volume encyclopedia of national biography.

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S. HARRISON THOMSON

ROTH, CECIL, *Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfield*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 178. \$3.75.

Every since the appearance of Monopenny and Buckle's monumental six-volume biography (1910-1920), there has been a constantly increasing flood of studies of Benjamin Disraeli. Some are solid, substantial contributions; some

rather flippant excursions into his social and amorous affairs; and, others, principally innumerable "theses," have examined in minute detail every aspect of his public affairs. All of this vast literature attempts to present some explanation for that fascinating, romantic, and complicated personality who dominated all aspects of English affairs for over half a century, in that great period of Victorian culture, expansion, and imperialism.

Cecil Roth's *Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfield*, is not just another addition to this expanding list. Rather, Mr. Roth's "object is to sketch his personality, to indicate the Jewish element in his background, and to elucidate how far, is at all, this affected his career, his outlook and his policies."

Mr. Roth has done the job well. His volume is a gem of condensation—a well-written survey of Disraeli's amazing career, ideas, policies, and relations with Queen Victoria. Mr. Roth's clear, concise, comments on Disraeli's novels, showing their historical importance and literary value, are especially needed in this day of unnecessary criticism of the literary significance of many other minor nineteenth century writers. And this clear appraisal serves a good purpose, for the fashion has been recently to dismiss Disraeli's intellectual accomplishments by saying that neither his novels nor his policy have stood the test of time. So able is Mr. Roth's effort that one does not object to his repeating many of the old stories, re-enacting the old scenes or re-telling the old clichés.

In this short notice, a few conclusions may be indicated. The real significance of the Canal shares was that England's interest in the Mediterranean was restored after a lapse of some fifty years. Disraeli's Judeophile sympathies are adequately discussed and presented. Such tendencies may have been evident as numerous quotations and citations from his writings prove. However, they were entirely realistic and did not affect his foreign policy, which was founded solely on his interpretation of the interests of England.

University of Colorado

JAMES G. ALLEN

MITRANY, DAVID, *Marx against the Peasant. A study in social dogmatism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951. Pp. xvi, 301. \$4.50.

For Marx, the class of the peasants (small farmers) was doomed. Small production was, in his opinion, always less efficient than large scale production. Therefore, the peasants, as a class had to be demolished by the implacable play of social forces conducive to the polarization of capitalist society into two antagonistic groups, the owners of the means of production (including the landlords) and the destitute masses of the workingmen. The peasants, as persons, not as a social class, could reach the state of moderate happiness only in the socialist society of the future.

Marxism is a doctrine engendered by the peculiarities of industrial society in the state of immaturity. By irony of fate, this doctrine became dominant in a region which was mainly agrarian and, more specifically, peasant, and this at a time when, in the place of its origin, industrial society had achieved maturity and overcome its childhood sicknesses.

Hence the conflict carefully studied by D. Mitraný. Being himself a Rumanian, he is well versed in the peasant ideology of the Danubian and Balkan countries, in addition to the Russian populism well known from many sources.

He formulates a particular peasant ideology, neither individualistic nor collectivistic. Preserving family farming, it would integrate it with various forms of cooperation and supplement it with new possibilities of earning a livelihood within the village.

But the Marxian conquerors of the peasant lands could never depart from their dogmatism. They had to impose in the village schemes of their own preparing the final destruction of the peasant way of life. Of course, the peasants resisted, passively, sometimes actively. The struggle has been long and manifold, as to tempo and means. It is lucidly presented in the book under review which begins by giving a survey of the ideological conflict, continues by narrating the Marxian revolution in the Russian village—this is the weakest part of the book—and then describes the agrarian reforms and the dogmatic struggles around them, between the two world wars, of course outside of Russia. It finishes by demonstrating that the dogmatic attitude of the Marxian conquerors could not but engender dictatorship. In a short "Epilogue" the author emphasizes that Communism has come to power only where by all Marxian tests it was least expected and that the Marxian revolutions have been successful only so far as they deviated from orthodox Marxism.

There are copious notes containing excerpts from many works not so easily accessible, and an extensive bibliography.

Fordham University

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Nationalism in the Middle East. Washington D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1952. Pp. 68. \$1.00.

The countries of the Middle East lie in a great strategic crescent, joining Europe, Asia, and Africa. Historically, and especially in modern times, this vast area has been the field of classic international rivalries.

Three new forces, in this area, are now evident—Nationalism, Soviet Russia, and Petroleum. These new factors are so significant that their interplay will, perforce, affect the entire course of world affairs; they are of particular interest to the United States.

The Middle East Institute has made an important contribution to an understanding one of these forces by the publication of *Nationalism in the Middle East*. This significant pamphlet consists of seven papers delivered at the Sixth Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs in March, 1952.

Space does not permit even a brief summary of these timely articles, prepared by eminent authorities. Reference must be made to T. Cuyler Young's paper on "Nationalism in Iran," because his survey supports the generally accepted idea that nationalism in contemporary Iran is so deeply rooted that not even the British, with their centuries of experience in the eastern countries can check it. This survey gives real significance to Dr. Mosaddegh's statement, before the final session of the International Court of Justice, on June 23, that oil nationalization will not "disappear with me."

Nationalism in the Middle East is a valuable pamphlet, essential to all who wish to understand, and appreciate, one of the basic forces now shaping events in the Middle East of contemporary times.

University of Colorado

JAMES G. ALLEN

EINAUDI, MARIO and GOGUEL, FRANÇOIS, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France* Notre Dame: Indiana, 1952. Pp. viii, 229.

The two studies by Professors Einaudi and Goguel deal with a problem of high importance in recent European History: the ascent to power of Christian Democracy in Italy and France after the collapse of the totalitarian régimes in these countries. Both these studies are carefully done and include a competent bibliography on a topic on which little scholarly research has been done so far. The essay on Italy emphasizes the juridical aspect while the one on France gives more of the historical background and also presents the reader with the portraits of the leaders of the French *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*.

The efforts of the French and Italian Christian Democrats towards the reconstruction of their countries are only a part of a broader European problem, as parties of similar outlook have taken the leadership also in other countries such as Germany, Austria and Belgium after World War II. Of much interest are the chapters in the volume of Einaudi-Goguel dealing with the connections between these groups and the Resistance Movement during the war. The common ethico-religious background of those sections which did not adhere to the Communist creed, comes out impressively. The relations between the Christian Democrats and the Catholic church are of a peculiar structure in Italy as well as in France largely as a result of the antecedent history of these two groups.

The political success of the two parties provides an interesting parallel: the Christian Democrats in Italy have been backed up by the nation for the whole of the period under treatment in the volume (up to the middle of 1951) while in France the MRP saw the number of the votes accorded to it drastically reduced largely due to the founding of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* by General de Gaulle in 1947. However, Professor Goguel concludes that "numerically weakened, the MRP is politically reinforced by the greater homogeneity of its electoral body" (p. 187).

Both authors feel that the two parties which they discuss have done well, especially in the field of political thought; Professor Einaudi points to some errors the Christian Democrats made in the use of power in Italy; he certainly can not be accused of lacking in moderation when he states: "in the small beginnings of land reform so far achieved, many people rightly see the real promise of large scale future developments." (p. 65)

Catholic University of America

FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

VUKMANOVIC, SVETOZAR, *Il Partito Comunista Greco e La Lotta di Liberazione Nazionale*. Milan: A. Piazza, 1951. Pp. 169. L. 250.

This brief volume might have been a genuine contribution to our knowledge concerning the growth, development, and decline of the Greek Communist Party during the period of 1940-1949, especially. It could have told us much concerning the origins of EAM/ELAS in September 1941, and Greek guerrilla warfare against the Nazis and the Fascists, when they were in occupation of Greece. It could have provided detailed knowledge of the liaison between EAM/ELAS and the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement—knowledge which would be extremely interesting and even important. Finally, it could have thrown much light on the Greek guerrilla warfare in the post-war years, 1946-1947 and the external

assistance received, at one time or another, from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (1946-1948). It could have told us these things because of the very important place which Vukmanovič-Tempo played as a major liaison factor between the Yugoslav and the Greek Communist movement.

But the fact is that the volume tells us very little, indeed, about these interesting matters. Instead it merely tells us that the Greek Communist Party failed because it violated the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninism, because it failed to establish a broad base among the Greek masses, whether in the cities or in the countryside, and because it counted largely on foreign assistance, principally from the Soviet Union, of course, to win the struggle in Greece for it. Students of the problem would modify these inferences considerably, of course. The volume suffers much from the repetition of the usual communist jargon. The book does have importance, however, because it throws light on the thinking of some Yugoslav leaders today with regard to what happened in Greece.

Arlington, Virginia

HARRY N. HOWARD

PEROUTKA, FERDINAND, *Projevy k domovu*. Paris: Editions Sokolova, 1952. Pp. 160

This publication of 23 Czech broadcasts by Peroutka over the Radio Free Europe from May 1, to December 30, 1951 is of some significance. Mr. Peroutka was, before 1939 and from 1945 to 1948, the leading liberal publicist of Czechoslovakia, and has, since escaping to the west, been active in the polemic against the communist dictatorship in his native land. His approach is to two Czech instincts: for political and historical truth which he constantly shows the communist régime to be violating, and to natural Czech resentment at having their hard won standard of living lowered by their present rulers to fatten their parasitic host, Soviet Russia. If he has been heard, over the jamming of the Munich air waves, his words can have given some comfort. It may reassure the Czechs, for instance, to hear that the negroes are not treated as their Communist press tells them they are, or to be told again that October 28 has no ascertainable connection with the glorious October Revolution, but just how far the reassurance can have any moral or social effect, we cannot know. Peroutka writes with verve, alternately bitter and ironical. He is able to find a good deal of material with which to work in the Czechoslovak Communist press.

University of Colorado

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PALTANE A, POMPILIUS and CONSTANTIN, ARSENIE, edd., *L'Almanach des Emigrés Roumains pour l'année 1952*. Paris: Collection "Langage et âme roumains," (39, rue Delambre, Paris XIV) 1952. Pp. 136, (mimeographed). Fr. 2000.

This *Almanach* is intended to be used with its Roumanian original, *Almanachul Pribegeilor Români pe anul 1952*, which, published contemporaneously, contained 350 pages. The editor's plan for the Roumanian edition was to provide for emigré Roumanians a combined anthology of extracts from speeches and writings of national heroes and leaders, a calendar of notable events in Roumanian history, tributes to Roumania from friendly foreigners, a chronology of important recent events in and outside of Roumania, and addresses of leading Roumanian

exiles, organizations and publications, in France and throughout the free world. The French edition is much shorter. Many of the longer extracts are only listed, and others abstracted. It is difficult for one who is not an exile to realize how tragic it is to be cut off from one's own land, without some bond of association with one's native soil and all the atmosphere that makes "home." This *Almanach* must be a great solace to many Roumanians. It is furthermore of great informative value to all those interested in the plight of this harrassed people.

University of Colorado

T.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J., *The World and the West*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. 99. \$2.00.

The title of this book is the theme of the Reith Lectures in 1952 over B.B.C. The first chapter is entitled "Russia and the West." The other five lectures go rather far afield, considering the relations of the West with Islam. India, the Far East and a reassessment of this complex of meetings as "The Psychology of Encounters." Only the first, "Russia and the West" is of particular interest here. Mr. Toynbee's point seems to be that Russia has, historically, as much, perhaps more, reason to be fearful of the West's intentions towards her as the West is of Russia. The West, through its pre-Imperial and imperialist centuries, has certainly grasped whole continents and conquered peaceful peoples. Naturally, in a lecture intended for popular consumption, generalizations, to illuminate a contrast or a comparison, will be set forth. But at several points, it would appear Mr. Toynbee has made things a little too simple. It is, for instance, difficult for a precise historian to use the term "Russia" for the Middle Ages. To speak of the "Polish" invasion of Moscow in 1610 in the same breath with 1812, 1941, or, reversely, the Russian invasion of the West in 1945, is quite misleading. Again, to speak of Russia's western neighbors who 'lopped off' the "western fringes of the Western world in White Russia and in the western half of the Ukraine" in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is to disregard almost completely the real nature of these territorial changes. To speak of Russia's 1945 'recapture' of territories taken from her, apparently including the Baltic lands, is to assume that they had really been Russian. The cold fact is that these areas have been passionately anti-"Russian" for almost all of their historical experience. Simplification for purposes of elucidation of issues can get so simple as to modify facts a little too much.

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